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MEASUREMENT AND MODELS IN THE STUDY OF STABILITY

By STEN SPARRE NILSON

I

THE problem of stability in politics can be viewed from various angles. One possible approach is to regard a number of power units at different points of time and note if any change in their relationship has occurred. This raises the question about measuring political power; and some scholars will doubt the advisability of asking such a question. Hedley Bull argues that political science is in danger of being "distorted and impoverished by a fetish for measurement."[1] He favors a return to the classical tradition, and some of his arguments are certainly persuasive.

In this particular case, however, one can scarcely say that the search for yardsticks is at variance with the classical approach. Aristotle himself was concerned with problems of measurement in the study of stability, when he wrote in the eleventh chapter of the fourth book of his *Politics*:

> In all states there may be distinguished three parts of the citizen-body: the very rich, the very poor, and those who are between them and form the mean. . . . The members of the middle class enjoy the greatest security. They do not, like the poor, covet the goods of others; nor do others covet their possessions, as the poor covet those of the rich. Neither plotting against others, nor plotted against themselves, they live in freedom from danger. . . . Those states can best be carried on wherein there is a large middle class—large enough, if possible, to be stronger than both the other classes, but at any rate large enough to be stronger than either of them singly; for in that case its addition to either will suffice to turn the scale, and will prevent either of the opposing extremes from becoming dominant. . . . Generally, the reason why democracies are more secure and more permanent than oligarchies is the character of their middle class, which is more numerous and is allowed a larger share in the government, than it is in oligarchies. When

[1] "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 372.

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democracies have no middle class, and the poor are greatly superior in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end.

Aristotle is clearly talking about political stability in the sense of a lack of change over a period of time. States that are carried on, that are permanent, he opposes to states that soon come to an end. And he wants to ascertain the conditions that make for such stability, believing that they can be expressed in quantitative form by a consideration of the relative wealth of citizens and of the number of citizens belonging to different classes.

We are presented here with a theoretical scheme set up by the founder of our science, a scheme that perhaps can even be said to give the outline of a *model*, in the mathematical sense of the word. Aristotle indicates an interest in measuring units of political power and finding the logical relationships between such units of different magnitude. Mathematicians will talk about quantifiable entities, which may be either variables or constants, and about relations between them, which will be expressed generally in the form of equations. These are models in the mathematical sense, which have come to be used quite extensively in economics.

In political science, too, certain models analogous to those of economics have been suggested by modern scholars. Lewis F. Richardson, some thirty years ago, sought to illustrate problems of international stability with the aid of curves and equations. This attempt has been open to severe criticism. A scholar who has taken great interest in Richardson's work, Anatol Rapoport, admits that the suppositions of his *Generalized Foreign Policy* were "farfetched" and his investigations as a whole "far from satisfactory."[2] Hedley Bull mentions Richardson only in passing and seems to find nothing of value in his point of view. Bull has much more respect for the work of the mathematical game theorists, particularly Thomas C. Schelling, whose observations on international politics he regards as important, original, and illuminating. Bull thinks, however, that the judgments made by Schelling "have not been and could not be demonstrated by his work in formal game and bargaining theory." Yet Bull admits the possibility that Schelling's

[2] Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor 1960), 45-46. Cf. Richardson, *Generalized Foreign Policy*, Monograph Supplement No. 23, *British Journal of Psychology* (June 1939). For other contributions to the discussion of similar problems, see Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York 1962); Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XLVIII (August 1966), 266-79; and Arthur Lee Burns, "A Graphical Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (December 1959), 326-42.

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ideas about international relations "have been suggested to him by his technical studies" and that such studies may sometimes provide "a helpful analogy."[3]

Quite possibly Bull's general skepticism regarding the usefulness of mathematical theory in international relations may turn out to be well founded. But his admission, which I have just quoted, could perhaps have been made a little less grudgingly. Helpful analogies are always worth looking for. And I believe they may be found not only in game theory, but also with the aid of the mathematical techniques that Lewis Richardson borrowed from economics. These techniques would seem to be more easily applicable to national than to international political studies, but they may illustrate certain phenomena that are common to both fields.

II

I think the techniques in question can be used to elaborate some of the ideas on stability that are suggested by Aristotle in the passage quoted above, particularly in the paragraph in which he points to a rather special kind of phenomenon, talking about the possibility of turning the scale before it has moved too far. At this point Aristotle seems to hold that while some features of political life need not stay completely unchangeable for stability to be maintained, yet they must remain within certain limits. This line of thought he applies to the question of a distribution of power among social classes.

I would tend to draw a sharp distinction between two of Aristotle's propositions: the one describing states in which the middle class is stronger than the other classes taken together and the one based on states in which the middle class possesses no such overwhelming strength. The first proposition relates to the personal economic security of the individual members of the middle class, which Aristotle sees as a stabilizing influence in politics. Logically, this is a different consideration from that of the possibilities of tactical interplay arising when the middle class is placed in a strategic position without being the strongest factor itself. I shall be concerned with the latter proposition. No doubt, however, the stability of societies in which the middle class is very numerous represents an important phenomenon. When wealth is so

[3] Pp. 368-69. On the limitations of game theory in political science, see Arthur Lee Burns, "Prospects for a General Theory of International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System* (Princeton 1961), 25-46; and Alan Coddington, "Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, and Strategic Reasoning," *Journal of Peace Research*, IV, No. 1 (1967), 39.

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evenly distributed that the people of middle income outnumber both the poor and the rich, the society will usually be an affluent one. And several writers in our own time have adduced evidence—including quantitative evidence—to show that a society of this type will be a stable democracy.[4] Yet, as Harry Eckstein says, "it is true that the half-dozen countries which are most highly developed are also stable democracies, but difficulties seem to arise only a very little below their level."[5] Then, perhaps, the second proposition of Aristotle is more relevant than the first one. Stability may still be upheld, but the task will be more difficult and may be synonymous with the maintenance of a certain distribution of power among classes. I am concerned, therefore, in the present article, with stability in the sense of *a distribution of power* among political units *which undergoes no change, or no more than a certain amount of change, over time.*

In principle any number of units can be considered—one, two, three, four, five, etc.—in national as well as international affairs, but I propose to discuss in detail only some of the problems arising when there are *three* units present, particularly the situation in which these are of roughly equal strength.

III

In the case of a mutual interplay among three roughly equal units of political power, Aristotle held that some degree of stability could be maintained when an element in the center allied itself alternately with one or the other of the two extremes. He may have thought of this as a statement of rather restricted validity, because it would apply only when the middle group was neither very strong nor very weak. But the proposition can also be regarded from another angle. Not only the behavior of a middle class placed between rich and poor, but, under certain circumstances, the behavior of *any* independent factor placed between two extremes will conform to such a model. Whatever the

[4] Seymour Martin Lipset treats the question in his book *Political Man* (New York 1960), chap. 2, "Economic Development and Democracy." Lipset refers explicitly to Aristotle. Cf. also Karl W. Deutsch, "Basic Trends and Patterns in Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), 34-57; and Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), Conclusion and Statistical Appendix by James S. Coleman, 532ff. For the connection between political stability and the rate of economic development, see Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 529-52. Olson points out that economic change may be a factor sometimes favoring and sometimes endangering political stability.

[5] *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton 1966), Appendix B, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," 275.

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nature of the two extremes—whether they be opposed on religious, economic, geographic, or other grounds—a third party placed between two political wings is potentially in a position to balance one against the other. Further, in certain cases, the model applies to economics as well as to politics. A governmental agency with a mandate to counteract economic instability may find itself in the same position as Aristotle's middle class, when the means at its disposal do not suffice to prevent, but can be used to moderate, the fluctuations of the market. And, what is particularly interesting from the point of view of social science methodology, the influence exerted by such an economic balancer can be quantitatively determined with the aid of precise measurement.[6]

Now the question is whether similar possibilities exist in the realm of politics. Political power must be conceived of as quantitative in nature, but it is often very difficult to assess its magnitude in a particular case. Only some of the elements of political power are precisely measurable; as regards other elements, we are reduced to making more or less rough guesses. The power of a party depends on the number of votes it receives, but also on the strength of its organization and the skill of its leaders; the power of a state depends on the number of its inhabitants, on its supply of raw materials, on its industrial and military establishment, on its organization, leadership, and so on. There is undoubtedly a good deal of vagueness involved here. Yet as one historian has said, power, whether it can be precisely measured or not, does exist, and can be observed to exist, in variable amounts.[7] Statesmen must measure power, regardless of the primitive character of the scales at their disposal. Political scientists find themselves in the same situation.

The number of votes received by a party gives an indication of its power. Votes are certainly not a perfect indicator, but changes in the number of votes do provide the political scientist with a means of measuring at least one element of stability or instability in politics. Sometimes he will venture to establish precise relations on the basis of statistics. Louis H. Bean, some years ago, came forward to contend that there was a definite quantitative relationship between political changes and changes in a certain index of economic activity (the

[6] It is not inconceivable that the agency in question may commit mistakes, buying or selling at the wrong moment, so that the instability of the market will be aggravated instead of decreased, in which case the agency will be an "unbalancer." This too can be quantitatively ascertained.

[7] Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York 1955), 27. For a social scientist's point of view, see James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York 1964), 49-50.

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Cleveland Trust Company Index of Business Activity), a relationship that held good for U.S. congressional elections in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century: "If the business index remains unchanged between presidential elections, the party in power neither gains nor loses, but an advance of 20 points tends to give that party 35 to 40 additional seats. A similar decline in business tends to shift that many seats to the opposition."[8]

Though Bean's measurement was no doubt too crude, it seems nevertheless that a definite quantitative relation between business activity and changes in congressional representation did exist in certain parts of the United States during the period in question.[9] In other countries, too, certain shifting patterns of power have been established for shorter or longer periods. Election statistics from parts of France during the Third Republic show this very clearly. In a department like the Ardèche, politics was dominated by the religious issue: when the government in Paris pursued an anticlerical course, the parties of the Right would increase their share of the total vote in the department, as a rule by some ten percent; whenever the government adopted a relaxed attitude toward the Church, the number of votes cast for the Right would decrease correspondingly.[10]

These were simple patterns of reaction; usually there will be a more complex interplay of forces in political life. Even so, however, it may be possible at times to construct models of political stability or instability and to make use of statistical data in assessing their adequacy. Then the political scientist can proceed along lines similar to those followed by the economist.

Take as an illustration of economic interplay the so-called cobweb theorem, which is characteristic of certain markets, especially for agricultural products. In the case of commodities that conform to the normal pattern, amounts produced, amounts purchased, and prices remain substantially unchanged from year to year. As regards other

[8] *How to Predict Elections* (New York 1948), 54-55.

[9] See my remarks in a letter to the editor of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XIV (Fall 1950), 612, on the subject of an article by Clark Tibbitts, "Majority Votes and the Business Cycle," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVI (January 1931), 596-606. Unlike Bean, Tibbitts concentrated on one region, the Northeast. His study has never been followed up.

[10] See André Siegfried, *Géographie électorale de l'Ardèche* (Paris 1949), 102. Similar high and low tides of clericalism were visible in northwestern France. But the fluctuations, the high and low tides, were not very marked, and fundamentally the situation remained stable, as in the Ardèche—stability being defined by Siegfried in quantitative terms: ". . . Les forces numériques de la Droite . . . se maintiennent, avec une étonnante stabilité, autour de 27 p. 100 des inscrits" (*Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la 3e République* [Paris 1913], 461).

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commodities, however, prices and production fluctuate markedly around a certain level, being now some distance above it, now some distance below. The degree of instability is measured by the amount of change per unit of time. In some cases, the phenomenon can be illustrated by means of a graph whose form is reminiscent of a cobweb.



FIGURE 1

P_{1967} denotes the current year's price, which will determine the quantity supplied next year, Q_{1968}. This quantity in turn determines P_{1968}—next year's price—which in its turn will determine the quantity supplied in the subsequent year, Q_{1969}. P_e and Q_e denote equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity, respectively.[11]

The following facts account for the instability: The influence of demand upon the supply of the commodities in question can be transmitted only with a time lag, because of the length of the production process. Time is required for plantings to mature, for hogs to be fattened (or, to take a nonagricultural cobweb example, for ships to be built). Producers will base their decisions largely on present prices. When these, for some reason or other, do not coincide with the equilibrium price, producers will be unable to make the quick readjustments that are required if economic stability is to be maintained. With reference to the illustration above, suppose the equilibrium price per

[11] References to the cobweb model can be found in a number of works on economics, such as E. F. Beach, *Economic Models* (New York 1957), 96; O. Lange, *Introduction to Econometrics* (New York 1963), 175; and William C. Hood and Tjalling C. Koopmans, eds., *Studies in Econometric Method* (New York 1953), 18. For an application to a concrete case, see Daniel B. Suits, "An Econometric Model of the Watermelon Market," *Journal of Farm Economics,* XXXVII (May 1955), 244.

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bushel of a certain product is four cents, whereas this year's (1967's) market price is six cents. Producers will be induced to start production of five million bushels (whereas the equilibrium quantity is only four million). When the five million bushels are brought to the market next year (1968), the price will fall to three cents, which will make producers start production of only three and a half million bushels to be marketed the following year (1969), and so on. If, however, the government partly foresees the difficulty and appropriates a limited amount of money to be used in 1968 to counteract the fall in prices, then the 1968 market price will not be three cents but somewhere between three and four cents per bushel, the exact level depending on the amount of money appropriated and spent for the purpose. If the government keeps in storage the quantities bought in 1968, letting them out on the market only in 1969, it will further counteract the destabilizing tendency by making the total available 1969 supplies more closely approximate the demand. Again, the influence of the balancer can be calculated exactly: it will be determined by the quantity of the product kept in government storage after its purchase in 1968.

In the theoretical cobweb case, it has usually been assumed that buyers set the price at which they are willing to absorb the whole of a crop immediately after the harvest (and similarly with other kinds of products), so that transactions take place only once a year. While this is often an unrealistic assumption in economics, it may correspond quite closely with what really happens in political life: legislative bodies are elected in their entirety at fixed intervals, and alliances are concluded or reversed at one definite point of time, more often than through gradual processes over a prolonged period.

In the case of an interplay of economic forces like the one described above, the government agency can be said to have acted as a third party supporting whichever was the weaker of the two others (going against the buyers in a buyers' market and against the sellers in a sellers' market). Now we may ask, Is it possible to find similar concrete examples in politics to support Aristotle's proposition on the relationship between a political three-party configuration and systemic stability? Aristotle based his theoretical work on a collection of facts, a compilation of the constitutional histories of a large number of Hellenic states, but not much of this has been preserved. We shall never know in detail the empirical background of his hypothesis, and we must turn from his lost constitutional handbooks to modern history. Here, examples are to be found in both national and international affairs.

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The European balance of power during certain periods can be fairly accurately represented by the model of a three-cornered contest. The early eighteenth century, in particular, witnessed a basic dualism in which power resided chiefly with France and the Austrian Hapsburgs—the two sides of a pair of scales—with Great Britain representing a somewhat lesser source of power and occupying a suitable position as balancer.

At the same time, in internal British politics, there was a similar configuration of interacting forces. Here the two main sources of power were the Whig and Tory parties, while the third force was represented by the uncommitted voters and by the Queen, who retained a good deal of influence, not least at election time. She was mainly concerned with upholding the "liberty" of the Crown, so as not to be tied to one party or the other: "For if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall not imagine myself, though I have the name of Queen, to be in reality but their slave."[12] A woman and an invalid, Anne did not possess the necessary strength to reign independently of both Whigs and Tories. However, she arrived at a solution that she found at least partially satisfactory. If she could not hope to dominate the parties, she could temper them and could prevent the complete victory of either by periodically throwing the weight of the Crown against the party whose predominance she found it necessary at a certain moment to reduce. Many voters were not committed to either the Whigs or the Tories, but wavered between them. The combined result of the reactions of the floating vote and the influence of the Crown was a series of fluctuations between Whig and Tory majorities. Queen Anne succeeded again and again in preventing this internal balance from being completely overthrown. At the same time, in European politics, Great Britain was holding the balance between the French and their continental adversaries.

I think it is quite legitimate to compare such three-cornered political contests, in both domestic and international affairs, with what happens when a government agency in our day endeavors to stabilize prices by means of open-market operations alternately favoring buyers and sellers. All these cases present some resemblance to the Aristotelian model. The configuration is seldom one of near-perfect stability. Under modern market conditions, the action of the third element does sometimes have an immediate steadying effect, but the complicated interplay of economic forces makes stability a difficult thing to achieve.

[12] Anne to Lord Treasurer Godolphin, quoted from G. M. Trevelyan, *England Under Queen Anne* (London 1930), Vol. I, 175.

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Presented with the challenge of this complexity, economists have worked out specific models that are of interest to politics as well as economics. I am thinking in particular of the above-mentioned cobweb theorem, which accounts for time lags and delayed reactions on the part of participants in the economic process. Similar delays are often of importance in political life, British history in the early eighteenth century again providing a good example. In British internal politics, when there had been a change of ministry, a certain amount of time always elapsed before its effects were fully worked out. Only after a while would it become clear that an extreme element had gained the upper hand, whereupon a belated reaction would bring the other party into power.[13] But in the reversed situation, too, the extremists formed in reality the strongest element, and, little by little, they would take over power from their moderate colleagues, until again the Queen and the voters would find that they had set into motion a process that went further than they wished. So they supported the first party anew.

Queen Anne never succeeded for long in steering a straight course between Whigs and Tories. Like a modern driver with incomplete control of his car, she would turn the wheel violently from one side to the other. It was, in the language of cybernetics, a case of "excessive feedback"—though never so excessive as to throw the car into the ditch.

Similarly, in European politics, Queen Anne and the politicians who increasingly managed foreign affairs for her supported the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV, but after a while they became aware, rather late in the day, that it had grown dangerously strong; then they began to support Louis against the Alliance, until they found that he was again beginning to make exorbitant demands. Here also, certain time lags were of importance. Lord Bolingbroke, who had charge of British foreign policy at the end of the reign, later commented upon the difficulty of assessing quickly and accurately the shifts in the European power distribution:

> The precise point at which the scales of power turn, like that of the solstice in either tropic, is imperceptible to common observa-

[13] A similar phenomenon seems to be discernible in the internal politics of the Third French Republic, where the Center, represented in particular by the Radical party, held the balance between Right and Left. The party would govern for a time with the support of the clericalists, until its rank and file reacted against this coalition. Then it would lean on the support of the socialists for a time, until the Radical rank and file reacted against that. By throwing their weight now to the Right, now to the Left, the Center politicians managed to maintain the system through a number of repeated oscillations, an "ever-recurring cycle" in the words of André Siegfried (*Tableau des partis en France* [Paris 1930], 126).

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tion: and, in one case as in the other, some progress must be made in the new direction, before the change is perceived. They who are in the sinking scale . . . do not easily come off from the habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage, nor from the confidence that these prejudices inspire. They who are in the rising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence in it which successful experience gives them afterwards. They who are the most concerned to watch the variations of this balance, misjudge often in the same manner, and from the same prejudices. They continue to dread a power no longer able to hurt them, or they continue to have no apprehensions of a power that grows daily more formidable. . . . The . . . principal powers of Europe . . . have verified the . . . observation.[14]

IV

Some of the factors that determined politics in the early eighteenth century can be represented in quantitative form. Elections, of course, were decided by the number of votes cast and counted for the various candidates, and if electoral statistics had been preserved this factor could be measured with precision. As it is, we possess only some very uncertain indicators; yet they are of a quantitative nature. After the general election of 1702, the Whig party was outnumbered by the Tories for three years, but its position was markedly improved at the election of 1705, and still more in 1708, when it won a clear numerical preponderance. The two following elections, however, held in 1710 and 1713, were lost by the Whigs. Yet in 1715 they won again over the Tories. It took some years before the full effects of a victory came to be felt, but then they were such as to make the "third force" turn away from the victor. After some further years, when the consequences of this reaction were clearly seen, the opposite party having had an opportunity to utilize its power to the full, the first party would once more experience a reaction in its own favor.

In principle, it is possible to express in quantitative form this interplay between party policies and voters' reactions to them. We shall have to make do with numerical data that are no more than rudimentary, but at least they are not altogether lacking. Thanks to the fine statistical work of Gregory King in the second half of the seven-

[14] Bolingbroke, *Works* (Dublin 1793), Vol. II, 372-73. David Hume remarked, in a similar vein: "Our wars with France have been begun . . . from necessity; but have always been too far pushed from obstinacy and passion" ("Of the Balance of Power," in *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* [Basel 1793], Vol. II, 99).

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teenth century, we know something about the numerical relations of classes in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England, and on this basis we can make a rough guess as to the composition of the electorate. We also have some information about economic developments during the period in question, and there are strong indications that voters were influenced by these developments.

Let us assume for a moment that nothing but considerations of material gain or loss influenced British voters. It is certainly an oversimplification, but it is not entirely unrealistic, and the assumption will permit us more easily to translate their political reactions into quantitative terms. The war against Louis XIV occupied the whole reign of Queen Anne and was waged by Britain largely to obtain advantages in trade (with the Spanish colonies, Flanders, and the Mediterranean countries). The war effort procuring these advantages had to be paid for by an increase in taxation. War expenditures mounted rapidly; in addition to the land tax of four shillings on the pound, the Lord Treasurer had to impose ever higher indirect taxes. But certain advantages were obtained rather quickly in return. British seapower encouraged Portugal to break away from her alliance with France in 1703. The Portuguese trade proved highly profitable to Britain, especially when, after some time, the convoy system got the better of enemy privateers. Other war aims were more difficult to achieve, however, and after a while the objections of many voters to increased taxation grew stronger than their eagerness to secure the advantage of a complete victory over France. They thought the price was too high.

There is no doubt that the course of the war had an important influence on the outcome of the six elections held from 1702 to 1715, of which three were won by the Tories and three by the Whigs. The Whigs represented the uncompromising war party, while the attitude of the Tories was more reserved. Both Whig and Tory magnates had a large number of safe constituencies, "rotten boroughs" where their word was law, but outside of these strongholds a substantial independent vote was to be found. It consisted largely of cultivating freeholders. On the basis of Gregory King's statistics, their number has been estimated at some 180,000. Perhaps half of them would vote in an election—we have no means of knowing the exact percentage of electoral participation. But we do know that many independent voters wavered between outspoken Whigs, "hot" Tories, and more moderate candidates without strong allegiance to either party. By the divided opinions of these yeomen, says G. M. Trevelyan, the balance of Whig and Tory interests was maintained or redressed at each successive

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election in the Queen's reign.[15] Their consecutive reactions, spinning back and forth, produced the pattern of a political cobweb.

The independent voters were more concerned about the pursuit of the war than were the Tories, but more concerned about its cost than were the Whigs. No doubt other concerns also have to be considered, such as the measures taken by the government in religious matters. Furthermore, many of the independent voters may not so much have formed personal opinions as they followed the gentle lead of the monarch. They were of her "party."[16] On the other hand, she often acted for largely the same reasons that swayed the mass of her people, whom, Trevelyan says, she in many ways represented better than the Whig and Tory politicians. And as for the religious question, which certainly played an important role, it was also closely related to the war issue: the Whigs, favoring the Dissenters at home, advocated a strong alliance with the Calvinist Dutch, while the High Church Tories were more inclined to seek an accommodation with Catholic France.

Let us assume—after all, it is not too far from the truth—that votes in each of the elections were cast according to the independent voters' views about the war and its cost. On the assumption that this was the only factor of importance, the following formula would be valid: A large Tory vote, with a correspondingly small Whig vote, would lead to the adoption of cautious and economical methods of warfare, with the consequence that after a time the majority of independent voters would demand a more vigorous pursuit of the war. They would be willing to pay higher taxes in order to obtain an increased war effort with its concomitant of expected gains; consequently they would vote the Whigs into power. The Whigs would be allowed to pursue the war until it seemed to the majority of independent voters to cost more than it was worth, whereupon a movement in the opposite direction would be initiated. This is no doubt an oversimplification, but to a certain extent the formula does correspond to facts; and it is a formula that can be expressed in quantitative terms. If we take the amount of gov-

[15] P. 23; see p. 436, n. 19, for Gregory King's statistics.

[16] A great number of favors and places in all parts of the country were at the disposal of the Crown, constituting a very effective means of influence at election time. As Lord Chancellor Cowper wrote to Anne's successor shortly after her death: "Give me leave to assure your Majesty, on repeated experience, that the parties are so near an equality, and the generality of the world so much in love with the advantages a King of Great Britain has to bestow without the least exceeding the bounds of law, that it is wholly in your Majesty's power, by showing your favour in due time [before the elections] to one or other of them, to give which of them you please a clear majority" (Trevelyan, 213).

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ernment expenditure E as an index of Whiggish policies, the supply of and demand for such policies can be expressed somewhat as follows:

$$\text{Supply relation:} \quad E_t = 7/3\, V_{t-1} - 2$$
$$\text{Demand relation:} \quad V_t = 10 - 1/2\, E_t$$

The subscripts refer to points of time. The demand relation shows the Whig vote V at time t to be a function of the government expenditure at that time. The supply relation shows the expenditure at any time to be a function of the vote cast at some previous point of time. A concrete time sequence can be computed by taking some initial government expenditure, such as seven million pounds sterling. With an expenditure of this size, the demand relation informs us that 65,000 independent votes will be cast for the Whigs (votes being expressed in tens of thousands in the equation).[17] With this number of votes cast at time t, the government expenditure at the next point of time will have risen to £13.2 million, according to the supply relation. An independent Whig vote of only 35,000 will be the consequence of this large expenditure.

I have chosen figures that correspond roughly to the actual government expenditure in 1705 and 1710, respectively (about £7 million and £13 million).[18] The first year saw a Whig electoral victory; the second, a great electoral defeat for the Whigs. Reckoning the floating vote to be made up of some 180,000 persons, of whom perhaps about one-half went to the polls, I have presumed that 65,000 independent Whig votes would give the Whigs a majority over the Tories in the House of Commons, whereas if only 35,000 ballots were cast in favor of the Whigs by independent voters, the party would obtain fewer seats than the Tories. Schematically, the development can be represented by Figure 2. The relationship between votes cast for the Tory party at certain points of time and government expenditure during previous periods could be represented by a graph similar to this one.[19]

[17] $6.5 = 10 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot 7$. The constants in this formula, 10 and $\frac{1}{2}$, are expressions of the permanent attitudes behind the repeated reactions of British voters during the period in question. It is conceivable that a similar formula could be found to describe French political reactions during the Third Republic (cf. n. 13 above), but then not only the variables but also the constants would be different. Similarly, in economics, the demand for two different commodities may be described by the same kind of formula, but as a rule the constants will be different.

[18] Trevelyan, III, 45; cf. II, 169.

[19] As has been intimated, Queen Anne did not always succeed very well in using her influence to keep the parties balanced, especially not toward the end of her reign. This is consonant with the shape of Figure 2, in which the cobweb moves away from the equilibrium position, the swings becoming more violent as time passes, while in Figure 1 there is apparent a tendency to convergence toward the point of equilibrium and a concomitant dampening of the swings.

No doubt voting in Anne's time was also influenced by factors other than those I

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

FIGURE 2

V

Another question is whether it would be possible to construct graphs and equations representing the fluctuating power distribution in *international* politics during the same period. The system of European states, like the system of British parties, exhibited a pattern of repeated fluctuation. It can be said that a fundamental stability was maintained, since neither France nor her continental adversaries ever became wholly dominant, England holding the balance between them; but the relationship between the various powers could scarcely be called a smoothly adjusted mechanism—any more than could the relationship between the various units within the British political system. It often took a considerable time before a shift in the distribution of power would influence the behavior of European statesmen, with the result that wide oscillations around the position of equilibrium occurred. Toward the end of the year 1700, the continental balance had been upset by the death of the King of Spain, who bequeathed his entire possessions to the grandson of Louis XIV. The ensuing increase in the

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have mentioned, factors that can be called extraneous to the system. Similar phenomena are well known in economic life. A cobweb model represents the mutual interplay of sellers' and buyers' reactions, with no allowance being made for factors such as changes in weather conditions, which often play an important role. An extraneous factor of this kind may decisively influence the size of a crop, perhaps to the extent of completely changing the cobweb picture.

We know that the mood of the British voter in the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession was influenced in part by a series of exceptionally good harvests. However, this factor was probably not of decisive importance.

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power of the House of Bourbon led to the formation of the Grand Alliance against Louis in 1701. The War of the Spanish Succession eventually restored the balance, but not without violent oscillations. Though the British felt in 1710 that the power of France should be reduced no further, and started secret negotiations with Louis to this effect, it took them more than two years to bring their continental allies around to the same view. In order to obtain a cessation of hostilities, the British statesmen actually withdrew their troops and betrayed the military secrets of the Austrians to the French. "Our Allies became our enemies and our great enemy our ally."[20] This meant going so far that the hopes of Louis were revived, and it looked as if he might get the upper hand in the peace negotiations, but at last the leading British minister, Bolingbroke, changed sides again and presented Louis with a threat that led to the signing of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.

These ebbs and flows in the fortunes of the two camps could be represented quantitatively in terms of the size of their respective armies, the strength of fortresses, the size of subsidies, and so on.[21] The question arises, By using such quantitative data, could one draw a graph to show the fluctuations taking place around a point of international equilibrium, similar to the graph showing fluctuations around a point of equilibrium in internal British politics? There is one serious obstacle in the way of such a procedure. Mass reactions can be legitimately represented by means of equations with a determinate solution and curves intersecting at a point of equilibrium. Economists use this technique when they analyze mass phenomena, assuming the existence of perfect competition, where no single individual is supposed to exert any appreciable influence on the state of the market.[22] However, when

[20] Trevelyan, III, 90.

[21] The actors themselves to a large extent operated with quantitative notions. The French frontier fortresses had such strength, it was held, that the Allies must outnumber the French troops by some 25,000 men to obtain equality. A yearly British subsidy of £250,000 was reckoned as roughly equivalent to an army of 25,000 mercenaries, mostly men hired from petty German princes. See *The Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge 1908), Vol. V, 414, 418. Statesmen tried to evaluate the balance of power as much as possible in quantitative terms. Thus the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700 were based on the idea of preserving the balance by dividing the Spanish Empire inheritance according to certain numerical calculations, as acknowledged, for instance, by Louis XIV in a letter of February 1699 giving instructions to his ambassador in London (*ibid.*, 388). However, when the whole of the Spanish Empire fell to his grandson, Louis put aside the thought of equilibrium.

[22] In the classical theory of monopoly, it is assumed that while one individual can affect other individuals, none of them is strong enough to affect him. Under this assumption, as in the case of perfect competition, indeterminacy is again avoided. The actions of Queen Anne, when she presented the British electorate with inducements to vote this way or that, can be compared to the actions of a monopolistic seller manipulating his prices.

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this hypothesis cannot be maintained, as in a market dominated by a few large firms or in the case of bargaining between a labor union and an association of employers, no determinate solution is possible. There is no single point of equilibrium. Such is also most frequently the situation in international affairs. As a rule, relations between opposing nations have not been like those existing between a great number of buyers and sellers in a free market. They have rather been analogous to the relations between a strictly limited number of buyers, sellers, or economic organizations dividing the whole of a market among themselves.

Lewis Richardson supposed that arms races were influenced mainly by popular reactions. His theory offered a mathematical description of how the national mood changes as a function of the mood of the adversary. However, arms races are only partly determined by popular moods; in large part they represent, as Thomas Schelling says, referring to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, "an interaction between central governments that relate budget plans and weapon decisions to a projection of a perceived threat."[23] Here, as in other fields of foreign policy, there is present a strong "oligopolistic" element.

To a still greater extent was this the case in the eighteenth century. Even in a country like Britain, where popular reactions often did influence policy, important decisions were made in foreign affairs by individual statesmen independently of public opinion—for instance, during the deeply secret negotiations that Bolingbroke conducted with Torcy, the French foreign minister. After many months the two ministers reached a settlement by which an *equilibrium* was established, as stated in the very text of one of the Utrecht peace treaties. However, in such cases of negotiation between a limited number of actors making discrete moves and countermoves, there does not exist just *one single* equilibrium position. There is a whole range of equally possible points at which the balance may be established, and the situation can no longer be illustrated by two curves intersecting at one definite point.

VI

The problem of political stability has been discussed within the framework of *general systems theory*, in the language of which the term "system" denotes a set of elements in interaction. In this sense, the relationships between the European powers in the early eighteenth century can certainly be said to constitute a system, as can also the

[23] "War Without Pain, and Other Models," *World Politics*, XV (April 1963), 472.

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relationships between the Queen, the voters, and the parties in Britain.[24] The pattern of interaction characteristic of each system can be presented, under certain assumptions, in numerical form; but not all aspects of the notion of stability can be expressed quantitatively. In general systems theory, a system has been called stable "with respect to certain of its variables if these variables tend to remain within defined limits."[25] However, it is difficult to define such limits exactly. In the political system of Queen Anne's Britain, now one party gained a majority, now another; and the degree of instability might be measured by things such as the frequency or the amplitude of the swings. But it is not easy to point out a precise limit beyond which the system would break down.

The problem of systemic limits has been mentioned by several authors. David Easton speaks of a system operating within "a critical range."[26] The idea of system-maintenance as variation within "critical points" or short of a "strategic point" of change also occurs in Talcott Parsons' sociology.[27] Unfortunately, as Harry Eckstein remarks, critical points are never concretely specified in these works.[28] And often a specification would be very difficult to produce.[29]

Perhaps it is of interest to draw a distinction between what may be

[24] The relationship between one party and the voters could be termed a subsystem. See Oran R. Young, "A Survey of General Systems Theory," *General Systems*, IX (1964), 69, in which a subsystem is defined as "an element or functional component of a larger system which fulfills the conditions of a system in itself but which also plays a specialized role in the operation of the larger system."

[25] A. D. Hall and R. E. Fagen, "Definition of System," *General Systems*, I (1956), 23.

[26] *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), 25.

[27] Parsons and others, *Toward A General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 228, 231.

[28] Eckstein, 14-15, n. 8.

[29] Can we define, for instance, the limits of political stability in the French Third Republic? Eckstein argues (p. 228) that the regime was near the breaking point several times, such as during the Boulanger period. On the other hand, however, the Third Republic did survive both this and other severe crises; it came through the ordeal of a world war in which France bore the brunt of the fighting for four years. Its breaking point at any given moment is certainly not easy to determine. Eric A. Nordlinger says, "The outstanding characteristic of the French political system is its historical instability. . . . While the republic tottered on in the interwar period the life-span of its governments was calculated in terms of months rather than years . . ." ("Democratic Stability and Instability: The French Case," *World Politics*, XVIII [October 1965], 127). It is true that in the 1930's the reactions of voters at the polls as well as the rapid changes of ministries can be taken as indications of instability. The 1920's were different, however. Despite frequent changes of premiers, there was a great deal of continuity. From January 1921 until March 1932 French foreign policy was practically in the hands of no more than two men, Raymond Poincaré and Aristide Briand. But then came, in rapid succession, Paul-Boncour, Barthou, Laval, Flandin, Delbos, Bonnet, Daladier, and Reynaud as foreign ministers (see Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats 1919-1939* [New York 1965], Vol. I, 52, Vol. II, 382).

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called, in certain cases, inner and outer limits of stability. Suppose a labor union asks for a wage rate of $3.00, while the employer offers $2.60. The union leaders would be willing to accept as low a rate as $2.75 rather than call a strike, and the employer would be willing to pay up to $2.85 rather than have a strike on his hands. Here, then, we find a set of stability limits that are valid with respect to a particular system of peaceful bargaining. Within these limits, the equilibrium will be established at a point that depends on the astuteness of the negotiators from both parties and on the strength of their nerves. According to whether the representatives of one side are more or less able than those of the other, the wage agreed upon may be, say, $2.76 or $2.80 or, perhaps, $2.85.

But it may also happen that the employer, misjudging the position of the adversary, holds out for a rate lower than $2.75—or that the union holds out for a rate higher than $2.85—and then an industrial conflict will ensue. In other words, the system of mutual interaction consisting of moves and countermoves in a peaceful bargaining game will be disrupted. However, when the conflict starts, the parties enter into another form of interaction; this new relationship will break down only in case other limits should be transgressed (the limit at which the union is dissolved, or at which the firm goes bankrupt, as a result of the struggle). The system will be preserved if the parties come to fear that they would lose too much by continuing the fight. In a case like the one outlined above, it seems reasonable to talk about two different systems of interaction, each with its particular limits of stability.

Similar considerations may be applied to the intercourse between states. At the Congress of Vienna, for instance, there were protracted negotiations between the five Great Powers about the distribution of territories formerly held by Napoleon and his allies. At first, in 1814, the Prussians had proposed that Russia receive the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, less the districts of Cracow and Tarnopol, which would go to Austria. In return for the Polish provinces that she was willing to cede, Prussia would be given the whole of Saxony. However, the Tsar did not accept the idea of letting Austria have the districts proposed, so the whole question had to be taken up again toward the end of the year at the Congress of Vienna, where Castlereagh and Talleyrand intervened. At the end of November, the Tsar gave his consent to the independence of the disputed Polish cities, but Metternich insisted on Austria's having the town of Cracow and would not consent to the cession of the whole of Saxony to Prussia. Very tense negotiations, proposals, counterproposals, and mutual exchanges of threats

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followed in December and early January, but finally an agreement was reached whereby the territories in question were divided among the Great Powers. The inner limits of the system were not transgressed. When Napoleon returned from the isle of Elba in March, however, taking power in France, it was regarded as a transgression on the part of the French, since Napoleon had refused to content himself with the prerevolutionary boundaries of the country. War followed. But it did not end either in the victory of Napoleon or in the elimination of France from the state system. After a short struggle, a new balance was established.

Here, as in a case of collective bargaining like the one mentioned earlier, we can say that certain inner and outer limits were drawn, and that they were defined in the minds of the principal actors with a good deal of precision, largely in quantitative terms. A special committee on statistics was appointed at the Congress of Vienna to provide an exact numerical basis for the division of lands among the sovereigns, and negotiations took the form of claims and offers of particular bits of territory according to the number of their inhabitants. For instance, on January 12, 1815, the Prussian chancellor, Hardenberg, submitted a "Plan for the Reconstruction of Prussia," which contained several statistical tables, among them one enumerating no fewer than twenty-five different districts and cities lost or regained by that state since 1805, adding up to a total of 3,180,215 subjects who had not been recovered by the King of Prussia and for whom he should have compensation in the form of other territories with a similar number of inhabitants.[30]

The Congress of Vienna provides an almost pure example of "oligopolistic" policies. Concern for popular sentiments was excluded on principle. And the whole process of haggling over subjects and square miles bore an essential likeness to private economic negotiations.

The claims of the various powers were interdependent; a solution in favor of one would have repercussions on all the others. As for the final, total configuration, various possibilities could be envisaged, and some of these were explicitly indicated by the participants. It is interesting, for instance, to see two alternative models outlined by Castlereagh in a letter to Wellington of October 25, 1814: either an outcome such that Austria and Prussia would form a barrier against French eastward

[30] Gulick, 249. The final settlement at Vienna did not depend merely on this simple kind of arithmetic. The buffer states to the east of France, for instance, were created not only with a view to the number of their inhabitants; regard was also had for the defensibility of their frontiers, the existence of rivers and harbors that made it possible to bring them swift aid from across the sea, and so on (*ibid.*, 259).

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expansion as well as against Russian westward expansion, with Britain in the background ready to support them; or else an outcome whereby Britain, France, and Austria agreed to join forces in order to keep Russia and Prussia counterbalanced. The latter solution was the one actually reached at the Congress in January 1815.

VII

The European states, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, certainly constituted a system in the sense of general systems theory: a set of interacting elements. But often a set of elements will simply exist within a common framework without necessarily being in mutual interaction. The main elements of a national economy usually interact. However, the wage level in a country's manufacturing industry, shaped by forces other than the wage level in its agriculture, can be high and rising while the level of agricultural wages remains low and stable, perhaps for several years. During such a period, the two wage levels can be said to belong to the same economic system, but not in the sense that they are influencing each other.[31] Or take a case from international politics: There occurs an increase in armaments. As a rule, an increase in the armaments of one country is a function of the armaments of other countries, either because of an interplay between popular moods and apprehensions, or because central decision-makers act upon one another with their moves and countermoves. It is quite conceivable, however, that a country's armaments level may be determined by other considerations, such as the desire to provide employment for the working population. More than one historical example can be given of a country's pursuing an armaments policy uninfluenced by the policies of other countries. Thus, in the 1890's, Germany thought herself militarily invulnerable owing to the newly established excellence of her army and considered it unnecessary to participate in any balancing process with other land powers.[32]

My contention, then, is that while political life can be regarded as consisting of systems of power units, the word "system" need not be taken in the sense of general systems theory, which demands that the units will always find themselves in mutual interaction. Sometimes they do, however, and in such cases, provided the power of the units

[31] Cf., for instance, Lee Taylor and Charles W. Glasgow, *Occupations and Low-Income Rural People* (Baton Rouge 1963); and Mancur Olson, Jr., "Agriculture and the Depressed Areas," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XLVI (December 1964), 984.

[32] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy*, VIII (1958), 50f., for this and other examples of what he terms absolute, as opposed to relative, armaments goals (i.e., goals relative to the armaments of other nations).

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can be measured in one way or another, it will be possible to set up mathematical models of political phenomena parallel to the models of variation and interaction used in economics.

As indicated by the examples given above, I believe that certain analogies from the study of duopoly and oligopoly in economics may shed some light on certain aspects of international relations, but that it is more difficult to apply in this field ideas taken from the economists' theory of perfect competition. The latter kind of analogy, assuming the predominance of mass reactions, may rather be relevant to some problems of national politics. On the other hand, it should be noted that certain models from duopoly theory can also throw light on domestic politics.

VIII

This use of duopoly models has been shown by Anthony Downs in his *Economic Theory of Democracy*.[33] Previously, some economists had intimated the possibility of comparing the relationship between parties and voters to the relationship between stores and the buying public. Harold Hotelling asserted that if there are two grocery stores in one street, they will both tend to move toward the middle of the street to attract customers from one another. He also pointed out that the situation may be similar when there are only two political parties of importance in a given country: they will tend to adopt programs closely resembling one another.[34] Certain political scientists, reasoning along similar lines, have contended that political moderation will be the necessary consequence of electoral laws establishing single-member majority elections, which favor the emergence of two major parties.[35]

Such a development is not the only logical possibility, however. An alternative can be suggested by a further elaboration of Hotelling's duopoly model. Thus Arthur Smithies has argued that the two stores may stay some distance apart in order not to lose customers at either end of the street; and the two major parties may stay some distance apart in order not to lose the votes of extremists, who would refuse to vote for them if they became too much alike.[36] Anthony Downs has added a further observation. The distance between the parties will be very considerable, he remarks, if the number of voters with extreme views is large compared to the number of voters in the center. In such

[33] (New York 1957).
[34] "Stability in Competition," *Economic Journal*, XXXIX (March 1929), 54-55.
[35] See, in particular, F. A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?* (Notre Dame 1941).
[36] "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," *Journal of Political Economy*, XLIX (June 1941), 423.

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a case, unfortunate consequences will follow: "In a two-party system, whichever party wins will attempt to implement policies radically opposed to the other party's ideology, since the two are at opposite extremes. This means that government policy will be highly unstable, and that democracy is likely to produce chaos. Unfortunately, the growth of balancing center parties is unlikely. Any party which forms in the center will eventually move toward one extreme or the other to increase its votes, since there are so few moderate voters."[37]

For extremist voters, Downs says, the rational course of action will be to abstain from voting if the party nearest them moves toward moderation; this latent threat of abstention acts as a powerful force pulling the parties away from a central position whenever there is a large number of what he calls "rational extremist" voters.

Though the model as presented by Downs may seem rather abstract, it is not too unrealistic. It may be of interest to point out, for instance, that his model represents quite well what happened in the Spanish Republic during the 1930's. A conspicuous feature of the Spanish political scene had been the abstention of large groups of potential voters, who took no interest in elections. During the 1930's, these voters were mobilized and cast their votes largely in favor of extremist parties.

The political model presented by Downs is not quite analogous to the economic one: while it may be impossible for more than two stores to operate profitably in a short street, there will always be room for more than two parties in any given country. In Britain, for instance, there are the Liberals and the Communists besides the Labour party and the Conservatives. Downs implicitly assumes the existence of minor parties. A similar assumption can be easily introduced in the economic model also. Suppose the street in question is long enough to give room to quite a number of stores, but there is a law imposing a heavy income tax on all but the two that happen to be at any time the largest ones. This would correspond to the system of single-member majority elections in politics, or to some such arrangement as the electoral law introduced in Spain on the British model in 1932, which similarly favored the two largest parties or coalitions. The result was not to make all but these two disappear completely, but to boost the two disproportionately while the others barely subsisted, being reduced to a position of insignificance after a short transitional period.

During that period, the Spanish Center tried to match forces with the extremes. It was defeated not only because it was inferior in numbers, but also because the superiority of the extremes was vastly magni-

[37] P. 120.

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fied in their parliamentary representation through the provisions of the law. In the 1933 elections in Madrid, for instance, the Left got 175,000 votes, the Right 170,000, and the Center 100,000, whereas the resulting parliamentary representation was as follows: thirteen seats to the Left, four seats to the Right, and none to the Center.[38]

Of course, if the Center had been the largest of the three units it would have reaped the corresponding benefits. A similar outcome would have resulted in Germany, according to a calculation by F. A. Hermens, if that country had exchanged proportional representation for the Anglo-Saxon electoral system in 1930. The moderate Social Democrats would have greatly increased their Reichstag representation while the Nazis, then still a minor party, would have received only two-thirds of the seats they actually took. However, if a similar change in the German electoral system had taken place two years later, the moderates would have fared badly. The Nazis, who then received about thirty-seven percent of the popular vote (and also of the Reichstag seats), would have nearly doubled their representation, obtaining a huge parliamentary majority. This is the result that we get if we apply to the circumstances of 1932 the calculation that Hermens made for the year 1930.[39] While one should be cautious in drawing conclusions

[38] Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge 1943), 266. The law of 1932 was applied only twice. The overall result of the 1933 elections was a very sharp swing to the Right. Then came a no less violent swing to the Left at the 1936 elections. Shortly afterward the Civil War broke out.

Arrangements in France had the opposite effect of increasing the parliamentary representation of the Center at the expense of the extremes. It is sometimes said that this was due to the two-ballot system, which made voters switch to the support of what they regarded as the lesser evil at the second ballot (Maurice Duverger, *L'influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique* [Paris 1950], 44: "Car le plus grand nombre des élus du centre ont triomphé au deuxième tour, les uns grâce à l'appui de la droite, les autres grâce à l'appui de la gauche"). A more important factor, however, seems to have been the extensive gerrymandering carried out to reduce the influence of many industrial districts in favor of the Center's rural strongholds. On the French elections of 1928, 1932, and 1936, see Georges Lachapelle, *Les régimes électoraux* (Paris 1934), 160, 164; and articles by Walter R. Sharp in *American Political Science Review*, XXII (August 1928), 685-86, and XXX (October 1936), 868.

In Imperial Germany the two-ballot system worked mainly against the Left (see Duverger, *Political Parties*, 2nd English ed. [London 1959], 375, fig. 44), an effect produced not by the second ballot as such but by an old-fashioned apportionment of seats favoring the rural districts at the expense of the industrialized constituencies, which found themselves increasingly underrepresented as the urban population grew in numbers. A similar development took place in Norway, where the two-ballot system was also in operation at that time (Debate in the Norwegian Parliament, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget*, November 27, 1919). In both Germany and Norway, the phenomenon of rotten boroughs was more important than the two-ballot device.

[39] See my article "Wahlsoziologische Probleme des Nationalsozialismus," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, CX, No. 2 (1954), 282-83; and Hermens, 257.

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from such numerical exercises, they may contribute to a clarification of certain points.

IX

I have been concerned with the possibility of introducing quantitative notions into the discussion of political stability. But there are other points of view. The problem can be regarded, for example, from a sociological angle, as has been done by Richard Rosecrance in his book *Action and Reaction in World Politics*,[40] in which he introduces the concept of mass society to account for instability in international affairs. I am skeptical regarding the usefulness of this concept; and since Rosecrance's book deals partly with the European state system of the eighteenth century, which I have discussed in the foregoing pages, I shall briefly indicate where I disagree with him.

Enumerating nine consecutive international systems from the eighteenth century to the present, Rosecrance regards five of them as having been stable and four as unstable: "Destabilizing systems have been introduced concurrent with mass societal tendencies. . . . It is significant that each of the four disequilibrial systems of international relations were either immediately preceded or accompanied by fundamental changes. . . . The mass of people became available to large-scale influence. . . ."[41] In accordance with his theory, Rosecrance regards the eighteenth century as having been a moderate age in international relations because of the absence of popular government: "Because of the lack of popular government, the subjects of prince or aristocracy did not identify themselves with the acts of their ruling cliques. . . . King or lord could not assume popular approval for his diplomacy or wars; hence, he could carry neither to extremes. . . . The consequence of the limited diplomacy which resulted from this condition can scarcely be overestimated."[42]

Further: "A signal characteristic of international relations under the old regime was the security of tenure enjoyed by the traditional elites. Unlike the mass society which ensued, the 'communal society' of the

[40] (Boston 1963). [41] *Ibid.*, 285, 281.

[42] *Ibid.*, 26. Rosecrance confines his detailed discussion to the years 1740-1789, but he repeatedly refers to the first part of the eighteenth and the latter part of the seventeenth century as belonging to the same system. For instance, on page 22, he mentions the battles of the War of the Spanish Succession. On page 234, he says that the eighteenth century never witnessed "any fundamental or persistent attempts to destroy the pattern of international outcomes like those which occurred in the first part of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Neither the international system nor the internal constitution of its various actors was ever at stake."

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eighteenth century made elites inaccessible to popular influence and masses unavailable to mobilization by [the] elite. . . . The relatively moderate relationships among European sovereigns . . . were due . . . to the security of individual regimes."[43]

No doubt there is a good deal of truth in this, but if we consider the first part of the eighteenth century, we shall find that the statement is not generally valid. There never was a more secure member of any traditional elite than His Most Christian Majesty Louis XIV, King of France, in the year 1700. Yet his overweening ambition was a menace to all surrounding states and raised the specter of a "universal monarchy." The relationships of Louis with other monarchs were anything but moderate. For instance, he repeatedly tried to invade the British Isles in order to place his own candidate on the throne of England. On the other hand, one of the factors that helped to restore the balance of power in Europe was the mass reaction provoked among the English by these attempts. A similar mass reaction in Holland worked in the same direction.

The ultimate stabilization was a result of the interplay of many forces. Yet it is easy to conceive of the possibility of a different outcome. Rosecrance and other authors have put great stress on the state of military technology in the eighteenth century as a factor making for stability. Though it certainly meant a good deal, its importance seems to have been exaggerated. Neither side obtained decisive victory in the War of the Spanish Succession, but both sides came very near to it at one time or another. In 1704 Louis seemed about to shatter the Allied forces and take the Emperor's capital of Vienna. Then he was unexpectedly stopped at Blenheim. Four years later Marlborough seemed in a position to march on Paris and dictate peace at Versailles; he might have done it if Prince Eugene had not deemed it too risky.[44] Charles XII of Sweden had but recently performed a similar feat when he chased Augustus of Poland out of his kingdom.

There was nothing inevitable about the maintenance of the balance of power in Western Europe; some single disruptive action might at one time or another have destroyed the system. The same observation may be applied to the system of internal British politics in Queen Anne's time, which seemed indeed on the point of breaking down toward the end of her reign, when her faculties were failing, and did

[43] *Ibid.*, 283.

[44] On Marlborough's plan, see Trevelyan, II, 368. I believe Bernard Brodie is right in speaking about the "myth" of the limited character of warfare in the eighteenth century. See his *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959), 30.

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break down upon her death, when there succeeded to the throne a foreigner with no understanding of the art of balancing between British parties. The functioning of the delicately poised system was destroyed by this individual accident.

X

There are many aspects of the problem of stability on which I have not been able to touch in this article, such as the important distinction between a form of government that is both stable and effective and one that is merely stable but not effective. I have considered stability only in the sense of what Harry Eckstein calls "persistence of pattern."[45] And I have treated in detail only some aspects of a pattern formed by three political units. Certainly there are many other possibilities, ranging from the single unit of the Roman Empire subjugating all other Mediterranean countries—or modern totalitarianism suppressing all parties but one—to polycentric configurations either international or domestic.[46]

It will help to clarify our discussions if we can introduce quantitative material concerning the various patterns. Take, for instance, the writings of Maurice Duverger on parties and elections. While Duverger has used a good deal of quantitative data in other connections, such as

[45] P. 229.

[46] Cf. the articles by Maurice A. Ash, Morton A. Kaplan, and Arthur Lee Burns in Part IV of James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 334-66; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 390-406; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* (Summer 1964), 881-909; and R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September 1966), 314-27. It should be noted that a bloc which appears monolithic may conceal internal cleavages. On the other hand, an apparently many-sided constellation can often be reduced to a simpler form. There were many actors in the wars against Louis XIV: Besides the various large and small states there were groups like the Protestant rebels in France, Italy, and Hungary; French Huguenot refugees; English and Irish Catholic refugees; and Spanish guerrillas fighting for or against rival pretenders. There was the Pope, who played an independent role, and there was also the Jesuit Order, parts of which acted independently of the Pope. Yet in the end, from all these diverse elements there emerges a three-unit pattern: on the one hand, Louis XIV and his clients; on the other hand, Austria and her continental helpers; and thirdly, the decisive balancer, Britain.

William H. Riker takes up the question of the size of a coalition in his *Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962), 211. Riker states as a fundamental principle that coalitions will "tend toward the minimal winning size." This is certainly often true in domestic affairs (cf. E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* [New York 1942], 95). However, in international politics the model is less applicable. At Yalta, in early 1945, the Western Allies were confident of winning the war against Japan, but nevertheless the USSR was brought in to enlarge the coalition. Though this meant sharing the spoils with an extra participant, it also seemed to promise a substantial reduction in the *cost* of achieving victory.

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the analysis of electoral systems, he has been content to describe the patterns formed by political units in purely qualitative terms. To begin with, he emphasized strongly the element of bipolarity in politics. French society, he wrote in a book on electoral laws, was divided into two opposite camps, those of the Right and Left; what other nuances might exist were of only secondary importance.[47] This is also one of the themes in his later book *Political Parties*, in which he writes about societies in general. A division into two camps is in accordance with "the nature of things." Any policy demands a choice, for or against. "Whenever public opinion is squarely faced with great fundamental problems it tends to crystallize round two opposed poles"; and then we can disregard, so Duverger says, all "secondary differences."[48] Such is the case not only in France, but everywhere. However in this book on parties he does not *always* stick to his theory of the basically bipolar character of politics. When surveying the French scene he admits that what he started by terming unnatural may be a perfectly normal phenomenon. We often find more than one axis, more than one important dimension of conflict within a society. French politics during the Fourth Republic was marked by several "overlapping cleavages," the three main ones being the cleavage between clericalists and anticlericalists, between adherents of the Western and the Eastern powers, and between adherents of a free and a planned economy.[49] While he makes no attempt to measure the relative importance of these cleavages, Duverger does make it clear that many people who were "leftist" in one sense were "rightist" in another sense.

A similar phenomenon is frequently observed in international affairs.

[47] There was evident "une tendance profonde à se diviser en deux grandes fractions rivales," "deux tempéraments politiques fondamentaux," "une opposition de base entre la Droite et la Gauche, l'Ordre et le Mouvement." Other differences were only "oppositions secondaires à l'intérieur de chaque groupe d'opinions" (*L'influence des systèmes électoraux*, 42-43).

[48] Pp. 215-16.

[49] *Ibid.*, 232. Perhaps the notion of overlapping cleavages could also be applied in an analysis of the Third Republic. Duverger seems to regard the political scene as essentially bipolar in that period; no doubt it contained many units, but a simple pattern of two great rival factions emerged on more important occasions. Though the Chamber of Deputies displayed a somewhat confusing array of party groups, he says, most of them could be arranged without too much difficulty along a Right-Left continuum. Even if one accepts this statement, however, it is hard to see the regime of the Third Republic as a two-unit system. It represents rather a variation on the three-unit theme (I would say a variation of the political cobweb type; see n. 13 above). A special case of overlapping cleavage is also to be noted. The French Right was clerical and capitalist; the Left, anticlerical and socialist. In the Center, the cleavages overlapped, the Radicals being capitalistic and anticlerical—rightist in economic matters, leftist in religion—putting the main emphasis sometimes on their opposition to socialism and sometimes on their opposition to clericalism.

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There is a cleavage between the Communist and the anti-Communist camps, but also between the Chinese and Russian brands of communism, while in the matter of nuclear policy the Soviet Union and the United States, as established atomic powers, are opposed to emerging atomic powers like France and China.

The relative importance of the different cleavages is not easy to evaluate, and little quantitative material is available that can help us in such evaluations. It is not altogether lacking, however, at least not with respect to internal politics. Under what circumstances is it true that public opinion tends to crystallize around two opposed poles? When is it, on the contrary, marked by overlapping cleavages? And are there certain times when it will be divided into three groups in the manner postulated by Aristotle? Questions such as these can be answered with a reasonable degree of certainty only if some amount of measurement can be accomplished. The task is not an easy one, but with the aid of election statistics, referendum results, public opinion polls, legislative roll calls, and so on, more could be done than has been done to find where the dividing lines go in politics and to estimate the forces on either side.[50] This would also make it easier to assess the element of stability in national politics.

And perhaps somewhat similar considerations would not be altogether irrelevant to the study of international affairs.

[50] Some empirical research in this direction has already been undertaken. For instance, Alfred Winslow Jones, who studied an American industrial city in the 1930's with the aid of systematic interviews, found a tri-modal distribution of opinion corresponding to the attitudes of big business, labor, and the middle class. See his *Life, Liberty, and Property* (New York 1941), 327. Cf. V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York 1961), 70-73. For attempts to measure the strength of "overlapping cleavages" with election statistics and survey data, see S. Rokkan and H. Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki 1964); and S. Rokkan, "Geography, Religion, and Social Class: Cross-Cutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics," in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York 1967). Cf. Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago 1967), 338-70. David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York 1962), 508-10, uses the somewhat related concept of "overlapping membership" in groups. For an incisive criticism of Truman, see Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 124.

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SELF-DETERMINATION

The New Phase

By WALKER CONNOR

CAN two or more self-differentiating culture-groups coexist within a single political structure? The question may well seem clearly settled by the overwhelming factual evidence of contemporary international politics, for it is indeed a truism that political and ethnic borders seldom coincide. Thus, the very existence of a host of multinational states, including such a time-tested example as the Soviet Union, would appear to document an affirmative answer. On the other hand, a recent spate of political unrest within such geographically diverse and historically unrelated states as, *inter alia*, Canada, Guyana, India, Uganda, Belgium, the Sudan, Burma, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, and Iraq, focuses attention on the common root cause of intrastate yet international conflict and again brings into question the assumptions of the multinational state.

These assumptions were never seriously challenged until the rise of *popular* national consciousness, and the issue is therefore of relatively recent origin. As Sir Ernest Barker noted: "The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were already there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things which are simply 'there' that matter in human life. What really and finally matters is the thing which is apprehended as an idea, and, as an idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of action. In the world of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical; and a nation must be an idea as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force."[1] Barker here provides us with the means of avoiding the labyrinthine question, What constitutes a nation? In the final analysis, the coincidence of the customary tangible attributes of nationality, such as common language or religion, is not determinative. The prime requisite is subjective and consists of the self-identification of people with a group—its past, its present, and, most important, its destiny.

What lent political force to the growth of national consciousness was the ancillary doctrine that political self-expression was a necessary concomitant of cultural consciousness, a doctrine that seriously chal-

[1] *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (London 1927), 173.

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lenged, perhaps even totally denied, the legitimacy of the multistate structure. There is general agreement that the first indications of this concept of the right of nations to political self-expression can be detected in the fruits of the first Polish partition, and more evidently in the American and French revolutions. Denied by the Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance, national consciousness throve on adversity, spreading throughout Europe and Latin America during the nineteenth century.[2] Although the peace settlements that followed World War I honored the concept more in the breach than in application, the numerous wartime and postwar public espousals of the doctrine by leading statesmen of the Allied Powers accorded to it a recognition of validity that would thenceforth prove difficult to ignore or deny. The doctrine, by this time expressed in the phrase "self-determination of nations," was clearly never intended by Wilson and other contemporary advocates to have universal application. Rather, it was intended by them to apply solely to areas formerly under the sovereignty of the defeated powers.[3] However, the principle had been consistently stated in the broadest of terms,[4] and it could therefore be cited with equal validity by any group desirous of repudiating foreign rule.[5] The doctrine thereafter became both a catalyst and a defense for independence movements throughout the world and was instrumental in the post–World War II recession of European power from Africa and Asia.

There was, however, a unique feature to the African and Asian independence movements. Although they had been conducted in the name of self-determination of nations, they were, in fact, demands for political independence not in accord with ethnic distributions, but along the essentially happenstance borders that delimited either the sovereignty or the administrative zones of the former colonial powers. This fact combined with the incredibly complex ethnic map of Africa

[2] Lord Acton believed that 1831 was the "watershed" year. He considered revolutionary movements prior to that date to be based upon either rival empirical claims or the refusal of people to be misgoverned by strangers. He noted that prior to 1831, Turks, Dutch, or Russians were resisted not as "usurpers" but as oppressors, "because they misgoverned, not because they were of a different race" (John E. E. Dalberg-Acton, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* [London 1907], 284).

[3] See Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since the World War*, Vol. I (Washington 1933), 488.

[4] See, for example, Wilson's speech before the League to Enforce Peace on May 27, 1916: "We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live . . ." (quoted in Wambaugh, 4).

[5] Wilson was later to admit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee his amazement and chagrin at the large number of requests for support of independence movements. Excerpts from his testimony are cited in Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (Chicago 1949), 21.

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and Asia to create, in the name of self-determination of nations, a host of multinational states.[6] Now in turn, these new political structures, along with some of the older European states, are the targets of growing demands that self-determination be carried a further step toward its natural conclusion. And the leaders of these new states, though recent espousers of national self-determination, are now perforce the defenders of multinationalism.

Multinationalism has had both its detractors and supporters among scholars. Although criticism of the logical bases of traditional political borders was inseparable from Locke's and Jefferson's insistence that government must rest upon the consent of the governed, it is in the writings of John Stuart Mill that the issue is first clearly posed in terms of nationality. His remarks, published in 1861 in *Considerations on Representative Government*, ignited a controversy among British scholars which was ultimately to include such notables as Lord Acton, Ernest Barker, and Alfred Cobban.

Mill maintained that "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality."[7] This conclusion was predicated upon his fear of despotic government, for he believed that a multinational population would invite authoritarianism by lending itself to a divide-and-rule technique. He feared that the mutual antipathies and jealousies of the nationalities would prove greater than any distrust of governmental power. Mill was particularly concerned about the possible impact that multinationalism might have upon the army. Convinced that a major deterrent to despotism was the common bond of nationality between army personnel and the public at large, he foresaw the danger that a despot of a multinational state might employ troops of one ethnic strain against his subjects of another. According to Mill, in such event the soldiers "will have no more scruple mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why, than they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies."[8]

Mill's analysis spurred a strong rebuttal in an article published during the following year by Lord Acton.[9] The contrast between the two men's

[6] Although Europe is similarly afflicted, its present political borders are not the result of fulfilled "self-determination" demands.

[7] *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York 1873), 313.

[8] *Ibid.*, 311. Similar fears concerning the ethnic composition of the army played a major role in Nigerian events during 1966.

[9] Entitled "Nationality," it was published in *Home and Foreign Review* in July 1862 and is reprinted in Acton, *History of Freedom*, 270-300.

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antithetical conclusions is the more remarkable because of the identity of goals. Acton, as Mill, desired foremost to prevent absolutism, but he envisaged the homogeneous population advocated by Mill as the natural ally of authoritarianism. In an argument not dissimilar to that advanced by Madison in *Federalist Paper No. 10* (if economic and geographic diversity be replaced by distinctions of nationality), Acton contended: "The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty . . . provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion."[10] He added: "That intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other force could so efficiently provide. The coexistence of several nations under the same State is a test as well as the best security of its freedom."[11]

In addition to recognizing its antidespotic function, Acton also supported the multinational state as the necessary vehicle of civilization. It was only within the larger crucible of the heterogeneous state that separate nations would interact, amiably compete, and contribute to the progress of one another. Small, homogeneous states were therefore viewed as "impediments to the progress of society, which depends on the mixture of races under the same government."[12] The word "mixture" should not be taken too literally, however, for Acton was certainly not making a case for assimilation. What he desired was stringent cultural autonomy. Although a state within which no mixture of nationalities occurred was described as "imperfect," a state that attempted to neutralize or absorb divergent cultures thereby, Acton maintained, "destroys its own vitality" and is "decrepit."[13]

Acton's analysis was criticized, in turn, by Ernest Barker, who found it wanting on pragmatic grounds. With the advantage of the knowledge provided by an additional sixty-five years of political history, Barker characterized Lord Acton's defense of the multinational state as abstract and controverted by facts. "But even in 1860," he contended, "it might have been perceived that in a multi-national State the government either pits each nation against the rest to secure its own absolutism [as maintained by Mill], or allows itself to become the organ of one of the nations for the suppression or oppression of others."[14] Barker acknowledged that history provided examples of autocratic states that were composed of a number of nations, but he held that an unassimi-

[10] *Ibid.*, 289. [11] *Ibid.*, 290. [12] *Ibid.* [13] *Ibid.*, 298.
[14] *National Character*, 16.

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lated democratic state tended to dissolve into as many democracies as there were nationalities. This tendency, combined with what Barker perceived as a seemingly inexorable movement toward assimilation brought on by the rise of such forces as public school systems, mass communication facilities, and the need for a common statewide tongue, caused Barker to predict a worldwide "scheme of political organization in which each nation is also a State, and each State is also a nation."[15]

The redressing of the scholarly balance on the issue was undertaken by Alfred Cobban during World War II. Cobban unequivocally aligned himself with Lord Acton, holding that the nationally heterogeneous state "must re-enter the political canon, from which, as Acton many years ago declared, it should never have been dispelled."[16] He shared Acton's sentiment that the nation-state had no logical relationship to freedom and noted that "the most prevalent solutions of the national problem in a world of competing nationalisms . . . are likely to be expulsion, massacre, or economic attrition."[17]

Despite his preference for multinationalism, however, Cobban recognized that the concept of the nation-state was growing in influence. But he vehemently denied that this development was necessary. Taking exception to Barker's contention that history proved that only autocratic states could remain multinational, Cobban enumerated a number of contemporary states that he held to be working examples of multinational democracies, and he felt compelled to the vastly different conclusion that in most instances political and ethnic borders could not possibly be made to coincide.[18] Looking to the future, Cobban correctly anticipated the subsequent withdrawal of European political domination from most of Africa and Asia, and he expressed his belief that the popular misconception of a necessary link between political and ethnic borders would be particularly inapplicable and pernicious on these continents. Consistent with Acton's proposals, he favored for these areas transgroup political structures within which tribal and cultural sentiments would enjoy autonomy.

Aside from the more philosophic question of what ought to be the incidence of identity between nations and sovereign political entities, there remain two questions, the answers to which are intrinsic to the conclusions of each of the foregoing authorities, and both of which can be subjected to empirical investigation. The first involves the potentiality of the multination state to survive as an effective political form.

[15] *Ibid.*, 125-26.
[16] *National Self-Determination*, 62.
[17] *Ibid.*, 73.
[18] *Ibid.*, 62, 63.

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Is it essentially an anachronism, albeit a tenacious one, whose death knell sounded with the first indications of popular national consciousness? The second question involves the relationship between the nation-state, on the one hand, and democratic principles and institutions on the other. Is it the single-nation state or the multination state that manifests the greater adherence to democracy? Political developments since World War II may well indicate the appropriate answers to these questions, for although only two decades have elapsed since the publication of Cobban's study, an unprecedented quantity of pertinent data has emerged from that period. The number of states has multiplied, global research and reportorial coverage have been greatly expanded, and the forces of political change have accelerated. Moreover, the post–World War II experiences of multination states follow a remarkably uniform pattern, thus furnishing more definite answers to these questions. The pattern is particularly evident in relation to the question involving the potential for survival of the multination state.

As earlier noted, the policy of politically dividing Africa and Asia along the former political and administrative lines of empire created a large number of transcultural states. If the movement for political separatism had given evidence of culminating at this point, the faith in the sustaining power of the multination form, which was shared by Acton and Cobban, would appear vindicated. But the overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that the movement is still far from completion.

Consider Asia: Reports persist that the Chinese Communist government is turning the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang Province into a minority by promoting an intensive migration of Chinese into the province in order to ensure the region's allegiance to Peking. Moreover, earlier Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule has led to the continuous military occupation of that region since 1959. On Taiwan there are rumblings of dissatisfaction on the part of the indigenous population, who tend to look upon the ruling group of mainland expatriates as aliens. Despite Indonesia's recent preoccupation with the question of internal communism, it should not be forgotten that regionalism underlay the rebellion waged between 1958 and 1961 and that common awareness of cultural distinctions remains a source of resistance to rule from Djakarta.[19] In the case of Vietnam, the intra-Vietnamese (Annamese) struggles have tended to obscure an active "self-determination" movement on the part of tribal hill peoples who populate more than half of the country's

[19] See, for example, George Kahin and others, *Major Governments of Asia,* 2nd ed. (Ithaca 1963), 674.

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territory. Popularly but mistakenly grouped under the single designation "Montagnards," they have made evident, by a number of open revolts against Vietnamese rule and by the creation of a liberation front, that the internal political problems of Vietnam would not terminate even with the highly unlikely creation of a government acceptable to all the ethnic Vietnamese.[20] In Laos, the confused and many-sided civil war has in no small part been due to the absence of transcultural identification with the Laotian state on the part of the diverse population.[21] In Thailand, the effectiveness of Bangkok's writ diminishes rapidly when one leaves the culturally compatible Chao Phraya Valley for the Lao-speaking northeast, for the Karen-populated hills of the west, or for the Malay- and Chinese-populated regions of the Malay Peninsula. In neighboring Malaysia, cohesion suffers from the antagonisms between the Malays and a strong Chinese minority, antagonisms that have already led to the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation.[22] In the case of Burma, it has been estimated that Rangoon controls only half of its territory; the remaining territory is populated by dissident, non-Burmese groups such as Shans, Kachins, Karens, Chins, and Mons.[23] Within East Pakistan, the inhabitants have long voiced strong dissatisfaction with their political ties to the peoples of West Pakistan from whom they are differentiable on practically every basis other than religion. In Ceylon, state unity has been frustrated by the intense rivalry between Sinhalese and Tamils which has periodically manifested itself in riots. Indian history has been even more often marred by eruptions of violence caused by the dissatisfaction of linguistic and cultural groups, and major governmental concessions concerning the delineating of provincial borders and the recognition of official languages have been the price of a return to order. In India's eastern areas, Naga and Mizo tribesmen are in open rebellion against rule by New Delhi. Iraq is riven by the Kurdish movement for self-determination, a problem that cannot be dissociated from the continuation of Kurdish territory into neighboring Iran and Turkey. Perhaps the most publicized failure of multinationalism since World War II

[20] The name of the liberation front is FULRO, a French acronym for the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races. For references to two of the more important revolts of the tribesmen, see the *New York Times*, September 21, 1964, and December 20, 1965.

[21] For a description of the various ethnic strains and their relations, see Frank LeBar and others, *Laos* (New Haven 1960).

[22] For a report that Sarawak may also attempt to withdraw from the Federation because of ethnic considerations, see the *New York Times*, November 17, 1966.

[23] Robert McCabe, "When China Spits, We Swim," *New York Times Magazine* (February 27, 1966), 48.

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involves an Asian and a non-Asian people on Cyprus; the only noteworthy interlude to the communal warfare there between Greek and Turk coincided with the ill-fated attempt at transnational government in the period 1960-1963.

Sub-Sahara Africa's short history of broad-scale independence has also provided a number of challenges to the concept of the multiculture state. Indeed, there is very little evidence of the existence of supratribal allegiance to the new political entities that have been created south of the Sahara, and much contrary evidence, such as the entire anarchic history of the Congo. The rejection of transnation principles has been particularly pronounced in situations coinvolving "Europeans" and "Africans." Antagonisms between a white, ruling minority and a Negro majority within the southern tier of states and territories are one manifestation of the relative weakness of transracial sentiments; the pursuit of "Africanization" (the replacement of non-Negroes by Negroes in all endeavors as rapidly as possible) throughout much of the remaining area of sub-Sahara Africa is another. Nor has the presence of "Europeans" been a necessary prerequisite for racial tensions. Thus, the now rather lengthy insurrection waged by the Negro peoples of southern Sudan against the politically dominant Arabs of the northern sector, the overthrow and expulsion of the ruling Arab minority on Zanzibar in early 1964, the almost total elimination within Rwanda of the formerly dominant Watusi by the Bahutu between 1959 and 1963, sporadic genocidal conflicts between the same two peoples for political control of neighboring Burundi, the revolt during 1966 of the important Buganda tribe against the centralization of rule in Uganda, the Somali irredentist movements in Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya, and the general resentment of East Coast Negroes toward settlers of Asian ancestry are all cases in which consciousness of race (in the minimal sense of readily visible distinctions) has proved antithetical to the concept of the multination state. Although less apparent a source of intrastate dissension than either tribalism or race, a third cultural division that seriously affects a number of states is that between the coastal and riverine people, who were most influenced by European ways and institutions during the period of colonialism, and the more isolated people of the interior. This bifurcation helps to explain, for example, the demise of the Mali Federation brought about by the withdrawal of Senegal in 1960, as well as the animosity between the Hausas and Ibos which threatens the survival of Nigeria. Yet a fourth division of Africa, which cuts across state lines and which appears to be growing in political significance, is that between Islamic and non-Islamic cul-

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tures. This distinction is perhaps the most important factor in an Eritrean movement for independence from Christian Ethiopia, and it is also a contributing element in Somali irredentism within Ethiopia and Kenya, in attitudes toward political independence within French Somaliland, and in the internal strife of both Nigeria and the Sudan.

The most warranted conclusion to be drawn from a review of recent developments throughout Africa and Asia would therefore appear to be that the concept of self-determination has proved more powerful than could be appreciated from the vantage point of the 1940's. If the evidence were limited to these two continents, a demurrer could be made on the ground that analysis had been limited to societies in which political institutions are in an inchoate and therefore ephemeral and inconclusive stage; it could be contended that analysis of long-range trends should logically give greater weight to the time-tested, modern states of Europe and of regions politically dominated by people of European background. However, the recent history of multinationalism in such cases does not differ appreciably from the Afro-Asian experience. This becomes particularly evident when one examines the subsequent history of those states that were deemed successful examples of multinationalism by Mill, Acton, Barker, and Cobban. The purpose of such examination is not to sit in hindsight judgment of their observations, but to illustrate the acceleration of cultural-political consciousness, for cultural tensions have surfaced even where competent observers could not detect them at earlier points in history.

Events have already furnished conclusive answers to the fate of Acton's major examples, the Austro-Hungarian and the British empires. Of the former, Barker has noted: "Unfortunately they tried to unite a territory which, if one may use a geological term, was full of 'faults'; and they inevitably failed. A nation can only be made by a State if the population on which it works already possesses some homogeneity. The mixture of Magyar, German, and Slav was too rebellious to the potter's hand."[24] Barker's commentary would apply with equal validity to the British Empire, for—whether in a particular region the impetus for independence was indigenous or came from Britain, whether or not the new state opted for membership within the loose structure of the British Commonwealth—the basic cause of the disintegration of empire was the refusal of people to accept political rule by those deemed aliens.

But what of those "Western" multinational states that are still in

[24] P. 123.

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existence? As previously noted, Alfred Cobban took exception to Barker's assertion that history indicated that democratic, multinational states could not survive. His empirical case on this point rested essentially upon the examples of Great Britain, South Africa, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland.[25]

The inclusion of Britain as an example of multinationalism is puzzling; although Barker also acknowledged Britain to be an exception to his rule, it is an exception that cannot go unchallenged. Both Barker and Cobban had the transnationalism of the Scotch and Welsh in mind, but the view of most authorities holds that the self-identification of these people with London is the product of assimilation rather than of the continuing coexistence of prospering cultures. Indeed, authorities have customarily emphasized the remarkable homogeneity of Britain's major island.[26] Moreover, when this homogeneity was challenged by the postwar influx of immigrants from the West Indies and southern Asia, the result was racial friction and the passage of restrictive immigration legislation, antithetical to the concept of multinationalism. And in Northern Ireland, the attempts by the Catholic minority to express through the electoral process their long-standing discontent with political rule by a religiously and culturally distinct people, as well as the attempts of the moderate government to move toward equalization of opportunity for the minority, resulted in a series of violent reactions during 1966.[27]

As to the example of South Africa, it is assumed that this state would not have been included by Cobban could the subsequent governmental adherence to the policy of apartheid been prophesied. If, on the other hand, Cobban was referring solely to the relations between the two white minorities—Briton and Boer—it must be noted that fundamental differences of attitude persist, even though currently suffused by the overriding issue of black-white relations.[28] The political outcome of the

[25] P. 63.

[26] See, for example, Gwendolen Carter and others, *Major Foreign Powers*, 3rd ed. (New York 1957), 7, 8. The degree of assimilation is evidenced by the fact that only a minority of Welshmen and an insignificant number of Scotsmen are able to converse in their original languages, and all but a handful of these are fluent also in English. In both regions there have been recent nationalist movements whose goals range from minor alterations in administrative forms and school curricula to total independence. However, these movements are not considered to pose a serious challenge to "British nationalism," and, in any event, are a manifestation more of a resurgence of nationalist particularism than of cooperative multinationalism.

[27] J. H. Huizinga, "Captain O'Neil and the Anti-Papist," *The Reporter* (October 20, 1966), 43-44.

[28] Paul Fordham, *The Geography of African Affairs* (Baltimore 1965), 207.

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cultural division between Englishmen and Boer therefore awaits a more normal environment.

The examples of Canada and Belgium are more instructive because of the elongated period during which two distinct cultures have survived within their borders on an apparently harmonious basis. Thus, Cobban wrote that French and British Canadians "have achieved a common political nationality without abandoning their characteristic cultural differences."[29] Tracing the unity of Canada back almost two hundred years to the French and Indian Wars, he credits its success to the wisdom of the British peace terms under which demands for compulsory anglicization were eschewed in favor of guarantees of cultural autonomy to the French community.[30] Similarly, with regard to Belgium, Mill, although the proponent of the nation-state, acknowledged more than a century ago the existence of a common national consciousness shared by the Flemish and Walloons; and Cobban, as late as 1944, could detect "no reason at all" for believing that cultural consciousness would lead to the disintegration of the state.[31] The contrast between these observations and recent events is striking. Contemporary relations between the two Belgian groups have been characterized more by street violence and demands for strict separation than by harmony. The breadth and fervor of the "Flanders for the Flemish" movement have been illustrated by broadly supported demands that French-speaking faculty members and students of Louvain University be forced to leave Flanders for Wallonia and by Flemish insistence on legislation that would preclude desirous Flemish parents from "denationalizing" their offspring by sending them to French schools.[32] Canada, meanwhile, has been troubled by (1) separatist movements, (2) the insistence of the culturally French province of Quebec for increased independence of the central government and a greater share of governmental revenues, (3) demands for a balancing of opportunities between French and non-French people, (4) resistance to a governmental requirement that civil servants be bilingual, and (5) even by a question of the degree to which the traditional flag (since replaced) did and should symbolize the hegemony of "Anglo" culture.

Cobban's final example, Switzerland, is the most commonly employed illustration of a multinational "going concern." Here again, mid-nineteenth- and mid-twentieth-century assessments are in accord, for Mill perceived a powerful sentiment of Swiss nationality which "went beyond different races, different languages, and different reli-

[29] P. 60. [30] *Ibid.*, 79. [31] Mill, 308; Cobban, 144.
[32] See, for example, the *New York Times*, October 9 and October 30, 1966.

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gions,"[33] and Acton, after noting the ethnological division of the population into French, Italian, and German components, concluded that "no nationality has the slightest claim upon them, except the purely political nationality of Switzerland."[34] It is tempting to pass over Switzerland as a rule-proving exception attributable to the peculiarities of its size, location, topography, and special historical circumstances. And, admittedly, Swiss unity does not appear as seriously challenged by cultural cleavage as does that of Canada and Belgium. Nevertheless, the assertion that the subnationalities do not have the "slightest claim" upon the allegiance of the Swiss populace cannot be accepted as a valid characterization of the situation. It should be remembered that, as a result of Swiss neutrality, allegiance to Switzerland has not been severely tested against ethnic ties to Germany, France, or Italy. While the reasons for Swiss neutrality are multifold, there is reason to speculate upon the degree of adherence that the central government could have expected had it elected to enter the Franco-Prussian War or either of the World Wars. In each instance, even a policy of impartiality was threatened by considerable sympathy for France or Germany, particular preference following linguistic-cultural lines.[35] Vastly more significant, however, is the evidence that Switzerland has not been immune to the growing intrastate tensions that have recently plagued other multinational states. In Berne, the only canton with a substantial French-speaking minority (more than five percent, less than fifty percent), there has been an active secessionist movement in recent years, despite the fact that the boundaries of this canton were fixed more than 150 years ago.[36]

In addition to the foregoing states, Cobban also referred to the Soviet Union as an example of successful multinationalism. Although aware that Barker's analysis differentiated between "autocratic" and "democratic" states, Cobban felt the inclusion justified because the Soviet Union was, in his opinion, at least more democratic and yet more cohesive than had been the tsarist regimes. No matter where one places the Soviet Union on the democratic-authoritarian spectrum, however, it cannot be accepted as an exemplar of cultural cooperation. Authorities may disagree on the level of assimilation that has been attained within the Soviet Union, but it is generally held that the Soviet government

[33] P. 308. [34] Pp. 294-95.

[35] George Codding, Jr., *The Federal Government of Switzerland* (Boston 1961), 154 and *passim*.

[36] *Ibid.*, 39. See also the article in the *New York Times* of March 19, 1966, which describes the sentencing of secessionists for terrorism, together with the judge's admission of a general climate of political tension.

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has steadfastly followed a policy of russification. It is difficult to assess actual results because the government has purposefully tolerated the continued use of minority languages, while simultaneously eroding the wellsprings of the minority cultures, such as the Islamic religion. Thus, through a number of devices—some coercive, others seductive—the Soviet Union has moved toward assimilation while maintaining the most superficial guise of cultural autonomy.[37] Moreover, authorities anticipate an acceleration of the russification program which will include the denigration of non-Russian languages.[38] Such a move would be consonant both with Lenin's prerevolutionary plan that a short period of linguistic autonomy would be followed by the establishment of a single state language and with the statement in the new party program that "full-scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved."[39] But a compelling reason for governmental acceleration of the assimilation process may well be the continuing discordant impact of culture-group orientation. Thus, a number of Latvian notables were accused in 1961 of fanning local nationalist sentiments. In a similar vein, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist party was quoted in *Pravda* in early 1963: "There is no ground—either social or political or economic—for nationalism in our land. But we cannot forget that vestiges of it are still tenacious among a certain segment of politically immature people . . . [and are] always ready to break out to the surface. . . ."[40] The government also felt constrained to censure nationalist groups in the Ukraine during the spring of 1966.[41] Assuming that the Soviet Union would prefer to conceal such problems for both internal and external reasons, the few such official acknowledgements of the existence of nationalistic attitudes are probably indicative of what the

[37] For a historical account of this process as applied to the Turkic peoples of the USSR, see Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization," *Problems of Communism*, XIII (January-February 1964), 7-15. For a more general treatment of russification, see also the articles by Richard Pipes and Hugh Seton-Watson in the same issue.

[38] This was the consensus at a conference of specialists held at Brandeis University in the fall of 1965, as reported in the *New York Times*, October 31, 1965.

Confirmation of such a program was furnished at a meeting of the Ukrainian Writers Congress in early 1967. In response to complaints that heavy pressures to have Russian replace Ukrainian and other minority languages had been exerted during the early 1960's, a visiting secretary of the Russian Writers Union apologized for the haste with which the program of "merging the cultures" had been introduced (*New York Times*, January 29, 1967).

[39] Quoted by Richard Pipes, "The Forces of Nationalism," *Problems of Communism*, XIII (January-February 1964), 4.

[40] *Ibid.*, 5. [41] *New York Times*, April 16 and April 20, 1966.

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government conceives to be a problem of serious magnitude. At the minimum, it can be said that Soviet policy-makers have not yet solved "the minority problem."

The elusiveness of a solution is illustrated by contrasting the experiences of two other nondemocratic European states, Yugoslavia and Spain. Following the Soviet example, the Yugoslavian government has paid at least limited homage to the concept of cultural autonomy. Thus, the ostensible form of government is a federation of six ethnically delineated republics and two autonomous areas, and the use of diverse languages and alphabets is permitted. However, Yugoslavia has not been as successful as the Soviet Union in preventing the public airing of intercultural enmity. The prevalence of ethnic tensions became a major issue in the mid-1966 purge of Vice-President Rankovic and his followers. This group was accused of "Great Serbian chauvinism," thereby intensifying the hostility that Croatians, Slovenes, Albanians (Shiptars), Macedonians, and the other minority peoples felt toward the dominant Serbs. Even a year prior to these disclosures, the government had been forced to suppress a Croatian Liberation Movement, the average age of whose members, most of whom could not have remembered a pre-Tito regime, indicates that the movement represents a resurgence rather than a vestige of Croatian aspirations for independence. It is evident, then, that the Yugoslav policy of granting limited autonomy to culture groups has not furthered the cause of unity.

Franco's response to cultural division was enforced homogeneity. Although the Catalan and Basque minorities had enjoyed a short period of linguistic autonomy under the Spanish Republic, Franco ordered that only the Spanish language could be taught in the schools and used by the communications media. However, despite three decades of implementation, the policy continued to meet strong resistance and the government has recently retreated from its earlier position and become more permissive toward the use of minority tongues. Thus, the Spanish attempt at forceful eradication of minority cultures failed.

Additional evidence of European failure to accommodate multinationalism within a single state might include the often-expressed dissatisfaction of the German-speaking people of the Italian Tyrol, the strained relations between Rumanians and the Magyars of Rumanian Transylvania,[42] and the reappearance of the "Macedonian question," which involves minorities within Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia.[43] It is also pertinent to note that "European" Australia and New Zealand have determinedly resisted multinationalism. Although seri-

[42] *Ibid.*, February 5, 1966. [43] *Ibid.*, September 18, 1966.

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ously underpopulated, both countries maintain barriers against the influx of non-Caucasoids while proffering a variety of allurements to the more readily assimilable people of northwestern Europe.

European experience, therefore, only tends to confirm a broad-scale trend toward political consciousness along lines of nationality. If the desires of nationalities were controlling, the second part of Ernest Barker's prediction of a global political division "in which each nation is also a State, and each State is also a nation" would therefore rapidly be approaching realization. Yet, as indicated, seldom do political and ethnic borders coincide.

The principal reason for the wide gap between anticipation and realization in matters involving self-determination is the universal tendency of governments to render decisions upon the implicit assumption of the need to preserve the entire political unit. As against a claim of the right of self-determination, the government proclaims the right to stamp out rebellion and the duty to prevent secession. What is a self-evident truth to those desiring independence is treason to those in custody of the government. This polarization in the attitudes of the "ins" and the "outs" toward self-determination is most evident in the about-face of those former proponents of self-determination who led successful independence movements. As earlier noted, the African and Asian leaders who once castigated European domination as violative of the right of self-determination are not now prepared to recognize such a right on the part of their own minorities.[44]

A survey of multinational states does not indicate that any particular form of government has solved this dichotomy between the need for unity and the fissiparous impact of ethnic consciousness. It will be remembered that Ernest Barker was willing to concede that nondemocratic governments might impede the rise of political consciousness among ethnic groups. Yet despite great variations in the form and effectiveness of their respective governments, most of the Afro-Asian states that are troubled by ethnic tensions are clearly not democratic. Nor, as we have noted, are nondemocratic states such as the Soviet Union, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Spain free of such problems. The inability of authoritarian governments to cope successfully with multinationalism must therefore be considered still another testament to the increasing power of ethnic aspirations, for it indicates that the immunity believed to be enjoyed by authoritarian governments four decades ago is no longer effective.

[44] For a penetrating treatment of this phenomenon, see Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), esp. 28.

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The prevalence of ethnic dissonance within so many authoritarian systems must be considered significant because authoritarianism does enjoy real advantages in combating nationalist movements. Among the more formidable weapons at the disposal of such governments are a clandestine reporting apparatus and the ability to intern leaders for long periods without bringing formal charges. Control of communications is also important, for, if effective, it permits the government to cut the leadership off from possible domestic and foreign support. Such a government, if it acknowledges at all the presence of a self-determination movement, will typically describe it as the activity of a few provocateurs or malcontents. In such cases, evaluation of the actual situation is difficult, perhaps impossible. The problem of assessing ethnic movements within the Soviet Union has already been touched upon, but it should be noted that a number of movements elsewhere were excluded from earlier consideration because of the unavailability of dependable data. How strong, for example, is the Kashmiri desire for independence? How strong the movement within India for a Dravidistan? Tamilstan? Sikhistan? How much support is there within West Pakistan or, for that matter, within Afghanistan for an independent Pushtunistan? In southwestern Iran for an independent Arabistan? In eastern Turkey for an independent Armenian state? In eastern Ethiopia for an independent Eritrea? In northwestern Algeria for Berber independence? In each of these instances, and the list could be greatly expanded, it is known that an ethnic movement does, in fact, exist, but lack of information prevents a valid assessment of its strength. However, it is safe to conclude that the political consciousness of various ethnic groups is even much more prevalent than we can document.

This trend obviously conflicts with the widely held opinion that nationalism has proved too parochial for the modern age and that its zenith is now well passed. This position has been lent credence by the postwar proliferation of multistate organizations, which ranged, in their original aims, from limited military or economic cooperation to complete unification. However, although the goals of a transstate organization may be contrary to national aspirations, they need not be so. One factor will be the degree of integration that is anticipated. There is nothing in military or economic cooperation that is inconsistent with extreme national consciousness, when the results of such cooperation are viewed as beneficial to the national interest. But the nearer one moves toward the erection of a multinational state, the sharper becomes the conflict between the organization and nationalism.

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For example, De Gaulle's nationalism does not blind him to the economic advantages that might flow to the French from regional economic cooperation under the EEC, but it explains his resistance to any proposed transfer of the decision-making power away from the individual states. Similarly, he supports limited military cooperation, but refuses to accept a position of national dependence concerning any aspect of military strategy. In short, there is nothing intrinsically incompatible between the growth of national consciousness and organizations of such limited goals as the European or Latin American Free Trade Associations. Significant, however, is the fact that in the case of those organizations whose goals have most clearly conflicted with nationalism, it is the organization that has been forced into retreat. The EEC structure remains, but few are still optimistic about its supranational objectives. Similarly, the amazingly short-lived "Sino-Soviet bloc" foundered on the incompatibility of Chinese and Soviet national aspirations. Subsequent attempts by the Soviet Union to perpetuate the monolithic nature of the geographically more limited Eastern European multinational structure (including the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) have experienced a series of major setbacks due to the rising nationalism of the Poles, Rumanians, Czechs, Bulgars, and other East European peoples. In interstate relations, as within the typical multinational state, the centrifugal forces of national aspirations are proving more powerful than the centripetal forces of transnationalism.

There is, moreover, considerable reason to expect a further proliferation of self-determination movements. For most people, ethnic consciousness still lies in the future. National consciousness presupposes an awareness of other culture-groups, but, to a majority of the world's population, the meaningful world still ends with the village.[45] If the past and present are instructive, it can be expected that cultural and political consciousness will spread with increased communications and that the ethnic hodgepodges that are Asia and Africa will produce a host of new demands for the redrawing of political borders.

Should such demands for self-determination be met? The question can be viewed within two quite distinct contexts—the one, moral; the other, practical. If the question means whether each nationality, simply because it is a self-distinguishing culture-group, has a right to self-rule, then the question defies a provable conclusion. Axioms, such as "the

[45] A 1962 UNESCO survey estimated that seventy percent of the world's population is essentially unaware of happenings beyond the village. See also Emerson, 36.

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right of self-determination," appear as moral imperatives until countered with opposing maxims. As earlier indicated, a "principle" of self-determination can be countered by other "principles," such as the right of states to preserve themselves, to protect their territorial integrity, to maintain internal order, to legislate against treasonable acts, and so forth. If, on the other hand, the question is intended to ask whether it is reasonable or even possible to grant statehood to each nation, it is doubtful that even those who are most sympathetic to the principle of self-determination would answer in the affirmative. Mill and Barker, for example, were both prepared to acknowledge the impracticality of self-determination in the case of two or more groups who were so geographically intermingled as to preclude a clear-cut geographic separation. Another possible objection to self-determination is that the people in question are not prepared for self-rule. Other critics have raised the issue of minimum standards, maintaining that self-determination should be denied when the group is too small, or the territory too limited, or the possibility of maintaining a viable economy too remote.

The interesting point is that such practical considerations have seldom had much influence upon ethnic aspirations. Even the absence of a clear geographic base has not necessarily prevented self-determination movements from arising. In the case of the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus and that of the Hindus and Moslems in British India, there was a high degree of geographic suffusion of the two cultures, but this intermingling did not prevent intergroup violence in the first instance and actual partition in the second. So, too, the proposition that lack of readiness for self-rule is a legitimate bar to immediate independence: although accepted by Mill and later institutionalized in the mandate system of the League and the trusteeship system of the UN, this principle has been increasingly depicted as predicated upon bias and, consequently, is decreasingly heard in public debates concerning independence. With regard to criteria of size, it is again instructive to turn to Cobban in order to illustrate how self-determination has altered international affairs over the past two decades. In the course of emphasizing the impracticality of granting independence to each small nation, Cobban raised, as a *reductio ad absurdum*, the specter of granting independence to Malta and Iceland. The fact that these areas have been granted statehood and that they have been joined in this successful endeavor by such other tiny entities as Gambia, the Maldive Islands, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Western Samoa again illustrates that

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practical considerations are not apt to prove a match for the emotional power of self-determination in those cases in which the sentiments of the national group are decisive.

But are the sentiments of a national group apt to prove decisive? The last stages of the colonial era have produced a number of instances in which a realistic Britain and France took the initiative in ceding independence to overseas territories. Nevertheless, as Rupert Emerson has noted, history clearly establishes that governments are not apt to grant self-determination, and that cases in which it has been granted are rare indeed.[46] But history also clearly indicates that the refusal to grant self-determination hardly eradicates the problem. The peacemakers of 1920 may have thought that they could dictate the proper limits of self-determination in Eastern Europe, stopping short of balkanization, but ferment for a furtherance of the self-determination principle plagues the area a half-century later. The appeal and the power of self-determination are quite independent of considerations of what a government ought to do or what it is apt to do. It is granted that the governments of multination states will continue to resist their minorities' requests for independence, but, in such cases, it is also expected that the states' existence will be increasingly challenged by secessionist-minded groups.

A quite natural response to this challenge is assimilation. If the coexistence of differing cultures appears incompatible with continued unity and yet partition is deemed unthinkable, policies to further homogeneity would seem to be in prospect. Moreover, this negative, albeit compelling, reason for instituting a policy of assimilation may be joined by positive considerations, in that marked heterogeneity represents an impediment to the statewide social and economic integration demanded by the modern state. This is particularly evident when linguistic differences are present. Certainly the Soviet Union must find a multiplicity of languages an efficiency-sapping nuisance, requiring countless oral and written translations of orders, blueprints, directions for the use of machinery, and so forth. So, too, a tendency for people to identify themselves with a particular culture and territory must constitute a most serious impediment to the mobility of labor. Aside, then, from the need to combat the divisiveness that springs from ethnic factionalism, the demands of modernization also exert pressure upon the government to eradicate its multinational character.

It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the resistance to

[46] Pp. 63-64.

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assimilation which governments can be expected to encounter. A number of governments have discovered belatedly that the enmity of groups toward acculturation represented a more formidable adversary than had been contemplated. Thus, the Indian and Pakistani governments have both been forced to backtrack on their plans for a single, official language; and Franco, by discarding many features of his assimilation program, has confessed failure to overcome Basque and Catalan resistance. On the other hand, the example of the American "melting pot" is often employed to illustrate that the assimilation of diverse cultures can be accomplished within a relatively short time. But it is highly questionable whether the experience of the United States is germane elsewhere.[47] A number of important factors peculiar to United States history points up by their very presence some of the major hindrances to assimilation that are faced by other states. For example, the American policy of conquest eliminated the indigenous people as cultural competitors; the pattern of early settlement created a dominant, almost exclusive, Anglo-Saxon culture; upon this firmly entrenched cultural base, representatives of other cultures, on their own initiative,[48] were periodically added in relatively small numbers. As a result, ethnic problems in the United States have not been primarily characterized by minorities resisting assimilation, but rather by the unwillingness of the dominant group to permit assimilation at the tempo desired by the minorities. Dealing with a proportionately small number of people who have voluntarily left their homeland to enter an existent cultural-political structure within which acceptance of the mores and language is a *sine qua non* of success is one matter; treating the relations between two large and neighboring ethnic groups, each possessing impressive title to its respective territory, is something quite different. The second situation more closely characterizes Canada, Belgium, and, for that matter, most of the ethnic problems to which reference has been made.

The continuous spread of modern communication and transportation facilities, as well as statewide social institutions such as public school systems, can be expected to have a great influence upon programs of assimilation. But can the nature of that influence be predicted? It is a truism that centralized communications and increased contacts help to dissolve regional cultural distinctions within a state such as the United States. Yet, if one is dealing not with minor variations of the

[47] Recent studies have even questioned the degree of melting that has occurred within the American pot. See, for example, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

[48] The major exception was the Negro slave.

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same culture, but with two quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures, are not increased contacts between the two apt to increase antagonisms? Improvements over the last two decades in what was an already effective transportation and communications network within Belgium have not been accompanied by improved relations between the Walloon and Flemish people. And in the less modern states, we have noted that cultural consciousness precedes political consciousness, and that cultural consciousness presupposes an awareness of other cultures. Is it not at least possible, then, that increased awareness of alien cultures on the part of the Baluchi people who inhabit either side of the Pakistani-Iranian border will result in Baluchistan's becoming a slogan rather than just the name of a geographic area?

The obvious point is that assimilation is even more of a natural foe to self-determination than is the multination state. The growing emotional power of ethnic consciousness, which threatens the multination state, also casts serious doubt upon the probable success of assimilation programs. Nonetheless, partly in resistance to the divisiveness of growing national consciousness and partly in response to the demands of modernization, an increased emphasis upon assimilation appears in prospect. As a consequence, the multination state faces a dual threat, consisting of demands for self-determination from below and governmental programs of assimilation from above.

Contemporary political forces, therefore, clearly move in the direction of that second part of Barker's prophecy that envisaged a world order in which "each State is also a nation." However, the first part of his prophecy, holding that "each nation is also a State," is clearly not upheld by the present political division of either the Arab world or the Spanish-speaking region of Latin America. The conclusion appears to be that diversity of cultures tends to preclude political unity but that sameness of culture does not preclude political division.

On the other question that divided Mill, Acton, Barker, and Cobban—whether heterogeneity promotes authoritarianism or democracy—postwar developments indicate a link between multinationalism and pressure for nondemocratic actions. This is not to say that one can predict the form of government simply by the degree of cultural homogeneity within a state. Most of the governments of the multinational states merit, on balance, characterization as authoritarian. But so, too, did the prewar governments of highly homogeneous Germany and Japan, as well as the present governments of most of the Arab states. It is evident, then, that there are many factors that combine in a varying

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and unpredictable mixture to determine form of government. However, the aforementioned tendency of governments to stress their political and territorial integrity has not been conducive to democratic responses to the growing problem of cultural-political consciousness.

There is a logical relationship between the *self*-determination of nations and the democratic concept that popular opinion should determine political allegiance. It is therefore ironic that while so many governments pay lip service to self-determination, the instances in which a government has permitted a democratic process to decide a question of self-determination within its own territory are rare indeed.[49] The general position of African governments with respect to Rhodesia during 1965 and 1966 offers a striking illustration of this inconsistency. Motivated by the pragmatic desire to rid Africa of "white rule," they insisted that British cession of independence, prior to the instituting of popular government, would be a travesty of the self-determination principle. Yet, at the same time, these governments were not prepared to permit the popular will to determine the political allegiance of segments of their own territories.

The natural repugnance of governments toward democratic solutions to questions involving the political allegiance of minorities has been underlined by instances of the refusal to grant plebiscites despite prior promises. India, for example, has suffered years of international embarrassment rather than honor its promises concerning a vote for the Kashmiri. Similarly, there were those who suspected that Sukarno never intended to hold a plebiscite in West Irian (the former Netherlands New Guinea), even though his promise to this effect was a basic condition of the UN's support for the Indonesian takeover in 1963. The subsequent abortive Communist coup brought into power a moderate group who were disposed to disagree with the major planks of Sukarno's domestic and foreign policies; but it was, nonetheless, under the authority of this group that the pledge for a plebiscite was in fact renounced during late 1966. It seems clear that governments believe that questions involving the political allegiance of groups residing within the sovereign territory are much too important to be left to popular opinion.

The methods by which governments have combated national movements have, in the main, been coercive. Where expedient, governments have shown little hesitancy in conducting military campaigns against

[49] The actions of France and the United Kingdom with respect to their overseas territories, after it became evident that the days of empire were numbered, are not considered true exceptions to this statement.

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such movements. Present or recent cases in point include Algeria (the Berbers), Burma, Burundi, mainland China (Tibet), the Congo, Cyprus, India (Mizos, Nagas), Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Vietnam (the "Montagnards"), and Uganda. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the leaders of self-determination movements have seldom been accorded the legal safeguards that would be deemed minimal to meet democratic requirements. Often their only choices have been to live in exile, as do the Dalai Lama and many of the leaders of the Formosan movement, or, like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (an advocate of an independent state of Pushtunistan within present Pakistan), to be committed periodically to long terms of imprisonment without legal process. Viewing self-determination movements as threats to survival, governments have tended to react violently and to justify the cruelest of treatment accorded to implicated leaders by branding them as rebels or traitors and therefore something worse than criminals. Admirably suited to such attitudes are the emergency acts and detention acts authorizing, in the broadest and most ambiguous terms, the internment without due process of law of persons acting in a manner inimical to the interests of the state. Such laws are extremely common in multination states and, in some cases, are found even within countries whose political system is ostensibly democratic.[50] Whether or not such responses are justified, either in general or in a particular instance, is not at issue; the point is that multination states have tended to become less democratic in response to the growing threat of nationalistic movements.

Political developments since World War II clearly establish that national consciousness is not on the wane as a political force, but is quite definitely in the ascendancy. Its force is currently being felt throughout sub-Sahara Africa and Asia, as ethnic consciousness de-

[50] Typical is a so-called Security Bill passed by the government of Guyana in late 1966 and obviously intended by the Negro-controlled government to restrict the activities of the East Indian segment of the population. Under its terms, the prime minister is empowered to intern without trial, for eighteen months, anyone he believes has acted or *will* act "in any manner prejudicial to public safety or public order or the defense of Guyana" (*New York Times*, December 9, 1966).

Within India, Kashmiri leaders have been periodically interned by the Indian government under an "emergency" measure. Moreover, in 1963, essentially in response to a Dravidistan movement, the Indian government passed the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution which sought to "prevent the fissiparous, secessionist tendency in the country engendered by regional and linguistic loyalties and to preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity" of the Indian union (cited in Robert L. Hardgrove, Jr., "The DMK and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII [Winter 1964-65], 397).

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mands political recognition, in place of the present political division that reflects colonial patterns. Moreover, the influence of nationalism is expected to increase greatly throughout these continents as the multitude of ethnic groups, many of whom are not yet cognizant of their identity, further acquire national awareness. The multination states of Europe and of areas settled by Europeans are also experiencing an increase in nationalistic orientations.

No multinational structure has been immune to this surge of nationalism. Authoritarian and democratic, Communist and non-Communist societies have been similarly affected. Nor does the postwar proliferation of transstate organizations and blocs repudiate the influence of nationalism; indeed, recent interstate developments further attest to the increasing tendency to think in nationalistic terms.

No government of a multination state has found the solution to the dilemma posed by the goal of state unity on the one hand and the centrifugal tendencies of growing national consciousness on the other. Motivated both by the desire to prevent partition and by the demands of modernization, such governments can be expected to resist nationalistic movements, with coercive methods if need be, while concurrently promoting assimilation.

The outcome of such programs is unpredictable, but the proven tenacity and emotional power of nationalism make this abstraction a most formidable opponent. In any event, that pernicious and perhaps unrealistic principle termed "self-determination of nations" is far from spent as a significant force in international politics.

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THE RISE OF THE JUSTICE PARTY IN TURKEY

By W. B. SHERWOOD

IN a world in which popular democracy sometimes seems on the defensive, the rise of the Justice party has a significance that goes beyond the borders of Turkey. That nation's continuing social and political revolution, obscured as it has been in the eyes of most foreigners by the cruel impasse of Cyprus and the revival of Greek-Turkish antagonisms in the eastern end of the Mediterranean, is worth trying to understand. Not only does multiparty rivalry exist, but political power in this important American ally is held by the Near East's only genuine grass-roots political party. This party has its roots deep in the country's social structure and is currently headed by an energetic and intelligent young leader of relatively humble origins.

In October 1965 the Justice party, successor to Menderes' Democrat party, won a resounding electoral victory and took over the reins of power in one of the Near East's rare bloodless changes of government. This election victory also marked the emergence of the party leader as a major new political figure on the Turkish scene. Suleyman Demirel, husky, balding, engineer-administrator, deserves much credit for the success of the Justice party, but it would be a mistake to view the rise of the party as his personal triumph. Demirel is not the charismatic father-figure or tribal chieftain of recent Turkish tradition, e.g., Kemal Atatürk, Ismet Inönü, or Adnan Menderes. Although he obviously resembles Menderes more than the others, Demirel is basically a modern, pragmatic executive and organizer, rather than an inspired leader possessed of a special kind of personalism. Furthermore, it may be that at this moment in history Turkey needs a modern politician, rather than a father or chieftain, at the helm. At any rate, the majority of the Turkish voters thought so in October 1965, and the contrast between the younger, earthy Demirel and his chief rival, the essentially autocratic Pasha, Ismet Inönü, could not be greater.

In short, the victory of the Justice party was not the personal triumph of a new, magnetic leader, but the victory of an organized, broadly based political party with genuine popular roots. Statistically, the party won fifty-three percent of the popular vote in the 1965 election and 240 of 450 seats in the National Assembly. The Republican People's

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party, which had ruled Turkey since 1920 with the exception of the Menderes decade (1950-1960), suffered the worst defeat of its political history, winning only 134 seats and twenty-nine percent of the vote. Even the Justice party's own partisans were surprised by the magnitude of its victory. A plurality had been a foregone conclusion, but many doubted that the party, which was under heavy attack from "intellectuals" and influential segments of the national press, could obtain a full majority. However, it did win and achieved an absolute majority in Turkey's National Assembly. Subsequently Demirel was designated prime minister by Cemal Gürsel, then president of Turkey, and formed the government that rules Turkey today.

Ironically, the accession to power of such a party is not viewed as an unmixed blessing within Turkey, where the Justice party is bitterly opposed by a substantial majority of the country's urban intellectual class, who doubt that a party or government responsive to the demands of the peasantry can solve Turkey's pressing economic and social problems. Most of these intellectuals favor the elitist Republican People's party, with others associating themselves with the Marxist Turkish Labor party. It is a paradox of Turkish politics that the latter, supposedly a socialist party, shares the narrow elitist outlook of the Republican People's party and has been equally unsuccessful in appealing to the masses. It is in its appeal to the masses that the Justice party has been most dramatically successful.

The Broad Basis of Justice Party Appeal[1]

The appeal of the Justice party and its predecessor, the Democrat party, is not ideological, but is rooted in the social structure of Turkey. The party's greatest support comes from the small-holder peasants, who are emerging from poverty and a subsistence way of life. They are allied with expanding, but still small, commercial, industrial, urban labor groups and newly wealthy farmers. These groups represent the familiar sociological phenomenon of rising social groups in competition with an older elite. The Republican People's party is the party of

[1] I have chosen to ignore the issues that developed, or seemed to develop, during the 1965 electoral campaign. Rather, in this analysis I have concentrated on the broad appeal of the Justice party and on what I conceive to be the fundamental differences between it and the Republican People's party. Joseph Szyliowicz has treated the election campaign in some detail in "The Turkish Elections: 1965," *Middle East Journal*, XX (Autumn 1966), 473-94. While Mr. Szyliowicz's facts are correct, I must take issue with his interpretation. For instance, he writes that the chief issues were "land reform, foreign policy, petroleum, foreign capital, and foreign trade." These topics did receive a great deal of newspaper attention, but, I submit, were "issues" only to a handful of intellectuals. The real issue was the clash of opposing socioeconomic groups.

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the older elite, representing those classes that came to dominate the latter days of the Ottoman Empire as well as the first twenty-five years of the republic, i.e., bureaucrats, city intellectuals, military officers, and the traditional class of "notables" in the countryside, including many large landowners. Some in this latter group received land primarily because of loyalty and services rendered during the Greek-Turkish War (1919-1922) to the predecessor of the Republican People's party, Atatürk's "Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia."[2]

Thus the Justice party represents the challengers for the power of an older ruling class. It stands for the manufacturer eager to challenge the entrenched bureaucrats in the state enterprises, or the newly prosperous small tobacco farmer determined to be independent of the domination of his social betters. Rooted in a social movement, it is not dependent on the presence of a charismatic leader for its cohesion. Many thought the old Democrat party, lacking a strong ideology, would fall apart following the downfall of Menderes. It merely reformed itself into the Justice party, almost without leadership.

Voting patterns bear out this analysis. Appealing to rising and newly prosperous social groups, the Justice party, as might be expected, runs most strongly in the relatively prosperous provinces of Western Turkey—along the Aegean, in Thrace (European Turkey), and in the Marmara and Black Sea regions. These are areas where the majority of the population is composed of independent, land-owning villagers. These are also areas where many cash crops (cotton, tobacco, grapes, figs, nuts, citrus) are grown, where villages are rapidly growing into towns, and where the money economy is firmly established. By contrast, the Republican People's party, although slipping badly everywhere outside of Inönü's home province of Malatya (eastern Turkey), has shown its greatest strength in places where there are large concentrations of the military-bureaucratic classes, e.g., Ankara, and in the very backward eastern provinces, where the land-owning *aghas* retain their traditional control over the peasantry and are able to deliver the vote to whichever party they favor.[3] The small Nation party, which appeals most directly to religious and social conservatism, shows its

[2] For discussions of the composition of Turkish political parties, particularly at the local level, see A. Haluk Ülman and Frank Tachau, "Turkish Politics: The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization With Democracy," *Middle East Journal*, XIX (Spring 1965), 153-68; and Kemal H. Karpat, "Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *World Politics*, XVII (October 1964), 50-74.

[3] It should not be inferred that the *aghas* support only the Republican People's party. They are quite flexible in their loyalties.

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greatest strength in the central plateau, while the small extremist parties of Right and Left, the Republican Peasant's Nation party and the Turkish Labor party, are strongest in the large cities (but even there, they have very limited strength, as the Justice party usually carries the largest cities, with the exception of Ankara, on the basis of its overwhelming support from the urban lower class).

The urban lower class is primarily composed of former Anatolian villagers crowded into the squatter areas of the large cities. The squatters share the aspirations of the rising peasantry. Many of them maintain ties with their home villages and tend to maintain their former voting patterns. Most of these urban peasants, now in the process of becoming urban labor, have come from the relatively prosperous areas of Turkey previously mentioned, not so much having been forced off the land by poverty as having been drawn by the attraction of city life. Once an Anatolian villager makes contact with the outside world through radio, travel, movies, and newly opened bus and truck lines, or even through political campaigns, the deadly monotony of the village becomes the more unbearable. For the most part, these are not destitute, landless laborers, although in some areas excessive fragmentation has undoubtedly played a part in encouraging the movement of villagers to the city.

The squatter areas are currently the scene of a struggle between the Justice and Labor parties, with the Justice party greatly in the lead for the present. Much of its success is due to its strong local organizations, which function as service organizations for the squatters. A typical villager arriving in Ankara or Istanbul goes immediately to that district populated by people from his home village. The local Justice party man helps him settle, aids him in problems with the authorities, and functions as an employment agency or a marriage bureau, as the case may be. The Justice party representative is always a resident of the district. The Labor party or Republican People's party man, in contrast, is almost always an outsider. The Labor party, however, at least recognizes the problem and is trying to put down grass roots, while the Republican People's party does not really compete. The foregoing description also demonstrates the importance that competing political parties have assumed in Turkish life, by providing channels for getting things done outside of the traditionally slow and still generally unresponsive bureaucracy.

The old Democrat party, although its power base was as described above, also had some very sophisticated people in its ranks. These included important groups in the Istanbul business community and a

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minority of high-level civil servants whose careers, sometimes for family reasons, were tied to the Menderes regime. In recent years many of these people have returned to the fold. In Istanbul, for example, in the early days following the overthrow of the Menderes regime on May 27, 1960, many middle- and upper-class ex-Democrats either stayed out of politics or turned to the New Turkey party, which had a more respectable image. Now, however, many have returned to the Justice party, both because of its increasingly moderate and pro-business face and because of the demise of the New Turkey party. The same thing is happening among a small minority of civil servants, in marked contrast to the pattern of the preceding six years. Quite clearly an important reason for this return is the presumed neutrality of the army[4]—it is no longer considered dangerous to belong to the Justice party, although it is socially unacceptable in many circles.

The Justice party is frequently called "pro-business." However its attitude toward business, although favorable in the Turkish context, is not one of dogmatic support of free enterprise. Both the Democrat and Justice parties have always promised to "free Turkey from the dead hand of the bureaucracy" and to free the peasant from onerous "control" from above. This philosophy goes quite naturally with a relatively favorable attitude toward private business. In Turkey, however, there are no large concentrations of economic power in private hands, as exist in the United States and Europe. Therefore, being "pro-business" in Turkey is not the same thing as supporting the interests of large corporate enterprises in the United States. The true economic conservative in Turkey is as likely to be an entrenched bureaucrat in a state economic enterprise as a monopolistic export merchant in the Aegean. It is also well to keep in mind that the late Adnan Menderes, although proclaiming himself a believer in "free enterprise" and dubious about the value of detailed economic planning, did not reduce the size of Turkey's state enterprises. Instead, he made them his own machines for economic expansion.

The Justice party's attitude toward religion cannot be separated from its basic appeal to the peasantry. Although the party is identified in the public mind as being sympathetic toward Islam, the claims of its opponents that it is the party of religious reaction and that its success at the polls is primarily a result of its reckless and demagogic exploitation of the religious feelings of ignorant people cannot be taken

[4] The relations between the Justice party and the army are discussed in the following section.

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seriously. This is an argument that, although widely repeated as a rationalization of the Republican People's party's lack of success at the polls, ignores not only the secular nature of the Justice party leadership, but also the materialistic nature of the bread-and-butter issues the party has successfully exploited.

On the other hand, as a popular party whose success has rested on responsiveness to the desires of the people, and particularly of the peasantry, the Justice party, as did the Democrat party before it, has responded to the obvious desire of many Turks for a relaxation of the militant antireligious campaign carried out by the republican reformers. For example, in well-known moves, the Democrat party in the early fifties allowed the prayers to be said in the traditional Arabic and permitted religious instruction in the schools, although a parent could request that his child be excused. Furthermore, Menderes built mosques in the villages as well as roads and schools. The Justice party is following the same tradition. However, conversations with villagers do not bear out the contention of opposition intellectuals that the present government has won the support of the peasantry merely by pandering to its religious inclinations. The peasants simply list mosques along with water, roads, educational opportunity for their children, and government support of agricultural prices as the things they expect from any government or party soliciting their votes.

A Democratic Evolution: The Origins and Development of the Party

The October 1965 accession to power of the Justice party was merely the latest episode in Turkey's experiment with democracy. The experiment was the first tried in the 1870's with the writing of Turkey's first constitution, was resumed in the few years after 1908, when there was briefly a genuine attempt to make the constitution work, and again in the early 1920's, when the first republican constitution was written. In 1950, genuine popular democracy was launched with great hopes and no little fanfare, as Adnan Menderes won a stunning election victory. It was then almost strangled by the excesses committed by Menderes' government in the late 1950's, staggered by the military coup of May 27, 1960, and threatened again by military adventurers in the early 1960's. But through it all, Turkish democracy has shown amazing vitality. Within eighteen months after its seizure of power in 1960, the ruling military junta, the Committee of National Unity, had turned Turkey back to parliamentary government. Free elections were held

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in October 1961, and although military pressures have sometimes been none too subtle, since then Turkey has been ruled in an essentially free and democratic manner by an elected civilian government.

It was following the May 27 coup that the Justice party was first organized. It was founded by a handful of ambitious men, many with limited political experience, who hoped to capitalize on the large numbers of Democrats left partyless after their party had been banned by the Committee of National Unity. The new party got off to a fast start in Turkey's western provinces where, although there were few former Democrats in its top leadership, it picked up most of the old Democrat provincial organizations intact. In central Anatolia it was somewhat less successful, meeting competition for the ex-Democrat vote from the small but long-established Republican Peasants' Nation party. In eastern Turkey it did poorly, as the newly formed New Turkey party was first on the scene to capture the old Democrat organizations.

When the Committee of National Unity restored the government to civilian control in the fall of 1961 and elections were held, the Justice party captured some thirty-five percent of the vote; the Republican People's party won thirty-seven percent while the small parties gained fifteen percent each. It is doubtful that the Committee would have been so enthusiastic about elections had it realized that the Republican People's party would fare so badly. However, despite the clear sentiment of the majority of Turks against this party, the military rulers insisted on Ismet Inönü, the party leader, as prime minister, and there followed a series of coalition governments headed by Inönü. During these years, the Justice party steadily gained adherents, primarily at the expense of the two smaller parties, as the ex-Democrats tended to gather under one roof.

Under these circumstances, the November 1963 nationwide local elections took on great importance, as they were widely viewed as a political referendum. When the Justice party received some forty-six percent of the vote, with the Republican People's party's share remaining at thirty-seven percent and the smaller parties showing corresponding losses, the then current coalition government fell and was replaced by a minority government of the Republican People's party and a few independents, Ismet Inönü again serving as prime minister. The establishment of this third Inönü coalition government set the stage for the subsequent entry into the government of the Justice party.

During this same period, within the Justice party several groups were struggling for leadership. At first, there were a number of military

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officers in important positions (most of these had been purged from the army following the 1960 coup). They were slowly pushed to the sidelines and lost most of their influence after the death of the party's first leader, retired Lieutenant General Ragip Gümüşpala, in the summer of 1964.

Another group that threatened to dominate the party in its early years was the right-wing clique led by Gökhan Evliyaoğlu. The issue was settled, however, when Evliyaoğlu failed in his attempt to bring into the party, at a high level, Alpaslan Türkeş, a well-known right-wing Turkish racist and a key figure in the 1960 coup.[5] Evliyaoğlu finally resigned from the Justice party in the spring of 1965, joining Türkeş in the Republican Peasants' Nation party, which then passed entirely into the hands of the extreme rightist element. Although some of this radical fringe remains in the Justice party, its voice is muted.

Following Gümüşpala's death, a former country doctor, Sadettin Bilgiç, became acting president-general of the party and was initially considered the favorite to become party leader. Bilgiç, however, was tarred by the press, perhaps unfairly, with the brush of extreme political and religious conservatism. Many in the party, worried about the party's image in the eyes of the intellectuals and about its relations with the army, felt the need for a more progressive leader. Suleyman Demirel, who had been chief of the State Water Resources Development Agency under the Menderes government and had acquired a degree of fame as a builder of dams, had been active in Justice party affairs since the party's founding.[6] Popular with many of the party's local officials, particularly in populous western Turkey, he was an obvious choice and defeated Bilgiç in a hotly contested election for the post of party president-general at the Justice party's December 1964 national convention.

Demirel's victory gave the Justice party a more progressive face and was initially hailed with enthusiasm even by the party's press critics. An interesting sidelight is that Demirel was quietly supported in the struggle by some of the old Democrat leaders in the background, including ex-President Celal Bayar himself. Bilgiç also had old Democrat connections through his older brother, Sait, who had been jailed

[5] For a few months, Türkeş, in his capacity as secretary-general to the chief of state, General Gürsel, was virtually prime minister of Turkey.

[6] It is interesting to note that Demirel, as a university graduate, qualifies as an "intellectual" by Turkish standards. It should be noted that he and several of his closest associates graduated from the relatively new Istanbul Technical University, rather than from the traditionally elitist Istanbul Law Faculty or Ankara Political Science Faculty, which have produced most of Turkey's civilian leaders.

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following the coup. When the issue was joined, however, the old Democrats, a rather sophisticated group politically, favored Demirel. Since that time there has been some evidence that these old Democrats, including Bayar, have been less enthusiastic about Demirel, perhaps because of his obvious determination to be his own man.

Under the Demirel leadership, the party moved rapidly both to put its own house in order and to prepare for the October 1965 elections. In an unexpected move, Demirel arranged an alliance with the small parties in the National Assembly and in February 1965 brought down the third Inönü coalition government on a budget vote. In early March, a new coalition government was formed containing the Justice, New Turkey, Republican Peasants' Nation, and Nation parties. (The Nation party had previously split off from the Republican Peasants' Nation party.) Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, a political neutral and former ambassador to Washington, became prime minister with Demirel as deputy prime minister, setting the stage for the Justice party's subsequent victory in the October 1965 elections.

Entry into the government gave the Justice party some immediate advantages. Primarily, it meant that the Republican People's party no longer controlled the election machinery, and it assured the Justice party of at least the neutrality of the bureaucracy, which was traditionally allied with the Republican People's party. It also gave Demirel a chance to demonstrate his "acceptability" and "responsibility" to the army. This was vital because, in order for the Justice party to assume power, it was necessary not only that it win an election, but also that it arrive at an accommodation with Turkey's senior military officers, who feared that the party would embark on a course of revenge for the 1960 coup. Demirel succeeded in arriving at the necessary accommodation.

Although the details are hazy, it is widely believed in Turkey that President Gürsel, a former senior general and former chief of the Committee of National Unity, acted as mediator. Gürsel's motive was, presumably, realization that the Justice party did in fact represent the aspirations of a large number of Turks, as well as his own personal distaste for Ismet Inönü. Whatever the facts, Demirel has continued to have an excellent relationship with Gürsel's successor, former chief of the Turkish General Staff, Cevdet Sunay. Sunay, elected by both houses of the parliament with the support of both major parties, has apparently given his approval to Demirel. As a highly respected former soldier, he is in a position to assure at least the neutrality of the senior military officers and to act as their spokesman within the government

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when necessary. Thus Demirel's "military problem" is solved for the present, although many middle- and lower-grade officers have reservations about his government.[7]

The Intellectuals and the Future

Many middle- and lower-grade officers and Turkish intellectuals, in particular, view the Justice party's posture of listening to the peasants, rather than instructing them, as virtually treason to the principles of Atatürk. Long wedded to the idea of induced change from above, they have been slow to grasp the fact that, as a result of the very success of the Atatürk revolution, Turkey is moving into an era in which change and reform are likely to be more and more organic. The day of the tutelary regime à la Atatürk, necessary as it once was, is past for most Turks. Therefore, the Atatürkian rhetoric in the pronouncements of many leaders of the Republican People's party has little meaning in today's Turkey. Deluded by its own rhetoric and still determinedly elitist in outlook, that party is not today an effective political opposition. Rather, it has been reduced to sterile obstruction in the parliament and a pettish insistence on its right to rule.

Many intellectuals, discouraged over the prospects of the Republican People's party's ever coming to power by elections, are increasingly drawn toward authoritarian ideas—ideas that they label progressive, but that look suspiciously reactionary to an outsider. Some intellectuals are attracted by the small Labor party, which, although nineteenth-century by European socialist standards, at least seems to be looking for new approaches. Others are hoping that the emergence of a "left of center" group within the Republican People's party signals a break with older traditions and a more realistic approach to modern political competition.[8] This seems doubtful. Neither the Labor party nor the Republican "left of center" has yet demonstrated the ability to communicate with the masses. Their political innovations to date have consisted of appropriating a leftist (chiefly French socialist) political vocabulary and grafting it on to Atatürkism. Their greatest successes have come when they have been most old-fashionedly nationalistic and xenophobic—stridently anti-American in the current Turkish context.

[7] See George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," *Middle East Journal*, XIX (Winter 1965 and Spring 1965), 54-66, 169-76.

[8] Since this article was written, the Republican People's party has split. Forty-four deputies, representing the party's more conservative and traditional elements and led by Turhan Feyzioğlu, have resigned and formed the Güven party. The city intellectual-bureaucrat element, calling itself "left of center," has remained. Ismet Inönü remains party leader, but real leadership is for the most part exercised by Bülent Ecevit.

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Although both groups have aroused some enthusiasm among city intellectuals, they have left the broad mass of the Turkish people untouched and unmoved. They have not convinced the majority of the villagers and workers that they are talking about real problems, much less offering solutions to those problems.

Therefore, although he is not likely to lose elections anytime soon, Prime Minister Demirel is faced with important political problems. He must not only make concrete progress toward solving the problems of poverty and economic development, but he must somehow draw Turkish intellectuals back into the political dialogue, for he needs their help in modernizing Turkey. Although his government has performed ably, it is yet to be demonstrated that the Justice party can rule Turkey successfully with the overwhelming majority of the Turkish elite in defiant opposition.

The future for Turkey, although partially cloudy, is nonetheless on the whole encouraging. The country is rapidly changing from a closed, narrow society dominated by a relatively small elite into an open society, in which many groups compete for and share political and economic power. The verdict of history is not yet in, but twenty-five years hence it may be that Demirel and his followers, with their ability to communicate with Turkey's long-muted nonelite groups, will have played the part of the Jacksonians in Turkish development.

Their success to date has come not only because they are attuned to the desire for economic and social betterment on the part of Turkey's long submerged peasants, but also because they have had the advantage of a series of existing institutions, built for the most part by the intellectuals, the military, and the bureaucrats now so out of sympathy with them. Although highly imperfect, these institutions work. For example, the Constitution of 1960, to which no present member of the Justice party contributed, is sufficient. Although far from perfect it is usable. Similarly, the Grand National Assembly does function as an operating parliamentary body. One of the significant developments of recent years has been the slow transfer of real political power in Turkey from the military and bureaucratic establishment to the parliament. Although the process is not yet completed, anyone who doubts that it is happening has simply not observed closely the workings of the government of Turkey in recent years.

Examples of other working institutions are the government ministries, the armed forces, the country's Islamic substructure, the various economic organizations, such as the banks and the chambers of commerce, and the massive educational structure. Ironically, it is the last

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which is in most need of reform and which is most impervious to change. Turkey's modern schools and universities are basically the offspring of the old *medrese* system[9] crossed with the nineteenth-century French. Somehow the Turks have managed to get the worst of both educational worlds. Their schools are devoted to learning by rote a body of knowledge or doctrine handed down from above and are firmly opposed to independent thought and inquiry.

In short, many serious problems face Turkey's new Jacksonians. They must fulfill their promise to the peasants, maintain their accommodation with the army, convert Turkey's rigid institutions from instruments of control (as befits their Ottoman heritage) to creative instruments of economic development, and induce Turkish intellectuals to contribute constructively to the solution of national problems. This is a massive prescription. The success of Demirel and the Justice party in filling it has great significance not only for the future of democracy in Turkey, but for its future in the entire underdeveloped world.

[9] Traditional Islamic theological schools in which the scholars memorized the Koran.

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POLITICS AND POPULATION CONTROL IN LATIN AMERICA

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THE remarkable change in the United States attitude toward family planning was symbolized last October by President Johnson's acceptance of the Margaret Sanger Award for his "vigorous and far-sighted leadership in bringing the United States Government to enunciate and implement an affirmative, effective population policy at home and abroad."[1] Less than a decade before, when the very mention of Margaret Sanger's name in official circles was considered risqué, President Eisenhower had made it clear that family planning was not the business of the U.S. government. Few could have predicted that in 1966 the President of the United States would say, "It is essential that all families have access to information and services that will allow freedom to choose the number and spacing of their children within the dictates of individual conscience."[2]

The change has been long in coming, is without doubt in the right direction, and is being welcomed by a number of countries. There are, nevertheless, a number of warning signals from Latin America, where North American promotional activity in the population sphere has been quite active over the past three or four years.

Latin American Attention to Population Problems

Although most of the Latin American nations have extraordinarily high rates of population growth, the recency of this phenomenon plus the existence of vast unsettled land areas in South America have helped to suppress concern about population problems among the region's intellectuals.[3] Because of religious taboos, moreover, public discussion of population and birth control has been muted. So effective was the blanketing of news on these themes that, as late as 1965, former Colombian President and distinguished journalist Alberto Lleras

* This article is a revision of a paper read to the December 1966 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

[1] *Planned Parenthood News* (November 1966).

[2] President Johnson's Special Message to Congress on Health and Education, March 1, 1966.

[3] J. Mayone Stycos, "Opinions of Latin American Intellectuals Toward Population and Birth Control," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCLX (July 1965), 11-26.

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Camargo referred to population control as "el gran tabu" of our century.

Beginning in the early 1960's, however, a combination of circumstances caused the topics of the "population explosion" and contraception to become public issues in most Latin American countries. These circumstances included publication of preliminary results from the 1960 censuses, which generally indicated higher rates of growth than had been supposed; the opening up of the topic for debate on the part of the Vatican; technological innovations such as "the pill," which lent themselves to journalistic treatment; and the promotional activities of North American private and government agencies that had previously written off Latin America as closed to birth control programs. In 1965, the Cornell International Population Program decided to determine the extent of attention to population problems and family planning in Latin American newspapers and began to collect newspaper clippings on these topics. Through the services of the Burrelle's Press Clipping Bureau, a surprising total of six thousand clippings was obtained in 1965 and over eight thousand were gathered in 1966. Approximately three-quarters of these articles explicitly mentioned birth control or contraceptive methods.

Thus, population and birth control have become public issues in Latin America just at the time when North American official policy with respect to foreign aid on population problems is being crystallized. What have been the Latin American reactions to the emerging North American positions? Publicly, there has been an almost total absence of enthusiasm, at best, and in most cases the reactions have ranged from suspicion to hostility. The expressed opinions have contained little reference to religious questions and have been more likely to impugn North American political or economic motives. Thus, the Chilean ambassador to the United States noted that family planning "is a problem which cannot be used as a lever for the international egotism of the rich nations, in allowing them to evade their duties of assistance and solidarity with the developing nations."[4] In leading the defeat last year of a proposal that UNICEF give assistance in the family planning area, the Peruvian delegate, a former minister of health, "voicing the views of other Latin American delegates, agreed that countries like India and Pakistan have overwhelming population growth. He explained that Latin America, however, has 'empty lands and untapped resources' and if UNICEF gets itself involved in population control,

[4] *Observaciones del Exemo. Sr. R. Tomić*, Embajada de Chile (Washington, May 5, 1966).

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rich nations might be tempted to reduce economic aid and concentrate on birth control assistance instead."[5]

In this article we shall attempt to account for such reactions, both by reference to the Latin American political ideologies and by reference to the way in which U.S. policy has been articulated. We shall rely heavily on two types of data. The first set of data is drawn from our newspaper files, particularly those of Brazilian papers of August 1966, when it was announced in Brazil that the government was planning to seek U.S. assistance in dealing with population problems. The second principal source of data is fifty-one interviews conducted with university professors in Colombia during the same month. Brazil provides us with a case example of how explosive the combination of two controversial issues—population and U.S. aid—can be among a highly nationalist people. The Colombian data provide insights into the attitudes of intellectuals just prior to public announcement of a national program of family planning.

Nationalism

Often fueled by anti-American sentiments, nationalism is a powerful force cutting across political identifications in Latin America. With reference to population, however, its manifestations on the Right are somewhat different from those on the Left. In large countries such as Brazil and Argentina, nationalists of the Right argue that a larger population is needed to develop the vast interior and make the nation strong. For example, during the August debate in Brazil over the possibility of U.S. aid on population problems, Dr. Fabio Fonseca, president of the Belo Horizonte Regional Council of Medicine, stated that Brazil needs a population twice its present size in order to settle the vast empty spaces of the country. He warned that "the yellow race, which is becoming more and more numerous, needs space to live and will not hesitate to seek uninhabited places like the immense Brazilian regions if this settlement is not promoted."[6]

A representative of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies charged that population control was being "imposed on us by a country with the dimensions of Brazil but with 300 million people, giving the impression that the American people with their land already overpopulated is

[5] Reported in *Survey of International Development*, III (June 15, 1966).

[6] *Diário de Minas*, August 5, 1966. For a detailed account of the Brazilian reaction, see Cornell University International Population Program, *Latin American Newspaper Coverage of Population and Family Planning* (Ithaca 1967).

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concerning itself with our empty spaces and intends to occupy our territory."[7]

A feature article in the newspaper *O Povo* claimed that the key to Brazilian prosperity lies in her beds and hammocks. It asked for more population so that Brazil's lands will cease to figure in the schemes of Western or Eastern imperialists as reserves of natural resources or vital space. "Brazilians," the article concluded, "let us continue loving and proliferating. God did not give us all this greatness for the installation of abortion or sterilization industries. Onward! To the children!"[8]

On the issue of family planning, nationalism causes the rightists to reject American cultural and moral values while gladly accepting America's dollars. As stated by the Archbishop of Brasília, Dom José Newton de Almeida Batista, "Give us dollars and we shall be powerful, provided that we also grow in number so that we can take possession of the immense territory God gave us."[9] Even more pointed was the headline in the conservative Catholic Peruvian monthly *ERPA*: "Latin America Needs Dollars, Not Pills." Under a photograph of President Johnson mounted on a horse, it noted, "From his Texas ranch, Johnson directs the control of births in Latin America. What about nonintervention, Mr. President?"[10] The invasion of foreign morality disturbs both religious and secular rightists, for it is a form of "psychic imperialism" that imperils spiritual and cultural values viewed as close to the heart and soul of the nation. The abortion of national growth along with the substitution of alien values is a combination especially unsavory to nationalists of the Right.

While nationalists of the Right want dollars instead of pills, nationalists of the Left feel Latin America can afford neither. *Both* dollars and pills are regarded as ameliorative measures to shore up a crumbling society whose demise had much better be brought about by revolution. Three Colombian university professors expressed the idea this way:

> Birth control is dangerous because it can become a distraction, or a justification for the bourgeoisie to reject change. . . . It might prevent the agrarian reform from ever taking place.
>
> With our system of production we can support about ten million. Since we have seventeen million we are overpopulated, but if our pattern of production were altered we could support fifty million or more. The reason why they want birth control is that they

[7] *Diário de Minas*, August 17, 1966.
[8] August 19, 1966.
[9] *Correio Brasiliense*, August 6, 1966.
[10] (January 1966).

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don't want a technical revolution. Birth control is a palliative measure which cannot lead to anything.

Birth control is being proposed as a panacea, which is utopian, false, and treacherous.[11]

The following citation from the Brazilian newspaper *Correio de Manhã* of August 10, 1966, illustrates the mix of nationalist and reformist sentiments:

Neo-malthusianism is manipulated by the big laboratories . . . and pharmaceutical houses. . . . The reactionary attitude is not that of the Catholic church but of the family planners . . . for commercial reasons, out of North American geopolitical interests (so there will not be a prevalence of underdeveloped populations, or Asiatics, or U.S. Communists), and out of fear of structural reforms. . . . Brazil, lacking in mechanical resources, depends for her economic progress on her working force. It should not be with birth control financed by the National Development Bank and the Alliance for Progress or foreign enterprises that our country will succeed in developing herself, but through drastic modification of the social and economic structures.

Marxism

In addition to the generalized suspicion of U.S. motives which cuts across political boundaries in Latin America, there is a deep ideological basis for opposition to controls on population growth. Marxian economics and social philosophy have had a profound effect on Latin American intellectuals, whether or not they can be considered Marxists. In order to understand Latin American thought, therefore, it is necessary to understand something of the Malthusian-Marxist controversy.

[11] As part of a 1966 summer project in Colombia of the International Population Program, Sergio Sismondo carried out an investigation of the attitudes of Colombian university professors toward economic development and population problems. Fifty-one interviews were completed, divided more or less evenly among the departments of sociology, economics, philosophy and humanities, and psychology in a leading Colombian university. The universe was defined as the total staffs in these departments, except in the cases of economics and psychology, in which certain ranks or groupings were excluded. In only ten instances was an individual selected for the sample not interviewed. However, 198 appointments had to be made in order to obtain the 51 interviews, i.e., an average of four appointments per interview, despite the fact that most interviews were completed in one sitting. The average duration was two hours and forty minutes, with a range of from fifty minutes to six hours. Translated extracts from these interviews have been employed throughout this article.

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Both Malthus and Marx were centrally concerned with the explanation and cure of human misery and poverty. For Marx, the cause was social and institutional, and the cure, accordingly, was the revolutionary introduction of a new institutional framework—socialism. While he saw overpopulation as possible—indeed, often encouraged—in a capitalistic society, he did not view it as a problem of any consequence in a socialist state. Malthus saw the cause of poverty as essentially biological and physical, rooted in man's instincts toward laziness and sexuality, on the one hand, and in the finite nature of food and resources on the other. His solution was accordingly individual: the curbing of the sexual drives and the stimulation of individual effort by competition—a distinctly counterrevolutionary prescription. The Malthusian approach was a damper on socialist optimism concerning man's ability to abolish misery by abolishing his social and economic systems. In Europe, Malthusian and Marxist organizations competed bitterly, with the socialists convinced that birth control was capitalism's last remaining hope for a preservation of the status quo. Pro-natalist fuel was added to the anti-Malthusian arguments as a consequence of the Soviet Union's huge losses of manpower in the World Wars. Violent verbal attacks such as the following were not infrequent in the Stalinist period: "Masquerading as scientists and philanthropists, these lackeys of American monopolies openly advocate cannibalism and try to justify the demoniacal plans for the mass extermination of peoples. . . . Bloody wars, the atom bomb and other means of mass extermination of peoples, the devouring of nations by nations—such are the concepts of the bloodthirsty ravings of present-day Malthusians."[12]

Throughout the fifties and early sixties, the Soviet bloc in the United Nations consistently argued that the West was blaming the failures of colonialism on population increase and that birth control was a tactic to divert attention from the needs for basic reforms. Typical excerpts from discussions held by the United Nations Population Commission only four or five years ago are given below:

> The theories of Malthus and their modern variants had been used as a pretext to distract attention from the abject poverty of the under-developed countries. The economic backwardness of those countries could not be explained away by such theories; it was the result of colonialist domination and exploitation. Malthusian and neo-Malthusian theories were unscientific, reactionary and un-

[12] A. Y. Popov (1953), cited in William Petersen, *The Politics of Population* (New York 1964), 118.

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worthy of United Nations support. The best way of solving demographic problems was to accelerate economic development and to promote international trade on a just and equal basis. Disarmament too could play its part. The population problem did not arise in the Ukraine for there socialist planning ensured that economic development far outstripped demographic growth.[13]

Demographic growth was therefore not the real problem and there was no justification for blaming it for the difficulties encountered by the developing countries in their economic advancement. Those difficulties were mainly due to economic backwardness, to the exploitation from which those countries had suffered at the hands of the capitalist countries and to the ineffectiveness of their policy of accelerated development. The problem could be solved only through resolute effort and radical economic and social reforms.[14]

There had been references to a population explosion presenting a threat even more serious than nuclear weapons. Some Western circles were making use of those neo-Malthusian ideas to distract world public opinion from the real causes of the poverty of the under-developed countries, by attributing economic backwardness to excessively rapid population growth, rather than to long years of exploitation in the colonial era. Efforts were being made to use the United Nations to spread propaganda on that subject and to disseminate theories which were at variance with reality.[15]

In the late 1940's, so keenly opposed was the Soviet Union to the very concept of birth control that it fought against the inclusion of "such abominable words" as "prevention of births" and "malthusianism" in the United Nations *Demographic Dictionary*.[16]

By the 1960's, however, there were major public programs of abortion and contraception in virtually all Communist nations. Although these have been justified, probably quite sincerely, as maternal welfare and anti-illegal abortion measures rather than as population control, they have doubtless caused some strains on the ideology. For whatever

[13] Mr. Kochubei (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Population Commission, A/C. 2/SR. 867, December 11, 1962.
[14] Mr. Serafimov (Bulgaria), Population Commission, A/C. 2/SR. 875, December 18, 1962.
[15] Mr. Solodovnikov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Population Commission, E/SR. 1246, April 9, 1963.
[16] Alfred Sauvy, *Fertility and Survival* (New York 1961), 204.

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reason, that lowered birth rates might not be undesirable in the developing countries has been increasingly admitted in the 1960's, but only if these occur as a result of prior changes in the economic and social structure. So intent have some writers been to demonstrate that low birth rates are an effect rather than a cause of development that they sometimes seem to believe that fertility declines magically—at the very least, without "artificial birth control":

> In Europe, various artificial means of lowering the birth rate had been applied, in keeping with the pseudoscientific views of Malthus; but the actual reasons for the decline had had no connection whatsoever with Malthusian philosophy. Three main factors tended to reduce birth rates: industrialization, rising material and cultural levels of living, and increased participation by women in national economic, cultural, and political life. The operation of those factors would cause the birth rate in underdeveloped countries to decline in coming years; a decline was in fact already noticeable in some countries, including India. His country had been accused of paying no heed to the threat to the world economy posed by present rates of population growth and of taking no steps to meet it; but that criticism was unwarranted. The USSR had never ignored the facts of population growth; but it felt that the artificial ways of limiting population growth advocated by the neo-Malthusians were inhuman and that in time, through the operation of the factors he had mentioned, the birth rate would drop of its own accord.[17]

The most recent indications are that Soviet ideologists are not so far from their Western counterparts. In the illustration below, an influential Soviet writer suggests that fertility control can accelerate the developmental process:

> The basic difference between the neo-Malthusians and the Marxists is not that the former propose various measures for limiting the birth rate while the latter unconditionally reject them all. The whole point is the relative importance both attach to these measures. The neo-Malthusians impose measures to limit the birth rate in order to avoid progressive social change in society. As for the Marxists, they feel there can be no demographic solution to the vital problems facing mankind. Their solution assumes first and foremost rapid economic development and profound social change. Demographic measures are no panacea for economic difficulties

[17] Mr. Podyachikh (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Population Commission, E/CN. 9/SR. 170, February 11, 1963.

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and social evils. A scientific population policy which encourages both an increase in birth control in some cases and a substantial reduction in others may serve as an important secondary means for markedly accelerating social progress.[18]

Marxist Influence on Latin American Thought

Whether through the writings of Marx himself or through his present-day exponents in Europe and China, Marxist ideology on population continues to have a powerful influence on Latin American intellectuals of all persuasions but the far Right. Consequently, the initial reaction of the typical intellectual to the question of population growth is that the real problems are social and economic and that any other view must be concealing ulterior motives. The need for basic social and economic reform, moreover, is obvious to virtually all persons of influence in Latin America. The Right talks about it, the Center means it, and the Left means it right now. Mass education, industrialization, agrarian reform, more equitable distribution of wealth, health, and happiness are the ingredients, which vary in priority, timing, and means of accomplishment; but nearly everyone is concerned that somehow and sometime they be realized. These needs are so crushing, so obvious, and so imminent that to talk of anything else appears to many only a diversionary tactic.

Nevertheless, there are some stark facts of population growth facing Latin America, rates of growth never experienced by Europe before or after Malthus and Marx. Increasingly, intellectuals are admitting that population growth is a problem, but for some it is just the kind of irritant needed to precipitate basic reforms in the economic and social structure. As phrased by Chile's ambassador to the U.S.: ". . . Probably the single most important factor promoting the process of modernization in the underdeveloped societies is *precisely* the social pressure created by population growth. . . . What would the effect be of reducing the social tensions due to population growth, in the semi-feudal and oligarchical societies of so many nations of the third world? Could it not be that a successful birth control program carries with it the seeds of self-destruction for its principal objective of modernization?"[19] Or as phrased by a Colombian university professor: "Population growth can have a very positive role because it can break the vicious circle. If the pressures are very large, the society has to feed

[18] E. Arab-Ogly, in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, cited in *Atlas* (December 1966).
[19] *Observaciones . . . R. Tomić.*

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many people and this need can create something new. . . . Like the great intellectual advance during the population explosion in classical Athens . . . it can force new ideas and can bring about the transformation of the status quo."[20]

While few socialists admit that population growth could be a problem in a socialist state, in the light of the pattern of recent political developments in Latin America, some socialist thinkers are becoming less optimistic about the imminence of revolution. What if the socialist state is a long time in coming? Is population increase really going to accelerate its occurrence? May population control be employed to assuage the misery of the prerevolutionary period? Three other Colombian professors express their points of view:

> Given our political system and the small likelihood of change, the conservative theory that you must control fertility because the economic systems can't take care of people's needs makes more sense . . . but if we had a good revolutionary government, then we should push for another alternative, as was done by Stalin who gave prizes for mothers of large families.
>
> The revolution is not brought about by the increase in numbers but by the consciousness of the people. To try to increase population would be falling into the absurdity of trying to increase misery in order to try to solve it.
>
> Some say that birth control will delay the revolution. This is a simplification of Marxist theory. . . . The more poverty and misery exist, the greater the probability of revolutions. But it doesn't take into account that the masses of the poor are totally lacking in revolutionary conscience, and that things are not likely to change.[21]

The dilemma is an agonizing one for the leftist thinker, for while he basically disapproves of the birth control solution, he must consider it in some indefinite short run, if only to slow the pace of accelerating misery.

> So we have two arguments working: one of them is that we should be working toward the revolution and the more people who want to join the revolution the better. The other is that since the revolution is going to fail, then we should have birth control to avoid the vain suffering of the people.

[20] International Population Program interviews.
[21] *Ibid.*

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> If all this misery is necessarily going to continue, then it is necessary to opt for birth control, at least to avoid having more people born only to end in misery and starvation. . . . While the revolution is brewing, it would be only decent to supply the population with the means they need if they want to practice birth control.
>
> I am lecturing to physicians about birth control and I cannot make up my mind on whether we can make policy for everybody or whether this is mainly a problem of the individual and the solution lies in the individual's mind. . . . Can we sacrifice the well-being of a generation or two in order to increase our dubious expectations of the future? We often say, "Let the population grow fast so that pressures of the status quo are increased and change comes about." But do we have the right to make such judgments on the entire population, or should we instead concentrate on curing the problems of the family as an institution itself?[22]

While politicians, social scientists, and clergy are concerned about the population question, the medical profession is doing something about it. The government of Colombia has allocated $300,000 in counterpart funds to the Association of Medical Faculties to train the nation's physicians in family planning techniques. In Chile, the major hospitals in the major cities supply modern birth control methods, and even in Brazil a private family planning association is gaining momentum under high-level medical leadership. Indeed, such activities in combination with a relatively permissive stance on the part of Church spokesmen have led various experts and enthusiasts to conclude that the birth control battle is more or less over in Latin America.

It is quite true that many members of the medical profession in a number of Latin American countries have accepted the principle that the public deserves contraceptive services as a means of preventing illegal abortions and that the Church has not reacted aggressively to such principles or programs. This is a remarkable story in itself and represents a revolutionary change in medical opinion. The change, however, has been much less profound among nonmedical groups, who figure more prominently in policy-making circles in Latin America. It should be pointed out that while medical men in Latin America may generally be to the Left of the American Medical Association, they are generally considered to be politically conservative. Accordingly, the

[22] *Ibid.*

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kinds of concerns expressed by the intellectuals quoted in this article are more rarely articulated by physicians and are almost never expressed to American birth control enthusiasts. On the other hand, in those areas where leftist physicians are a powerful force, they can become a particularly potent influence against population control. Thus the executive committee of the Guanabara Medical Association (Brazil), described by a *New York Times* writer as a group of "left-wing and anti-American physicians," announced in December 1966 that they were preparing draft legislation to prohibit the production and sale of contraceptive pills and devices in Brazil.[23]

Further, a positive stance on the part of the Church would be a mixed blessing. Basic agreement with the Church on population problems and family planning has always been a mild embarrassment to the Left. A move by the Church to a pro–birth control policy would help to consolidate leftist opposition to birth control, since such a policy would make consistent the socialist views of the reactionary character of the Church and the reactionary character of population control. In short, the battle is not yet over.

The United States and Population Control

Even when widespread birth control services are accepted in Latin America there will be serious questions about their role in the society and about the role that United States assistance should play. Few of the Colombians interviewed objected to U.S. aid for research or for purely technical assistance. As one respondent put it: "At the level of research it is very good . . . but the policy to be followed should not be determined by them, the foreigners. They always suggest, and that should not be, because their suggestions are often taken too seriously, and they are very often bad."[24] Or another, who had termed birth control "utopian, false, and treacherous," said with respect to aid on family planning: "We have to learn how to receive gracefully all that is knowledge or the product of culture, all that is science and technology, all that can help us."[25]

It might appear that in reality there is little danger of the United States' determining what policy Latin American nations should follow, but there is evidence that the U.S. line on population control is becom-

[23] Juan de Onis, in the *New York Times*, December 5, 1966. In Chile, prominent leftist physicians are among the leadership of the family planning movement. Nationalism takes a much milder form in Chile, and a more detailed comparison with Brazil might be rewarding.

[24] International Population Program interviews. [25] *Ibid.*

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ing not only clearer but harder. "There can no longer be any doubt in the administration or the country that this Congress was determined to defuse the population bomb," announced Senator Tydings last year.[26] Potentially explosive as such an activity might appear, there were signs that indelicate approaches were on the horizon. As early as mid-1965, Senator Clark told the U.S. Senate that "A.I.D. should be advocating the institution of voluntary family programs *as a necessary condition* to meeting the rising tide of unfed mouths and unfulfilled aspirations in these countries . . . and thus preventing American aid from being poured down a rat-hole. A.I.D. should move on from its attitude of limited response to initiatives made by aided governments, to an attitude of *active proselytizing of the cause of voluntary family planning*, in the many countries where that would be appropriate."[27]

Was the U.S. going to enforce birth control by holding up assistance on food, health, and economic development? What did President Johnson mean, many wondered, when he announced on January 20, 1966, that "the hungry world cannot be fed *until* and *unless* the growth in its resources and the growth in its population come into balance."[28] Was it true, as was stated in a discussion of the Food for Peace Bill, that "population control . . . by implication at least is mentioned as one of the elements to be considered in continuing U.S. aid"?[29] Was there any special significance in Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman's echoing the President's view of the superior value of investments in birth control?[30]

Latin American officials who had seen a withdrawal of North American support for health programs began to wonder if they were being told to stem life rather than to heal it. As the then minister of health of Peru put it, in what the journal *Caretas* termed a "sensational revelation": "The U.S. is willing to help in a campaign for the control of births but not in one to reduce the rates of death."[31] If health had been cut back, what next? Was not this concern what lurked behind UNCTAD Secretary General Paul Prebisch's statement that lowering birth rates is not "an alternative to a broad policy of economic development"?[32]

Perhaps the burdens of the space race, hot and cold wars, and the

[26] Joseph D. Tydings, Speech to the U.S. Senate, October 22, 1966.
[27] Joseph S. Clark, Speech to the U.S. Senate, June 14, 1965 (italics added).
[28] *Population Crisis* (November 1966).
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] Speech to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, July 21, 1966.
[31] "La Encuesta Hall," *Caretas* (August 28, 1964).
[32] Cited in *Alliance for Progress Weekly Newsletter* (February 7, 1966).

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development of nuclear facilities were causing the U.S. to look to solutions cheaper than economic development. "Heavy investments [for space research, etc.]," pointed out the Peruvian minister of health in explaining the "pessimistic" or Malthusian position of the developed nations, "are part of the struggle for world supremacy. . . . [The developed countries] are concerned about the competing demands for investments involved in this struggle."[33]

United States government economists had for some time been developing elaborate economic rationalizations for the transfer of funds from the "rat-hole" of economic aid to the haloed programs of family planning for increased per capita product. Thus, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis told the World Population Conference in 1965 that "if national economic resources were devoted to retarding population growth *rather than accelerating production growth*, these resources could be one hundred or so times more effective in raising some less developed countries' outputs per head."[34] In case such a handsome margin of profit did not seem adequate to justify the risks, the bomb-defusing experts soon produced an even more compelling argument. As stated (unofficially) by a social scientist in the Postattack Division of the Office of Civil Defense: "Rapid population growth rates have made economic growth and political stability increasingly difficult to maintain in some parts of the world, thereby adding to the need for programs and forces *to help maintain internal order and to defend against guerilla warfare*."[35]

The culmination of the utilitarian school of thought was reached in President Johnson's San Francisco speech on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations, June 25, 1965. Confirming many Latins' worst fears in an admirably clear and succinct sentence, he stated: "Let us act on the fact that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth." Many believe that Pope Paul VI's UN message was a direct reply to this new kind of economic calculus. In a statement that, perhaps mercifully, achieved much more space in the Latin American press than did the President's, he suggested the need to increase the amount of bread rather than decrease the number of guests at the banquet of life.

[33] Speech by Dr. Javier Arias Stella on the inauguration of the Peruvian Center of Population and Development Studies, Lima, January 14, 1965.

[34] Stephen Enke, World Population Conference, September 1965 (italics added).

[35] Robert Lamson, "Needed Research for Population Policy," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IX (February 1966), 23-25 (italics added). It is stated that the article represents the views of the author and not those of the Office of Civil Defense or the Department of the Army.

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The Chilean ambassador to the United States answered the argument on its own terms: "Are we looking for a cheap solution or the best solution?" he asked. ". . . It could be that the optimum return would result from our choosing the ninety dollars for economic development rather than the five for birth control."[36]

Other Latins asked themselves, If birth control programs are such a good investment, how is the Yankee capitalist, usually so astute in such matters, able to resist such an obvious bargain in the United States? That the United States has been able to point proudly only to Puerto Rico as its birth control showcase has not exactly been its strongest selling point in Latin America. However, the charge that the U.S. does not practice what it preaches was countered in mid-1965 when, in the triumphant editorial words of the *New York Times*, "American Indians, Eskimos and natives of the islands the U.S. holds in trust in the Pacific have just been made beneficiaries of the first Federal program offering direct help in family planning and birth control."[37] (Little noted was the unappreciative reaction of the *Navajo Times*: "We have had Washington's stock-reduction program forced on us. Now it would seem they are trying to sell us a people-reduction program.")[38]

Conclusions

In Latin America, a region deeply dedicated in spirit to freedom and liberty but often bound in fact to political tyranny and economic dependence, intellectuals are especially concerned about the freedom of choice in family matters. Indeed, even socialist opposition to population control often melts away if family planning is spoken of as increasing the scope of rational decision-making in the family. The following quotations from three Colombian professors show how birth control can be favored while population control is opposed:

> Birth control should represent an increase in the free will of the people. It should add one dimension to their possibility of choice. It should be free and available to everybody. . . . The Malthusian thesis that population growth increases misery is nothing but a comfortable way to justify the existing structures.
>
> The government should not interfere directly with family affairs. The only thing it should do is have intensive educational cam-

[36] *Observaciones . . . R. Tomić.*
[37] "More Headway on Birth Control," *New York Times*, June 21, 1965.
[38] Cited in *Indian Voices* (October 1965), 5.

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> paigns on family affairs . . . not to reduce the size of the family . . . but to give parents an opportunity to have the children with responsibility, to space them adequately.
>
> It is not necessary to control population in Colombia to reduce the growth rate since the people are not even in possession of their own land. Birth control can be applied only as an increase in the free will of the Colombian people.[39]

On Human Rights Day, December 10, 1966, United Nations Secretary General U Thant circulated a statement on family planning signed by the heads of twelve world states. In his covering statement U Thant noted that not only is population growth "an important factor in the rate at which nations can attain their economic goals, but . . . the size of the family is a fundamental human problem which must be based on the decisions of responsible parents concerned with the dignity and well-being of their children. . . . I feel bound to call attention to a declaration expressing concern with the quality of human life as well as with the number of human beings on earth." The national leaders, while mentioning the economic consequences of rapid population growth, also took a humanistic approach. They maintained that the "opportunity to decide the number and spacing of children is a basic human right" and that "the objective of family planning is the enrichment of human life, not its restriction; [freeing] man to attain his individual dignity and reach his full potential."[40]

Not long after, Pope Paul, in a marked change of emphasis from his earlier United Nations speech, recognized the appropriateness of government action to affect population growth, leaving it for "parents to decide on the number of their children . . . [following] the demands of their own conscience. . . ."[41] More specific programmatic steps have also been taken by the World Health Organization and the United Nations in the early part of 1967, giving family planning a more apolitical world base, both ideologically and programmatically.

Our previous analysis suggests that it is precisely this kind of sponsorship combined with this kind of ideology which will create a favorable environment for the introduction of national family planning programs in Latin America. In Brazil, the attack on Planning Minister Roberto Campos would have lost most of its steam if *international*

[39] International Population Program interviews.

[40] The statement was initially signed by the heads of state of Colombia, Finland, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Singapore, Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, the U.A.R., Yugoslavia, and India. Several additional countries have subsequently signed.

[41] *Populorum Progressio*, March 28, 1967.

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agencies had been known to be providing assistance to Brazil on population matters. Doubtless, too, some of Lleras Restrepo's current problems with the Colombian Conservatives over the government's family planning policies could have been avoided if international agencies had provided most of the technical and financial assistance. While the international agencies are gearing up for such aid, discreet and limited U.S. aid can be extremely useful, even more so if it comes from private organizations and foundations. With luck, within a decade much of the ideological controversy in most Latin American countries will have terminated, and the equally large problem of programmatic facilitation will have to be faced. At that time, the prediction of Marxist sociologist Jean Fréville may come to pass: ". . . The people of the future . . . will be able to control the size of the population according to their potentials and needs. Far from reducing the birth rate in order to preserve the old hierarchy and to implement a reactionary imperialist policy, they will be able to control the birth rate as a factor for balance, planning and progress."[42]

[42] Quoted in Arab-Ogly.

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Research Note

TOWARD EXPLAINING MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

By ROBERT D. PUTNAM*

I. Introduction

MILITARY intervention in politics is extremely common. Outside the North Atlantic area, the armed forces are more likely than not to be among the most important power contenders in any political system, and military regimes are at least as widespread as either totalitarian or democratic ones. It is surprising, therefore, that until recently this phenomenon has attracted little attention from students of politics. Though there has been some speculation about the causes of military intervention, our actual knowledge of the subject is meager indeed.

The preeminence of the military in politics in Latin America has long been recognized, but, even in this case, as recently as 1960 George Blanksten could complain that "political studies of the Latin American armed services are sorely needed."[1] Aside from a few vague remarks about "Hispanic heritage" and "backwardness," virtually no empirically based explanations of Latin American militarism have been offered. Since Blanksten wrote, of course, Johnson and Lieuwen have undertaken excellent analyses of this topic, but both authors' works have been primarily historical studies of the development and extent of military intervention in various countries, rather than verified, general explications of the causes of this phenomenon.[2]

A study of the factors that account for the varying political role of the military in Latin America would thus be useful both for students of Latin American politics and for students of comparative politics generally. Latin America constitutes in many respects an ideal "labora-

* I should like to thank the following individuals for their help in the preparation of this research note: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, Robert H. Dix, Richard Simeon, and Rosemary Putnam.

[1] "The Politics of Latin America," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 502.

[2] John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1961) and *Generals vs. Presidents* (New York 1964).

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tory" for analyzing militarism. The range of military involvement is great—from "pure" military regimes, such as Argentina's present regime, to "constitutional" military regimes, such as El Salvador's, to military "protectorates," such as Brazil's, to civil-military coalitions, such as Argentina's under Perón, to regimes in which the military is merely one among numerous important "power groups," such as Mexico's, to regimes in which the military is virtually nonpolitical, such as Costa Rica's. In this "laboratory," certain independent variables are held constant—colonial background, nature of the struggle for independence, length of independence, religious background, cultural authority patterns.[3] This means that we cannot examine the impact of these constants on the propensity for military intervention, but it does allow us to focus more clearly on other possible explanations. The purpose of this research note is to investigate in this Latin American "laboratory" some of the more important speculations about the sources of military involvement in politics.

II. Theoretical Propositions

A survey of the literature on military intervention in politics discloses four broad categories of factors suggested as causes of, or conditions for, intervention or abstention: (1) aspects of socioeconomic development; (2) aspects of political development; (3) characteristics of the military establishment itself; and (4) foreign influences. I shall here present and explicate the relevant hypotheses and shall refrain from setting out the broader theoretical perspectives of the various authors.[4] In particular, I shall limit my attention to propositions that answer the question, What accounts for the varying incidence of military intervention in politics? (There are many other interesting questions in this general area, concerning the political and ideological orientations of military regimes, the political, social, and economic consequences of military intervention, and so on, but these will be ignored here.)

[3] Certain of these variables are, to be sure, not entirely constant throughout the area, but they are so nearly so as to warrant ignoring their effects.

[4] The following works were consulted in preparing this inventory of theoretical propositions: Robert J. Alexander, "The Army in Politics," in H. E. Davis, ed., *Government and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1958); Stanislaw Andrzejewski, *Military Organization and Society* (London 1954); Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York 1962); William F. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (New York 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago 1964); John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962); and the works cited in footnote 2.

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One of the most common hypotheses links the propensity for military intervention with social and economic underdevelopment. Samuel Finer argues that *the propensity for military intervention is likely to decrease with increased social mobilization.*[5] The concept of social mobilization refers to such developments as urbanization, the rise of mass education and mass communications, the development of a money economy, and increased mass participation in social and political activities and associations. Social mobilization increases the number of potential political actors and diffuses increased political resources to these actors. The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that these actors will be willing and able to sustain civilian political institutions.[6]

Finer and others have also argued that *economic development, especially industrialization, diminishes the propensity for military intervention.*[7] This effect of economic development stems partly from the increased socio-technical complexity that puts public administration beyond the skills of the armed forces, partly from the civilian opportunities for social mobility which economic development opens up, and partly from greater wealth, which allows and encourages stable, civilian government.[8] Germani and Silvert have articulated a hypothesis hinted at by others, namely, that *military intervention is inhibited by the rise of middle strata in the social structure,* since these middle strata have in especial measure both the motivation and the ability to create and sustain stable civilian political institutions.[9] These same authors also argue that *the likelihood of military intervention is greater, the greater the cleavages and the less the consensus in a society.* (This proposition is related to the proposition discussed below linking military intervention and political violence.)

A second set of variables, correlated with but distinct from those involving social mobilization and economic development, may be grouped under the heading "political development." The most obvious hypothesis, as stated by Finer, is that *"where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be*

[5] Pp. 87-88. The term "social mobilization" (which Finer himself does not use) was introduced in this sense by Karl W. Deutsch in "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* LV (September 1961), 493-514.

[6] Huntington's counterhypothesis linking social mobilization with *increased* military intervention is discussed later in this section.

[7] Finer, 113-15; Alexander, 158.

[8] Janowitz's attack on this proposition (pp. 18-20) is weakened by his failure to distinguish the military-civilian dimension from the democratic-authoritarian dimension and by his failure to recognize that a correlation can be important without being perfect.

[9] Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie,* II (Spring 1961), 62-81.

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weak. . . . Where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-existent, military intervention in politics will find wide scope—both in manner and in substance."[10] Though this proposition is important, it is also somewhat unsatisfying, for it fails to take our search for explanation very far from the phenomenon that we are trying to explain. A more interesting hypothesis, suggested by Finer, Johnson, and others, is that *the propensity for military intervention in politics decreases with increasing popular attention to and participation in politics.*[11] Another set of hypotheses relates military intervention to weaknesses in civilian political institutions: *military intervention decreases with increasing strength and effectiveness of political parties, of political interest groups, and of civilian governmental institutions.*[12] Huntington's theory of political development and decay stresses the importance of "the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures." "Political decay"—of which a notable symptom is military intervention—arises out of an imbalance between social mobilization and political institutionalization. Therefore, *the greater the social mobilization and the less the political institutionalization, the greater the likelihood of military intervention.*[13] A final aspect of political development that is relevant here concerns the role of violence. Lieuwen and Needler have argued that *the tendency toward military intervention increases with increasing political violence.*[14] Obviously, the military have an important advantage in a political game where violence is trump, for that is their strong suit.

The third set of hypotheses concerns the way internal characteristics of a military establishment affect its predisposition to political intervention. *"Professionalization" of the military is linked with decreased military intervention* (Huntington) *and with increased military intervention* (Finer).[15] This apparent contradiction can perhaps be resolved if we consider a few of the possible components of "professionalization." Many students of civil-military relations have suggested that *military intervention decreases with the development within the military of a norm of civilian supremacy.*[16] As with the proposition linking military

[10] P. 21.

[11] Finer, 87; John J. Johnson, "The Latin-American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," in Johnson, ed., *Role of the Military*, 127.

[12] Finer, 21, 87-88, 115; Alexander, 157.

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430.

[14] Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in Johnson, ed., *Role of the Military*, 132-33; Martin C. Needler, *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (New York 1963), 76.

[15] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 84; Finer, 24ff.

[16] For example, Finer, 32.

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abstention with the legitimacy of civilian institutions, the proposed explanatory factor in this hypothesis is "too close" to the phenomenon to be explained. On the other hand, if the hypothesis is given a historical focus, it is rather more interesting. Thus, with respect to Latin American armies it is commonly asserted that military intervention is the prevailing norm because of the Hispanic heritage.[17] Similarly, it is argued that *the propensity for military intervention increases with the habituation of the military to intervention*, or more simply, that intervention breeds more intervention.[18]

The larger and more sophisticated the armed forces, the more likely that they will have the administrative and technical skills necessary for running a government and that the military will have a preponderance of armed power over civilians. Thus, some have argued that *the size and sophistication of the military establishment are positively related to the propensity for intervention in politics*.[19] Janowitz has discussed a variety of other internal characteristics of the military establishment which he sees as related to the propensity for political involvement, such as political ideology, social and political cohesion, and career and recruitment patterns. I shall not pursue these propositions here since I do not have the data necessary to test them.

Two final factors often adduced to explain military intervention, especially but not exclusively in the Latin American context, involve foreign influences. First, it is often alleged that *military training missions from foreign nations inculcate attitudes favorable or unfavorable to military intervention in politics*. Edelmann echoes many others in arguing that "the influence of German, Italian, and certain other military missions" has been among the "most important" causes of military intervention in Latin America,[20] while Johnson argues that the effect of U.S. missions is to transmit norms of civilian supremacy along with their tutelage in military techniques.[21] Second, it is often argued that by a kind of "demonstration effect" *military intervention in one country encourages intervention by the armed forces of other countries in their own political systems*, or more simply, that coups are contagious.[22]

[17] For example, Alexander, 153.
[18] *Ibid.*, 154-55.
[19] Janowitz, 42.
[20] Alexander T. Edelmann, *Latin American Government and Politics* (Homewood 1965), 189.
[21] "The Latin American Military," in Johnson, *Role of the Military*, 129.
[22] Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics," *ibid.*, 134.

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III. Methodology

There is no dearth of suggestions about what factors are causally related to military intervention in politics. The problem is to subject this array of propositions to some kind of empirical testing. The primary method used here is correlational analysis. For each Latin American country an index is constructed representing the extent of military intervention in politics over the last decade. This is our "dependent variable." This index will be correlated with a variety of other data intended to represent or reflect some of the suggested independent variables. The strength of the empirical relationships will be summarized by the standard Pearsonian correlation coefficient r.[23]

This technique is a powerful one for testing hypotheses such as those outlined above, for it allows us to weigh and summarize all the relevant evidence. In particular, we can go beyond mere lists of illustrations and exceptions. This technique is, of course, not the only possible one—other complementary techniques are the case-study method and the comparative historical method. Nor is it without its limitations. First, the present analysis is "synchronic," rather than "diachronic"; that is, it compares information on military intervention and, for example, social mobilization at the present time in the various Latin American countries. With one important exception, we shall not compare data that would allow us to examine changes in the degree of intervention and mobilization in one country over time.

Second, as already suggested, we shall not examine all the factors that might be linked theoretically to military intervention. In particular, two classes of factors are beyond the scope of this investigation. First, we cannot examine propositions involving variables that are virtually constant throughout the Latin American area, such as religion, colonial background, length of independence, and the like. However, it is precisely these factors that could not possibly account for the wide variation among these countries in military intervention.[24] Second, a number of theoretically interesting and relevant variables must be ignored here because we lack the data necessary to test them. We lack direct information on the political allegiances of the populations, on the extent of social cleavage and consensus in the various countries, and on the

[23] See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York 1960), 273ff.

[24] Obviously, this study can consider only the range of variation in the independent variables which occurs in Latin America. For example, levels of social mobilization above or below the level achieved in Latin America might have effects on militarism which could not be detected in this study.

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internal characteristics and norms of the military, such as those discussed by Janowitz. For a few of these factors we can make some attempt to use indirect indicators, but these attempts must be especially tentative. On the other hand, the relative success or failure of attempts to explain military intervention with the factors for which data are available will give us some indication of how much variation is left to be explained by *other* factors.

Before proceeding further, the term "military intervention" must be more precisely defined. In doing so, I shall borrow Robert Gilmore's definition of militarism: "The military institution is concerned with the management and use of controlled violence in the service of the state according to terms laid down by the state. When the military institution veers from this role to participate in or to influence other, non-military agencies and functions of the state, including its leadership, then militarism exists in greater or lesser degree."[25]

Obviously, the persuasiveness of this study depends on the validity of the index of military intervention used as the dependent variable. The heart of this index, which I shall call the "MI index," is a rating assigned to each country for each year of the decade 1956-1965, based on the extent of military intervention in the political life of that country for that year. This rating is on a scale from zero to three, from least to most intervention. Thus, for the decade, a country's MI score could range between zero and thirty.

The ends of the scale are easiest to define. A rating of zero is given to a country in which the armed forces were essentially apolitical, their role restricted to that of a minor pressure group on strictly military matters. Latin American examples of this level of intervention during the period studied were Uruguay and Costa Rica, as well as Bolivia during the years just after the 1952 revolution. A country that was ruled directly by a military regime, either individual or collective, and in which civilian groups and institutions were reduced to supplicants or tools of the military, is rated three. Examples of this level of intervention were Paraguay and (after the coups of the early 1960's) Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Bolivia. Ratings of one and two are assigned to levels of intervention falling between these two extremes. A rating of two is given when a country was ruled by a military-civilian coalition in which the civilian elements had some real influence, or by civilians subject to frequent demands from a powerful military estab-

[25] Robert L. Gilmore, *Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela* (Athens, Ohio, 1964), 4-5.

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lishment, or by a dictatorship (often of a personalistic variety) based on force of arms, but not solely responsible to the armed forces.[26] Examples of this level of intervention in Latin America during the last decade were Brazil and Argentina (except for periods of direct rule by military juntas), Venezuela after Pérez Jiménez, and Nicaragua (a "familistic" dictatorship in which the armed forces played an important, but not predominant, role). A rating of one is given when a country was ruled by essentially civilian institutions, with civilian power groups preeminent, but with the armed forces still a significant political force in nonmilitary matters. Examples of this level of intervention were Mexico and Chile, and Colombia after Rojas Pinilla.

This rating method explicitly excludes from consideration certain political characteristics of related interest. I have not considered the degree of "democracy" in a country, apart from the extent of military intervention. Thus, for example, Castro's Cuba, despite its quasi-totalitarian character, is rated only one, since the available evidence suggests that the military play only a minor role in contemporary Cuban politics. Nor have I considered the ideological complexion of the military establishment; both the reactionary Paraguayan regime and the reformist regime in El Salvador are rated three.

In constructing the index I have used the literature on Latin American militarism, textbook accounts of Latin American politics, general histories of the period, and the *Annual Register* of political events. In cases of ambiguity, I have gone directly to monographic literature on specific countries. My sources are given in Appendix I, which also gives the actual year-by-year ratings for the various countries. Naturally, in a number of cases conclusive information on the precise political role of the military in a given year was lacking. In such cases I followed whatever seemed to be the preponderance of evidence, and since such cases invariably involve a difference of only a few points in the final country score, the overall effect is marginal.

This description of the construction of the MI index is some warrant for its validity, but fortunately there is an independent check on its plausibility. After the ratings had been compiled, I discovered a rather detailed classification by Martin C. Needler of the "normal political role of the military" in each Latin American country. A comparison of his rankings with my ratings will not "prove" the accuracy of

[26] In this connection it may be helpful to note Gilmore's distinction between "militarism" (as defined above) and "caudillism": "Caudillism is a political process in which violence is an essential element. . . . [It] may be defined as the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power" (pp. 5, 47). Caudillist regimes, such as Haiti's, are rated two.

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either, because both employ the "reputational" method. However, the strong concordance between the two assessments, shown in Table I, should increase our confidence in the MI index. With the exception of Needler's final category, the mean MI score for each category differs significantly from the others as it should. Moreover, the overlap in the range of MI scores between adjacent categories is, with the same single exception, one MI point at most. The only exception to this almost perfect concordance results from Needler's inclusion of Cuba and Nicaragua in the category of countries where the military are "in control," and, as I have argued above, the weight of the evidence suggests that this categorization of these two countries is misleading.[27]

TABLE I. A COMPARISON OF TWO RATINGS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN TWENTY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Needler's Ranking According to "Normal Political Role of Military"	*Mean MI Index Scores*	*Range of MI Index Scores*
1. "None" ($N = 1$)	0.0	0
2. "Limited" ($N = 5$)	8.8	0-15
3. "Intervene" ($N = 5$)	21.8	20-23
4. "Veto Power" ($N = 5$)	24.4	22-28
5. "In Control" ($N = 4$)	23.2	16-30
(Category 5, excluding Cuba and Nicaragua)	(28.5)	(27-30)

SOURCE: Needler, *Latin American Politics in Perspective*, 156-57.

In sum, then, although there might be some disagreement about the exact rating for a given country, the MI score seems a fairly good measure of the extent of military intervention in the politics of each Latin American nation.

The data on the independent variables for each country are of three general types. In the first place, certain standard statistics, such as extent of urbanization, measures of economic development, and literacy rates, have been gathered from a number of statistical handbooks. Second, some variables based on rankings by informed observers have been drawn from *A Cross-Polity Survey* by Banks and Textor.[28] Finally,

[27] The fact that the differences in MI scores among Needler's third, fourth, and fifth categories are much less than the differences involving his first and second categories comports with one's intuitive notion of the "distance" between the levels of intervention indicated by the descriptions of his categories. Thus, for example, the difference between a military that habitually "intervenes" and one that has "veto power" is less than the difference between one that "intervenes" and one whose political role is "limited." Needler's ratings of individual countries are given in Appendix I.

[28] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

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information on several dichotomous characteristics, such as the incidence of German military training missions, has been compiled from standard treatments of Latin American politics. Sources for data on all these variables are given in Appendix II.

The data on the independent variables involve problems of reliability and validity. "Reliability" refers to the accuracy of the statistics in measuring whatever it is that they measure. How accurate, for example, are the data on per capita GNP? As is well known, statistical data from Latin America are often not of the highest quality, and the reader is referred to the sources listed in Appendix II for discussions of this problem in particular cases. It is important to understand that in general the effect of unreliability in measurement of variables is to *reduce* the obtained correlation coefficients slightly below the values that would be expected if there were no such measurement error.[29] "Validity" refers to the accuracy of the statistics in measuring the concepts in which we are interested. How well, for example, does per capita GNP or the proportion of the GNP derived from agriculture indicate "socio-technical complexity"? We cannot resolve these problems; we can only use appropriate caution in interpreting the results.[30]

IV. Results

Socioeconomic development

The correlations between the MI index and various statistical indicators of social mobilization and economic development are given in Table II. Five variables measure social mobilization: (1) percent of population in cities over 20,000, (2) percent of adults literate, (3) news-

[29] See George A. Ferguson, *Statistical Analysis in Psychology and Education* (New York 1959), 289. Given the probable error margins for the data used here, reliability coefficients in the range .8-.9 would be expected. This would mean, for example, that an obtained coefficient of .20 understates the actual correlation by about .02-.05 and that a coefficient of .60 understates the actual correlation by about .06-.15. For error estimates, see Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964). For a detailed analysis of GNP error and a calculation of an approximate reliability coefficient, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Comparison of Aggregate Political and Social Data . . . ," *Social Sciences Information*, v (September 1966), 1-18.

[30] For a few of the variables, data were not available for all twenty Latin American countries. In some cases, I have estimated the missing data and calculated coefficients including this "best guess" data. Unless these "guesses" are *wildly* off (and I do not believe that they are), the error introduced by including them is probably less than the error that would be introduced by ignoring the countries they represent. Precise data on Uruguay, for example, are often missing; yet it would be quite misleading to ignore the fact that this country fits many of our hypotheses remarkably well. Coefficients based on "best guess" data are indicated as such, and in all cases coefficients have also been presented without this "best guess" data.

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TABLE II. MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A FUNCTION OF SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Variable Number	*Variable Content*	*Correlation With MI Index*
1	Percent of population in cities over 20,000	—.49
2	Percent of adults literate	—.47
3	Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	—.57
4	University students per 1,000 population	—.45
5	Radios per 1,000 population	—.44
6	Per capita GNP (1957)	—.30
7	Percent of GNP derived from agriculture	.26 (.18)
8	Percent of labor force in agriculture	.24
9	Percent of population in the primary sector	.39
10	Percent of labor force earning wages or salaries	—.42 (—.32)
11	Percent of labor force employed in industry	—.29
12	Percent of population in middle and upper [social] strata	—.48 (—.45)

SOURCES: See Appendix II. For Variables 7, 10, and 12, the correlation coefficients are based on data including "best guess" estimates for two or three countries for which precise data are not available. Coefficients in parentheses are based on data *not* including these estimates. See footnote 30.

paper circulation per 1,000 population, (4) university students per 1,000 population, and (5) radios per 1,000 population. As one might expect, these variables are highly intercorrelated: the mean intercorrelation is .81. They are also fairly closely correlated in the expected direction with military intervention: the mean correlation is —.48.[31] To simplify subsequent analysis, I have added together each country's (standardized) scores on these five indicators to form a single index of social mobilization, or "SM index." This index represents very accurately the factor common to these five indicators—all of the intercorrelations among the five components and all of their individual

[31] There is considerable debate about whether tests of statistical significance are appropriate in cases, like the present study, in which we have not a random sample from a larger universe but a complete universe, viz., all contemporary Latin American countries. Strictly speaking, significance testing is merely a way of checking inferences from a random sample to the universe from which that sample is drawn. On the other hand, Blalock and Gold have argued that significance tests may help us sift important from unimportant findings, even when there is no question of inferring to a larger universe. See Blalock, 270, and David Gold, "Some Problems in Generalizing Aggregate Associations," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VIII (December 1964), 16-18. Gold, however, adds the qualification that when one is dealing with small N's (as we are here), "judgments of importance that can be made reasonably from the *size* of associations should take precedence over tests of significance." Keeping in mind the problems associated with significance-testing in this situation, one may find the following figures helpful: assuming a one-tailed test and an N of 20, an $r \geqq .38$ is significant at the .05 level; an $r \geqq .31$ is significant at the .10 level; and an $r \geqq .23$ is significant at the .33 level. These significance levels are derived from the *World Handbook*, 262.

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correlations with the MI index can be accounted for in terms of covariation with the SM index. This index itself correlates —.53 with the MI index. The conclusion must be that social mobilization is fairly strongly, and negatively, related to military intervention. More than one-quarter of the total variance in the MI index can be accounted for by covariation with social mobilization. (The square of a correlation coefficient, termed the "coefficient of determination," indicates what proportion of the variance in one variable is accounted for by covariation with the other. Here, for example, —.53 squared equals .28 or 28 percent.)[32]

Six of the variables are closely related to economic development: (1) per capita GNP, (2) percent of GNP derived from agriculture, (3) percent of the labor force in agriculture, (4) percent of the population in the primary sector, (5) percent of the labor force earning wages or salaries, and (6) percent of the labor force employed in industry. Again, these variables are highly intercorrelated: the average intercorrelation among them is .72. Each is moderately correlated with military intervention in the expected direction: the mean correlation of the six with the MI index is —.32.[33] As in the case of social mobilization, to make subsequent discussion simpler I have added together each country's (standardized) scores on these six indicators to form a single index of economic development, or "ED index." Like the SM index, the ED index represents very accurately the factor common to its six components. This ED index correlates —.37 with the MI index.

Before we can decide definitely on the relationship between economic development and military intervention, however, we must take into account their joint correlation with social mobilization. This procedure, in fact, produces a most remarkable result: if we remove the effect of social mobilization, economic development itself turns out to be *positively*, not negatively, correlated with military intervention! The pattern of simple, or zero-order, correlations among these three variables is given in Figure 1. Since the ED index and the SM index are very highly intercorrelated, the partial correlation between economic development and military intervention, controlling for social mobilization, becomes +.26. The explanation of this finding is that the SM-MI and SM-ED correlations are so strong that they "mask" the real, positive ED-MI correlation.

[32] See Blalock, 295-99.

[33] In calculating this mean correlation and in compiling the ED index that follows, I have reversed the scoring for Variables 7-9, so that a large positive number always refers to a high level of development.

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

FIGURE 1. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

A more sophisticated procedure for analyzing this pattern of interrelations is provided by causal path analysis.[34] This technique allows us to calculate "causal weights," or "path coefficients," indicating the nature and importance of the causal relationships among a set of variables, provided (1) we are willing to posit some particular pattern of causal relations among the variables, and (2) we are willing to ignore (at least temporarily) the possible effects of variables not included in the set being considered. In our present case, the first of these conditions can be met by assuming that military intervention is a result, rather than a cause, of social mobilization and economic development. As a first approximation, this is probably true; later in this research note I shall explore this point further. (Path analysis does *not* require us to decide which way(s) the causal arrow joining development and mobilization should point.) If we can make the assumption implied in the second condition—that there is no fourth variable intruding—we can calculate from the correlation coefficients given in Figure 1 the causal weights, or path coefficients, given in Figure 2.[35] These weights

[34] The discussion that follows is not intended to be a complete presentation of the logic and methodology of causal path analysis. For introductions to this recently developed technique, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill 1964); Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Analysis . . . ," *American Sociological Review*, XXX (June 1965), 365-74; and Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXII (July 1966), 1-16. For a readable and comprehensive introduction for political scientists, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inference in Political Analysis," in Joseph Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, 2nd Series (Dallas 1966).

[35] The equations for calculating the path coefficients (or p's) in this case are quite simple:

$$r_{21}=p_{21}$$
$$r_{32}=p_{32}+r_{21}p_{31}$$
$$r_{31}=p_{31}+r_{21}p_{32}.$$

This is a simple algebraic system of three equations and three unknowns. For the

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

FIGURE 2. PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

imply that the direct effect of social mobilization on military intervention is strongly negative and that the direct effect of economic development on military intervention is moderately positive. Path analysis also allows us to estimate the proportion of the variance in a dependent variable which remains unaccounted for by a system of independent variables.[36] Social mobilization and economic development together account for about thirty-three percent of the variance in the MI index, leaving sixty-seven percent yet to be explained.

The remaining hypothesis linking socioeconomic development and military intervention refers to the rise of the middle strata. Accurate information on the class structure of the Latin American countries is difficult to obtain, but Germani and Silvert present data on "the percentage of the population in middle and upper [social] strata."[37] The correlation of this variable with the MI index is —.48, supporting the notion that the rise of the middle strata is associated with a decline in military intervention. However, because this measure of class structure

general equation of path analysis, see Duncan, 5.

[36] The equation for calculating the residual variance is quite simple:

$$p_{3u}^2 = 1 - p_{32}^2 - p_{31}^2 - 2p_{32}r_{12}p_{31}.$$

See Duncan, 6.

[37] R. Vekemans and J. L. Segundo present numerically identical data under the heading "Percent of population at intermediate and senior grades of employment," in "Essay on a Socio-economic Typology of the Latin American Countries," in E. de Vries and J. M. Echavarria, eds., *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America*, Vol. I (Paris 1963).

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is almost perfectly correlated with the SM index (r=.94), it makes virtually no *independent* contribution toward explaining variance in levels of military intervention.

In sum, then, there seems to be good evidence that both social mobilization and economic development affect a country's propensity for military rule. Social mobilization definitely inhibits military intervention in politics, as predicted. The direct effect of economic development seems to be to encourage military intervention, although there is also a strong indirect effect linking economic development and military abstention, by way of social mobilization. The implications of this complicated pattern of findings can be brought out by several examples. Colombia and El Salvador are, in terms of the ED index, equally developed economically, but Colombian society is considerably more mobilized, as measured by the SM index. For the period under consideration, the Colombian military were much less involved in politics than were their Salvadoran counterparts. On the other hand, Venezuela and Costa Rica are about equally mobilized socially, but Venezuela is considerably more developed economically. As the preceding analysis would have predicted, Venezuelan politics in the period studied were much more subject to military intervention. Altogether the variables examined in this section account for about one-third of the total variance in the incidence of military intervention in Latin American politics.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Data on political development are much less readily available than data on socioeconomic variables. The correlations between military intervention and the political variables for which we can obtain data are given in Table III.

First, let us consider briefly the question of public commitment to civilian rule. Alexander Edelmann argues that among the most important influences counteracting military intervention in Latin America are "constitutional and legal restrictions imposed on members of the military regarding political activity. . . . Written not only on paper but also in the aspirations of liberty-loving citizens, they serve notice on the military of what their fellow countrymen expect."[38] If Edelmann is right that constitutional restrictions reflect popular norms and that these popular norms inhibit military intervention, then there should be a high correlation between constitutional restrictions and military abstention from politics. In fact, the correlation between military inter-

[38] Pp. 192-93.

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TABLE III. MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A FUNCTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Variable Number	*Variable Content*	*Correlation With MI Index*
13	Constitutional restrictions on the military	—.18
14	Percent of voting-age population voting	—.13
15	Interest articulation by parties	.04
16	Interest articulation by associations	—.19
17	Stability of party system	—.36
18	Interest aggregation by parties	—.63
19	Log_{10} (10 × deaths from domestic group violence per million population)	.20
20	Weighted Eckstein "instability" index	—.08

SOURCES: See Appendix II.

vention and constitutional limits on military political activity is only —.18. The mean MI score for the fourteen nations that as of 1959 had some constitutional restrictions on political activity by the military is 17.4, while the mean MI score for the entire region is 18.4. The evidence clearly fails to confirm Edelmann's hypothesis. The explanation may be either that constitutions and popular aspirations are unrelated or that these aspirations do not affect military intervention.

A frequent hypothesis is that popular political participation inhibits military intervention. The best available indicator of such participation is the proportion of the adult population that votes in national elections.[39] Table III shows that the correlation between electoral turnout and military intervention, though in the predicted direction, is quite low. As a matter of fact, if we control for the level of social mobilization, the remaining partial correlation between turnout and military intervention is virtually zero.

In assessing the hypotheses linking military intervention to the weakness of political parties and pressure groups—the political infrastructure—we are forced to rely almost exclusively on the judgments compiled for the *Cross-Polity Survey*. Four scales presented there are relevant: (1) extent of interest articulation by political parties, (2) extent of interest articulation by associations, (3) stability of the party system, and (4) extent of interest aggregation by political parties. The correlations of the two variables involving interest articulation are, in

[39] It is true that the accuracy of electoral turnout as an indicator of participation is limited by variations in the social and institutional context of the act of voting. Voting does not have the same meaning in the U.S. and the USSR, in the Netherlands and Uganda. Restriction of our attention to the Latin American countries minimizes this problem. For a fuller discussion of the problem, see Germani and Silvert.

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fact, negligible, viz., .04 for parties and —.19 for associations. Judging by these statistics, strong and articulate parties and pressure groups do not necessarily inhibit military intervention, nor do weak parties and pressure groups necessarily encourage intervention.[40] The stability of the party system is somewhat more strongly related to military intervention, and the extent of aggregation by political parties is quite strongly related, with coefficients of —.36 and —.63 respectively. These figures, especially the latter one, strongly suggest that in contemporary Latin America political parties and military regimes represent mutually exclusive mechanisms for reaching political decisions. On the other hand, these relationships are hardly surprising, because they approach being tautological. In any country where a military regime was in power most experts would be likely *ipso facto* to rate as insignificant the role of parties in aggregating interests and resolving political problems.

The final proposition to be considered in this section on political development links military intervention to the role of violence in politics. Two different indices of political violence in the Latin American countries are available. Harry Eckstein compiled from the *New York Times Index* an enumeration of violent events occurring in every country in the world in the period 1946-1959 and tallied these in ten categories ranging from civil wars to police roundups. I have computed for each Latin American country an index based on five of his categories, with "warfare" and "turmoil" weighted by a factor of four, "rioting" and "large-scale terrorism" weighted by two, and "small-scale terrorism" weighted by one.[41] (These were the only categories dealing with mass violence.) The other index of political violence is based on the variable "Deaths from Domestic Group Violence per Million Population, 1950-1962" presented in the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. To reduce the skewing effect caused by the great variance in this variable (from 2,900 for Cuba to 0.3 for Uruguay), I have used a logarithmic transformation to "squash" the distribution. (Given the nature of the distribution, the effect of this transformation is to raise the correlation coefficient obtained with the MI index.) The

[40] Edelmann argues that one particular sort of interest group is especially likely to inhibit military intervention: "The most serious threat of all to the power of the military is that posed by the labor unions . . ." (p. 194). Actually, the correlation between military intervention and the proportion of union members is —.07. Huntington argues that political decay varies directly with the extent of party fragmentation. The comparable *Cross-Polity Survey* variable is called "Party System: Quantitative"; this correlates .23 with the MI index; controlling for social mobilization reduces this to .16.

[41] I have borrowed this weighting technique from Eldon Kenworthy, "Predicting Instability in Latin America" (unpublished).

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first index of political violence, based on Eckstein, is virtually unrelated to military intervention. The second index is slightly related in the expected direction, with r=.20, but this relationship disappears when controls are introduced for socioeconomic development.

Our conclusions about the hypotheses linking military abstention and political development must be cautious because of the limitations of the data available. With this qualification in mind, we can conclude that (apart from the trivial relationship between rule by the military and rule by political parties) there is very little evidence linking political development to military abstention in any straightforward way. Widespread participation in elections, strong parties and pressure groups, and freedom from political violence are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for military abstention.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Several students of military intervention have stressed the importance of internal characteristics of the military establishment in determining the extent and nature of military intervention. Unfortunately, data are available for only a few, very gross, characteristics of the armed forces of the Latin American countries. Table IV shows the relationships between the MI index and these characteristics—military expenditures as a proportion of GNP, military personnel as a proportion of the adult population, and total military personnel.

TABLE IV. MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A FUNCTION OF INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY

Variable Number	*Variable Content*	*Correlation With MI Index*
21	Defense spending as a percent of GNP	.55
22	Military personnel as a percent of adults	.07
23	Military personnel in thousands	—.24

SOURCES: See Appendix II.

The strong positive relationship between military intervention and military spending is hardly surprising and is probably the result of circular causation. Interestingly, militarism in the sense of intervention in politics does not seem to be linked to militarism in the sense of the proportion of men in arms. Still more interesting is the *negative* correlation between absolute size of the military establishment and extent of military intervention. This finding directly contradicts the proposition relating intervention to the size and sophistication of the armed

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forces. The finding cannot be attributed to the spurious effects of either simple population size (for the correlation between population size and the MI index is virtually zero) or socioeconomic development. Possibly the negative correlation reflects an inhibiting effect of either greater "professionalism" or lower internal cohesion in larger military establishments. Of course, the relative weight of this variable in determining military intervention is not great, for it accounts at best for only about six percent of the total variance in the MI index.

FOREIGN INFLUENCES

One of the most common explanations of military intervention in Latin America is that German military training missions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries "infected" Latin American officers with ideas of military involvement in politics. As it turns out, this is a good example of a proposition that has been "tested" by time rather than evidence. The correlations between the MI index and the incidence of German, French, Chilean, and U.S. missions are given in Table V.

TABLE V. MILITARY INTERVENTION AS A FUNCTION OF INCIDENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING MISSIONS

Variable Number	*Variable Content*	*Correlation With MI Index*
24	German military training missions	—.20
25	French military training missions	.03
26	Chilean military training missions	.36
27	U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements	.06

SOURCES: See Appendix II.

The two most notable figures are the slight *negative* correlation between German influence and military intervention and the moderate *positive* correlation between Chilean missions and military intervention. The average MI score for the countries that had German missions is 15.2.[42] The average score for those that had French missions is 18.7, and for those with Chilean missions, 23.0. (It will be recalled that the mean score for the area as a whole is 18.4.) Neither the negative finding involving German missions nor the positive one involving Chilean missions can be attributed to spurious correlations with socioeconomic

[42] This negative finding is independent of the particular period during which the various missions were in residence. The mean MI score for only those countries that had German missions in the nineteenth century—generally the period referred to in this connection—is lower still: 13.6.

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development. The explanation for the German finding seems to be simply that a plausible hypothesis has been repeatedly affirmed without adequate testing. Without more detailed information about the Chilean missions, that correlation will have to go unexplained.

The data on U.S. military missions refer to the twelve countries having Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements with the U.S. as of 1960 and are included only for general interest. The fact that the correlation of U.S. missions with military abstention is at present negligible need not imply that over a period of several decades such contacts will not affect the political orientations of the Latin American armed forces.

The other major foreign influence often alleged to affect military intervention is the "demonstration effect" of military coups in other countries. Historians of particular instances of military intervention have from time to time apparently uncovered some direct evidence of such influence, but the question to be considered here is to what extent this kind of "coup contagion" is a general phenomenon. The technique to be used is a familiar one in mathematical sociology.[43] I first listed all the successful military coups in Latin America from 1951 to 1965. The number of countries experiencing coups in each half-year period was then tallied.[44] Essentially, the technique consists of comparing the obtained distribution of coups with the distribution that would be expected if the incidence of coups were random across countries. If coups are contagious, we would expect more periods during which there were either *no* coups or *many* coups than we would expect if coups were distributed randomly throughout the fifteen-year span. Table VI compares the obtained distribution with the distribution that would be expected if the thirty-two coups of this period had been distributed randomly. (This random distribution is given by the formula called Poisson's distribution.) The evidence clearly disconfirms the contagion hypothesis. If anything, the data suggest that coups are slightly *more evenly* distributed (not less evenly, as the contagion hypothesis suggests) than chance alone would imply, although overall the differences are rather small.

[43] See James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (Glencoe 1964), 288-311.

[44] Attempted but unsuccessful coups were ignored, partly for the conceptual reason that the definition of an "attempted coup" is problematic, partly for the practical reason that adequate information on attempted coups is lacking. The period of a half-year is chosen as representing about the optimum length of time during which contagion might be expected to operate. An analysis using one-year intervals produced results exactly comparable to those reported. I tallied countries rather than coups so as to exclude the effects of "contagion" within a single country.

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TABLE VI. NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH MILITARY COUPS IN HALF-YEAR PERIODS, 1951-1965

NUMBER OF COUNTRIES	NUMBER OF PERIODS	
	Obtained Distribution	*Random Distribution*
0	8	10.3
1	13	11.0
2	8	5.9
3 or more	1	2.8
	30	30.0

SOURCE: *The Annual Register* (London 1951-1966).

These findings conclusively disconfirm several widely repeated propositions about military intervention. Neither German military missions nor "coup contagion" can be blamed for military involvement in Latin American politics.

HISTORICAL TRENDS AND INFLUENCES

I have already described the construction of the MI index for the period 1956-1965. Exactly the same procedures were used in compiling MI scores for the periods 1906-1915 and 1951-1955 (see Appendix I). Taken together these data allow us to examine the relative incidence of military intervention at selected periods over the last half-century. Table VII gives the relevant data. The average levels of intervention

TABLE VII. THE INCIDENCE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FOUR FIVE-YEAR PERIODS

Period	*Mean MI Index Per Annum*
1906-1915	1.53
1951-1955	2.02
1956-1960	1.87
1961-1965	1.81

show that although the extent of intervention since 1950 has been somewhat higher than it was a half-century earlier, the general trend within the later period has been downward.[45] The intercorrelations among the scores for the most recent five-year periods, given in Figure 3, illustrate the not surprising fact that the extent of military intervention in

[45] The lower level of intervention in the earlier period probably reflects (1) the fact that after the turn of the century civilian government enjoyed a period of considerable success in Latin America and (2) my decision (see footnote 26) to distinguish "caudillism" from "military intervention."

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the various countries tends to be quite constant, at least over this fifteen-year period.



FIGURE 3. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MI INDICES FOR THREE RECENT FIVE-YEAR PERIODS

Hypotheses linking military intervention or abstention to traditional norms in the military establishments imply that there will be a significant correlation between past and present levels of intervention. The simple correlation between the MI scores for the period 1956-1965 and the period exactly a half-century earlier is .47, thus moderately confirming this prediction. Perhaps, however, this correlation merely reflects the fact that the countries predisposed to military intervention by socioeconomic conditions in 1906-1915 were at the same relative level of socioeconomic development at mid-century. Perhaps, that is, continuities in socioeconomic development, rather than continuities in traditions of militarism, account for the association.

Precise information on earlier levels of socioeconomic development in all twenty Latin American countries is impossible to obtain. Fortunately, for one indicator of social mobilization—literacy—we can make some reasonable estimates. Among those seven countries for which 1910 literacy rates are available, these rates correlate almost perfectly (r=.98) with the 1950 literacy rates for inhabitants of sixty-five and over—the generation who were young adults in the earlier period. Relying on this fact, we can use the 1950 rates for those sixty-five and over—which can be closely estimated for all of the countries—as indicators of the levels of social mobilization a half-century ago.

Figure 4 displays the intercorrelations among our four variables: literacy in 1910 and 1960 and military intervention in 1906-1915 and 1956-1965. Of the several hundred possible causal models that might be used to fit this set of correlations, all but four can be eliminated as inconsistent with the pattern of correlations obtained or with the temporal ordering of the variables.[46] The four possible causal models are shown in Figure 5. If we assume that military intervention in 1906-

[46] This elimination process follows the technique suggested by Herbert Simon and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. See Blalock, *Causal Inferences*, 61-94 and *passim*.

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1915 could not have significantly influenced literacy rates in 1910 (even though it might have influenced *later* literacy rates), we can eliminate Models A and B. If, in addition, we assume that 1910 literacy rates do not affect 1956-1965 military intervention directly, but only indirectly through their influence on 1960 literacy rates, we can also eliminate Model C.



FIGURE 4. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG LITERACY RATES, 1910 AND 1960, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION SCORES, 1906-1915 AND 1956-1965

Having decided on a particular causal model, we can apply the technique of causal path analysis to examine the interrelationships among social mobilization and military intervention for the two periods. The results of this analysis, given in Figure 6, show that both contemporary literacy rates and earlier levels of military intervention make independent contributions toward explaining present levels of military intervention. The figure also reveals that military intervention itself has a deleterious effect on subsequent levels of literacy. One implication of this pattern of findings is that part of the strong correlation earlier



FIGURE 5. FOUR CAUSAL MODELS CONSISTENT WITH INTERCORRELATIONS SHOWN IN FIGURE 4

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

FIGURE 6. PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LITERACY RATES, 1910 AND 1960; AND MILITARY INTERVENTION, 1906-1915 AND 1956-1965

noted between social mobilization and (contemporary) military intervention can be traced to the impact of earlier military intervention on both contemporary levels of mobilization and contemporary levels of intervention.[47]

Another surprising fact revealed by this historical analysis is that levels of socioeconomic development were relatively much more important determinants of military intervention a half-century ago than today. As shown in Figure 4, the correlation between 1910 literacy rates and 1906-1915 military intervention was —.64, while a half-century later the analogous correlation was —.47. In terms of variance explained, the impact of literacy on military intervention dropped from forty-one percent to twenty-two percent. We lack earlier data on the other indicators of social mobilization, but it is interesting and significant that the overall index of social mobilization for 1960 correlates —.67 with the 1906-1915 MI index, as compared to —.53 with the 1956-1965 MI index. Over the last fifty years in Latin America the political sphere has become more autonomous; that is, factors other than socioeconomic development have become relatively more important determinants of military intervention.[48]

V. CONCLUSIONS

The statistical analyses presented in this research note have answered some questions about military intervention. Social mobilization clearly increases the prospects for civilian rule. Traditions of militarism play an important role in accounting for contemporary military intervention. Neither foreign training missions nor foreign examples of successful intervention seem to have any impact.

[47] Perhaps an analogous explanation would apply to the relationship between economic development and military intervention. We lack the data necessary to carry this analysis further.

[48] Huntington argues that one aspect of political development is an increasing autonomy of politics from other social spheres. See "Political Development and Political Decay," 401-30.

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But some of the findings call for further reflection and inquiry. How can we account for the fact that the direct effect of economic development seems to be to encourage, rather than to inhibit, military involvement in politics? What are we to make of recent speculations linking political institutionalization and military abstention, in the light of the present negative findings?[49] What are the implications of the declining (although still important) strength of the relationship between military intervention and levels of socioeconomic development?

Overall, the independent variables we have examined here account for somewhat less than half of the total variance in contemporary military intervention.[50] One way of beginning the search for other significant factors is to examine so-called "deviant cases," that is, countries with MI scores considerably higher or lower than would be predicted on the basis of the variables examined here. Let me illustrate this technique.

Figure 7 displays a "scattergram" of the relationship between military intervention and social mobilization. Obviously, a few countries are widely out of line with the relationship characterizing the remaining countries. Argentina has a much higher MI score than would be expected on the basis of its social development, while Bolivia and Costa Rica have MI scores much lower than would be expected. The effect of these deviant cases is to lower substantially the obtained correlation coefficients. If we remove Argentina from the analysis, the coefficient rises from —.53 to —.67, and if we remove Bolivia and Costa Rica as well, the coefficient rises to —.79. The proportion of variance explained has risen from twenty-eight percent to sixty-two percent. Similar analyses could be presented using the other independent variables discussed in this research note.

Let me be clear that the import of this discussion of deviant cases is *not* that these variables "really" explain the higher amounts of variance, for obviously we cannot "write off" countries like Argentina, Bolivia, and Costa Rica. Rather, this analysis focuses our attention on the countries that are most anomalous when analyzed in terms of the variables considered here, as well as on the characteristics that might

[49] Huntington's theory of political development (*ibid.*) implies that social mobilization leads to military rule and that civilian rule depends on strong political institutions; neither of these propositions is confirmed by the present study. It would be worth further investigation to determine whether the propositions do apply to other underdeveloped areas.

[50] Among the other independent variables considered and rejected in the present study were (1) total population (r=.02), (2) racial composition (r=.16), and (3) rates of social change (for urbanization, $r = -.18$).

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

FIGURE 7. SCATTERGRAM OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

explain their deviance. In the case of Bolivia, the 1952 revolution drastically reduced (temporarily, at least) the role of the military to a level below that which might have been expected for a country at its level of socioeconomic development. From this perspective, the events of 1964-1965 in Bolivia might be interpreted as a "return to normalcy." The "Argentine paradox" is a familiar one to students of Latin America; the present study graphically reveals once again the extent of this paradox. The case of Argentina and, by contrast, the case of Costa Rica suggest the importance of pursuing the suggestions of Germani and Silvert that military intervention is related to the extent of cleavage or consensus in a society.

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Appendix I

Year-by-year military intervention scores

	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	MI Index 1906-15	MI Index 1956-65	Needler's Rankings*
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
Uruguay	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	1
Bolivia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	3	10	9	1
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	10	1
Mexico	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	18	10	1
Colombia	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14	15	1
Cuba	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	16	4
Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	20	2
Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	17	20	4
Peru	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	14	21	2
Brazil	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	16	22	2
Haiti	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	30	22	3
Ecuador	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	20	23	2
Honduras	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	20	23	2
Argentina	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	10	23	3
Venezuela	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	20	23	3
Guatemala	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	20	26	3
El Salvador	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	20	27	4
Dominican R.	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	21	28	3
Paraguay	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	16	30	4

* Martin C. Needler, *Latin American Politics in Perspective* (New York 1963), 156-57. Rankings of "Normal Political Role of Military": 0="None"; 1="Limited"; 2="Intervene"; 3="Veto Power"; 4="In Control."

Sources: *The Annual Register* (London 1951-1966); Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs 1964); H. E. Davis, ed., *Government and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1958); John E. Fagg, *Latin America: A General History* (New York 1963); Robert L. Gilmore, *Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela* (Athens, Ohio, 1964); John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1961) and *Generals vs. Presidents* (New York 1964); John Martz, *Central America* (Chapel Hill 1959); Dana G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America* (New York 1918) and *The Latin American Republics: A History*, 2nd ed. (New York 1950); Martin C. Needler, ed., *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton 1964); Franklin D. Parker, *The Central American Republics* (New York 1964); J. Fred Rippy, *Latin America: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor 1958); Robert E. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana 1959); William S. Stokes, *Latin American Politics* (New York 1959); Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (September 1960), 745-63.

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APPENDIX II. SOURCES OF DATA FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable Number	*Variable Content*	*Source Number and Page*
1	Percent of population in cities over 20,000	I, 228
2	Percent of adults literate (1960)	XI
3	Newspaper circulation per 1,000 population	II, 108
4	University students per 1,000 population	I, 228
5	Radios per 1,000 population	II, 118
6	Per capita GNP (1957)	II, 155
7	Percent of GNP derived from agriculture	II, 172; III, 70
8	Percent of labor force in agriculture	II, 177
9	Percent of population in the primary sector	IX, 64
10	Percent of labor force earning wages or salaries	III, 38
11	Percent of labor force employed in industry	X, 90
12	Percent of population in middle and upper [social] strata	IX, 64
13	Constitutional restrictions on political activity by military	VIII, 132
14	Percent of voting-age population voting	II, 84
15	Interest articulation by parties	V, 37
16	Interest articulation by associations	V, 33
17	Stability of party system	V, 43
18	Interest aggregation by parties	V, 38
19	Log_{10} (10 × deaths from domestic group violence per million population)	II, 99
20	Weighted Eckstein "instability" index	IV, Appendix I
21	Defense spending as a percent of GNP	II, 79
22	Military personnel as a percent of adult population	II, 77
23	Military personnel strength in thousands	III, 41
24	German military training missions	VI
25	French military training missions	VI
26	Chilean military training missions	VI
27	U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements	VII, 201
28	Percent of adults 65 and over literate (1950)	XII
29	Percent of adults literate (1910)	XIII

SOURCES: *I.* Gino Germani, "The Strategy of Fostering Social Mobility," in E. de Vries and J. M. Echavarria, eds., *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America*, Vol. I (Paris 1963). *II.* Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964). *III.* Center of Latin American Studies, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (Los Angeles 1962). *IV.* Harry Eckstein, *Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation*, a report submitted to the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, Smithsonian Institution (Washington 1962). *V.* Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). *VI.* John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 108, 163; John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964), 69-71; William S. Stokes, *Latin American Politics* (New York 1959), 129-32. *VII.* Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1961). *VIII.* Stokes, *Latin American Politics. IX.* Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, II (Spring 1961), 62-81. *X.* R. Vekemans and J. L. Segundo, "Essay on a Socio-economic Typology of the Latin American Countries," in de Vries and Echavarria. *XI.* United Nations, *Compendium of Social Statistics* (New York 1963). *XII. Ibid.*; United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook* (New York 1955, 1964); UNESCO, *World Illiteracy at Mid-Century* (Paris 1957). *XIII. Ibid.*; UNESCO, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries* (Paris 1953).

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Review Articles

SOME DILEMMAS IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

By SIDNEY VERBA

Robert A. Dahl, editor, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, xix, 458 pp. $10.00.
W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, 90 pp. $3.50.

THERE has been a revolution in comparative politics. But as with all revolutions, it is difficult to date its beginning, hard to chart its course, and now, when the revolution has become established, difficult to say what has been accomplished. The publication of *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, edited by Robert A. Dahl, provides a good occasion to reconsider the revolution and to review some of the problems that have emerged. It is a good occasion because the book is both a splendid comparative work and one that illustrates some of the dilemmas of comparative research.

The revolution in comparative politics started with a number of brave principles: look beyond description to more theoretically relevant problems; look beyond the single case to the comparison of many cases; look beyond the formal institutions of government to political processes and political functions; and look beyond the countries of Western Europe to the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The new comparative politics aimed at the creation and testing of generalizations and theories about politics and, especially, about macropolitical systems. The macropolitical perspective was perhaps forced on the practitioners of comparative politics by the nature of their subject matter. It creates the great strength of the work being done in the field as well as many of its special problems.

There is much evidence that the revolution has changed things. If one merely measures the growth rate, it is clear that the field of comparative politics is past the takeoff stage and into the stage of sustained growth, if not already into that of superabundance. The number of empirical studies, of theoretical works, of theoretical works *cum* a few data, of data-based works *cum* a little bit of theory, etc., etc., is impressive indeed. And there is little parochialism left. The students of

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comparative politics have ranged far beyond the once-standard European countries. (Indeed they have ranged so far that the study of European politics has been in danger of becoming an underdeveloped area in political science.) If a decade ago the problem was one of pushing the field of comparative politics off dead center, the problem today is one of finding a center.

One of the fruits of the revolution is the rich body of theoretical literature that has been produced. But frameworks, paradigms, and theories proliferate at too rapid a rate. In addition, the general theoretical works float well above reality, and they often are so abstract as to suggest no clear problem focus. They are more often sets of categories than sets of propositions. In the old days, graduate students may have gone into the field as barefoot empiricists. Today they go equipped with elaborate systems models. These models are important as part of the intellectual equipment of the students of political systems, but they are not exactly the appropriate footgear to replace the barefoot empiricism. To extend the metaphor: the barefoot empiricists didn't know where they might step; the recent students have trouble getting their feet on the ground.

But all is not theorizing. There is much empirical work as well. The standard model remains the single-country case study. These monographs differ from those that would have been produced in an earlier day and in this they reflect the revolution. They are of new countries; they often use some more systematic framework; they look at new variables and aspects of political systems. But they do not really avoid the problems of the older configurative monographic literature in the field of comparative politics. They are idiosyncratic in style, and they cannot test hypotheses. In short, they do not easily add up.

Monographic case studies may still be the norm, but there is also a growing body of more explicitly comparative works. These deal not with political systems in their configurative wholeness, but with analytically selected aspects of systems across a wide number of nations. They include books or essays on bureaucracy, or development, or elections. Some of these comparative studies attempt systematically to gather data and present or test hypotheses about the set of nations with which they deal. Official data-gathering agencies and the high-speed computer have combined to make it possible to look at the nations of the world as units for statistical analysis.

But many of these more widely ranging comparative studies do not add up very well either. The isolation of a few simple variables from UN statistics or even concentration on the party or the bureaucracy as

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a focus simplifies too much. If the monographic literature provides us with few generalizations, the second kind of literature provides us with many generalizations that do not seem to fit many or any of the relevant cases.

Why has there been so much movement and yet so little movement forward? In part the answer is the toughness of the problem with which we are dealing. We are comparing the most complicated set of social units we know, total societies; and generalizations do not come easily. To be comparative, we are told, we must look for generalizations or covering laws that apply to all cases of a particular type. It will not do to take a more historic approach and look at each political system in its unique and idiographic entirety. We must do analytical rather than configurative studies. The student of comparative politics says "Amen" to all of this; but where are the general laws? Generalizations fade when we look at the particular cases. We add intervening variable after intervening variable. Since the cases are few in number, we end with an explanation tailored to each case. The result begins to sound quite idiographic or configurative. Early political scientists, for example, abstracted out certain constitutional or electoral forms and attempted to relate these to political outcomes such as the stability or effectiveness of the government. But, as we look more closely at the specific cases, it turns out that there are no easy generalizations about the relationship between constitutional or electoral forms and the resultant pattern of politics. The cultural context, for instance, turns out to have a major effect on the relationship between political forms and the operation of political processes.

But if we follow more recent trends and try to relate cultural patterns to political outcomes, we find just the converse problem. Patterns of social or political belief are related to important political outcomes, but not in a simple manner. We must take into account the structural context—that is, the forms of political institutions—in understanding the relationship between political beliefs and the political outcomes. In a sense we have come full circle. We looked beyond the political institutions because other variables seemed more relevant, but for generalizations using these new variables to hold, we must bring back the institutional structures. And we have to bring in many other intervening characteristics—aspects of the stratification patterns in society, levels of economic development, and so forth. As we bring more and more variables back into our analysis in order to arrive at any generalizations that hold up across a series of political systems, we bring back so much that we have a "unique" case in its configurative whole.

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The dilemma is real and cannot be easily resolved. But we shall get closer to its resolution if we realize that the dichotomy between the generalized law approach and the configurative-idiographic approach is false. The patterns for which we try to account in comparative politics—stability versus instability, various configurations of political parties, the absence or presence of political opposition, variations in the type of political opposition, and so forth—are immensely complicated and cannot be accounted for by one or two simple causes. Only by considering the combination of a large number of factors can we hope to begin to account for relevant variations. The "uniqueness" of the explanation for any particular case arises from the fact that the combination of relevant factors that accounts for a nation's pattern of politics will be different from the combination in other cases, and the relative importance of various factors will differ from case to case.

But the "unique" explanation of a particular case can rest on general hypotheses. Configurative explanations—if we can talk of such—rest, on one level, on the plausibility of the account of a political event; and, in that sense, they are based on criteria that are almost intuitive in nature. But, as many have argued, they also rest on the acceptability of a variety of unexplicated general laws that underlie the argument. What is needed then, if we are to resolve the dilemma posed by the search for simple rules to explain complex phenomena under conditions where there are few cases, is a *disciplined* configurative approach. The approach could be described as multivariate analysis if the variables were more easily quantified and amenable to statistical treatment. The rules for such an approach might include these:

1. Factors that account for the variation in political patterns in which one is interested should be explicated. In other words, the implicit hypotheses (or at least the most important ones) should be made explicit. In practice this means that factors relevant to one case have general relevance to all the cases under consideration. Geographical factors, for instance, may be important determinants of political patterns in some nations, but they remain relevant for cases where they have no such discernible impact. The absence of impact of geographical factors is important.

2. Additional factors, when brought in to explain the pattern in a particular nation, should not be brought in as *ad hoc* factors, but as representatives of general rules that are applicable elsewhere. The "unique historical event" cannot be ignored, but it must be considered as one of a class of such events even if it happened

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only once. This rule applies even to cases where the event is considered exogenous to the model of politics developed. Exogenous factors are ones for which we attempt no explanations in our models; but once they have come into play, their impact on the patterns of politics in which we are interested is subject to understanding in terms of general rules. To take a trivial example: the eruption of Mount Vesuvius had a major impact on the stability of the Pompeian political system. We do not have to account for the eruption; it was an exogenous event. But "destruction in a natural calamity" as a factor that overrides all others in determining the stability of patterns of politics represents a general phenomenon.

3. We must search for further rules as to the relationship among the many factors we introduce. Which factors operate in the same direction? Which ones cancel each other out?

A disciplined configurative approach is, thus, based on general rules, but on complicated combinations of them. Explanations may be tailored to the specific case, but they must be made of the same material and follow the same rules of tailoring.

All this is easier said than done.

I

This long introduction brings us to the *Political Oppositions* volume. It is not a work that presents an abstract framework, nor is it a configurative case study, nor is it an analytical comparison using a few variables. It is a little bit of each and, as such, may be an indication of the way in which much future comparative work will go.

The book has a number of characteristics to commend it as a possible model for future work:

In the first place, it is explicitly comparative in scope: it is about ten countries, rather than about one. And it redresses the geographical imbalance by returning to the older nations. Furthermore, a number of the nations considered within the book are the relatively neglected smaller European democracies whose experience is particularly relevant to theories of democratic stability.[1] The number of countries is important—ten Western democracies that face a similar set of problems, rather than one country or all countries. Thus the book falls some-

[1] The current work being done on the smaller European democracies under the direction of four of the authors of this book—Hans Daalder, Robert A. Dahl, Val R. Lorwin, and Stein Rokkan—will fill a major gap in our knowledge and continue the work of this volume.

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where between the configurative case study and the worldwide analytical gloss which tries to generalize about all societies.

Just as the number of cases falls between the two extremes of total coverage and single-case focus, the way in which the cases are dealt with falls between the extremes of the configurative case study and the simplified focus on a few variables. The individual chapters (or at least many of them) concentrate on a specific set of parallel problems in a parallel manner, but range widely to put the particular problems that have been selected out for study—particularly the patterns of cleavage—into the more general context of the society.

The book is on a *problem*: How do we explain the persistence and variations in patterns of political opposition in different societies? It is important to mention this simple fact because so many of the general works in comparative politics are not on problems—or at least are not on problems that are clearly defined. The problem posed in the book is big but not unbounded, and the book attempts to explain certain aspects of political systems, not political systems in their totality.

The straightforward structure of the argument deserves imitation. The book starts by discussing the importance and rarity of legitimate political opposition; it talks about variations in the set of dependent variables (that is, the variation in types of opposition in democracies); and then it suggests some explanations that relate aspects of the society, the political structure, and the history of these nations to their patterns of opposition. The structure I am describing is the one that exists most clearly in the introductory and concluding material by Professor Dahl, but it supports at least in part, much of the rest of the book.

The book stands as a model also because it uses a multiplicity of approaches. Explanations are not sought in single variables, but rather in the complex intertwinings of the social structure of the society, its political structures, its political culture, and the record of its political history.

Lastly, the book can stand as a model of the way in which comparative social science research may have to be organized in the future. It is a multiauthored book in which a general framework is provided by the editor while individual specialists on each of the nations write separate chapters. We have the advantages of depth and expertise on each of the countries without losing the advantage of comparative perspective.

In many respects, therefore, this book represents a model that can be followed and probably will be followed in the future. But the model also poses problems, problems related to the general issues in compara-

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tive analysis that I mentioned above. The book represents a judicious balance of the case study and the more analytical comparison, but it naturally picks up some of the faults of each. The case studies may not satisfy some specialists. This is not because of lack of knowledge or skill on the part of the authors of the individual chapters—it would be hard to find as competent a set of specialists on these countries. But the limitation of the problem and the attempt to obtain parallel accounts may force the authors to slight certain aspects of the problem that other specialists would consider important.

But the exact opposite is true as well: the authors of the individual chapters deal with parallel problems but in a configurative way. Systematic comparisons across the several chapters are, therefore, somewhat difficult. The chapters add up more easily than would completely unorganized case studies, but they still do not add up very easily.

The dilemma of comparative analysis is clearly posed: reality seems to demand a configurative approach; generalizability seems to demand a more analytical approach. This book attempts what I have called a *disciplined* configurative approach that would allow systematic comparison. And though it may fall between two stools, that may be the best place to sit for these purposes.

The search for disciplined configurative studies highlights a problem that arises in the multiauthored book. There are great advantages in having a large number of country specialists, but specialists are hard to discipline. In *Political Oppositions*, the major theoretical chapters that attempt to tie together the individual country chapters are found at the end of the book. As is pointed out in the Preface, it was originally intended to place the theoretical chapters first and have the individual case studies follow upon the theory. Professor Dahl suggests that one reason for the final organization was that the framework kept changing. My guess—based on experience with other volumes organized in this way—is that another reason why it didn't work out lies in the individual styles and inclinations of the authors. Some of the individual country studies relate very closely to the kinds of variables and generalizations discussed by Dahl in his concluding chapters. Others do not. The essays on France and Germany, for instance, do not touch on the theme of social cleavage as a basis for political cleavage, which is central in most of the rest of the book. The loss in comparability is unfortunate because much theorizing about stable democracy has been based on the examples of fragmentation and cleavage in France and Germany. As we now look beyond these countries to nations like Norway and the Netherlands, we find that the generalizations derived

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from the German and French experience need qualification. It would have been most useful if this volume had given us an opportunity to look back again at these countries in terms of the somewhat different set of insights derived from the smaller European democracies that seem to combine sharp social cleavage with stable and effective democracy.

But such are the ways of social scientists. If we want to have as collaborators men of the stature of the authors of this book, we must let them go their own way. The three concluding chapters by Professor Dahl represent a *tour de force* even as a framework that *results from* the individual chapters rather than a framework *for* the chapters. But it would be a shame to let the matter rest there. Could we hope for a *Political Oppositions Revisited* volume that would start from where this volume leaves off?[2]

II

The *Oppositions* volume allows us to look a bit more closely at the problems inherent in the development of meaningful generalizations about political systems. They all revolve around the configurative-analytical distinction. One problem is that the variables we select turn out to be more complex the more closely we look at them. This is illustrated by the elaborate typology of patterns of opposition developed by Professor Dahl toward the end of the book. Before we can explain variations in patterns of opposition, we must specify what these differing patterns may be. But, as Professor Dahl points out, the varieties of opposition are many and do not fall into any simple typology. He provides a most useful simplification based on six characteristics: "1. The organizational cohesion or concentration of the opponents. 2. The competitiveness of the opposition. 3. The site or setting for the encounter between opposition and those who control the government. 4. The distinctiveness or identifiability of the opposition. 5. The goals of the opposition. 6. The strategies of opposition" (p. 332). The typology is too simple to capture the richness of real patterns of oppositions; on the other hand, it is complex enough to impede the development of any simple and parsimonious explanation of oppositions—which probably means that it is just about right.

Or consider some of the independent variables used to explain patterns of opposition. Traditionally, distinctions in democratic systems

[2] Indeed, I understand that a further volume on oppositions in non-Western democracies, edited by Professor Dahl, will be forthcoming.

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have rested on the number of political parties—essentially the distinction between the two-party and the multiparty system. But as we look more closely at this distinction—as the authors of this volume do—the situation turns out to be somewhat more complicated. There are no agreed rules for counting the number of parties: when is a party large enough to count? And even if we can divide nations into two-party and multiparty systems, we find that the two sets are internally different. Parties, for instance, differ substantially in their degree of internal cohesion. The variable of internal cohesion is considered so crucial to the patterns of opposition that it is added to the typology. Thus, we get a four-fold typology based on the dichotomies between two-party and multiparty systems and between cohesive parties and less cohesive ones.

But even this four-fold typology creates many problems. Many dimensions relevant to political parties are left out; indeed, even on the two dimensions dichotomized there are problems. There are several kinds of multiparty systems, as there are of two-party systems. The degree of cohesion of a political party can be only crudely indexed by a cohesive and noncohesive dichotomy, and in addition, the parties within an individual nation differ among themselves in their internal cohesion, yet we place entire sets of parties on one side of the dichotomy or the other. As Dahl points out, some interesting cases—France and Italy are examples—involve patterns of opposition between relatively cohesive and somewhat less cohesive political parties.

The problem is complicated by the fact that there are really not many cases that are relevant. In only about thirty nations are there opposition parties, and only eight of these nations can be called two-party systems. And in this volume we are dealing with only ten countries having opposition parties, and of these countries three at most could be considered to be two-party systems. (Indeed, the words "at most" illustrate that even to classify the three nations, Britain, Austria, and the United States, as two-party systems requires some qualification as to what is meant by the term.) We thus get a typology with too few cells to capture significant differences, but with enough cells so that only a few cases fit in each.

And these problems exist solely in connection with the number-of-parties variable. As becomes clearer in the discussion in the book, to relate this variable to patterns of opposition we must take into account a large number of other—even more complicated—intervening factors.

The complexity of the explanatory process is seen if we look at the list of primary conditions and intervening factors that Dahl suggests

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help explain the patterns of opposition. He lists five primary conditions: "constitutional structure and electoral system; widely shared cultural premises; specific subcultures; the record of grievance against the government; and social and economic differences." In addition, he lists two intervening factors that help account for variations in patterns of opposition, but that are highly dependent upon the primary conditions: "the specific patterns of cleavage, conflict, and agreement in attitudes and opinions; and the extent of polarization" (p. 348). These are woven together to explain patterns of opposition in such an interesting and elegant manner that I can best refer the reader to Chapter 12 of the book itself. When we start putting together all these dimensions, the result is close to configurative analysis. But the result is strikingly different from the older "unaggregatable" configurative studies. The very fact that these complex variables have been explicated and applied in a similar manner to the countries involved (at least by Dahl and some, if not all, of his colleagues) makes all the difference.

The value of systematic explication is seen in the way in which history is used in explaining patterns of opposition. The current patterns of opposition can be understood only in relation to the historical patterns with which they developed. That, of course, opens up vast complexities, but the authors decided to stress only a few significant aspects of the political history of their nations. In particular, Dahl focuses upon the record of grievances against the government, and this largely in relation to the sequence by which the working class was accepted into the political system. The limitation is a bit arbitrary; he might have gone back one earlier step and stressed, as does Barrington Moore in his recent book, the preindustrial coalitions involving land owners, peasants, and urban bourgeois groups.[3] But the principle of disciplined selectivity remains the same.

The problem of finding meaningful generalizations about complicated macropolitical phenomena is, of course, not unique to this book. This book is particularly fruitful, however, in that it makes so clear and explicit the way in which one goes about this. Dahl specifies the variations in the dependent variable and then specifies the conditions that might explain the variations. He is even clearer when he goes on to discuss how one might test some of these generalizations. There are essentially two methods—looking for the relationship between changes over time in the independent variables and the dependent variable within a single nation, and comparing the relationship between inde-

[3] *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston 1966).

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pendent and dependent variables across nations. "Within a given country, a large change in one of the seven conditions increases the likelihood that the existing pattern of opposition will change in a specifiable way. As between two countries, a large difference with respect to one of these conditions is likely to be associated with a difference in patterns of opposition in the two countries" (p. 349). And, of course, the several conditions may interact with each other. "Within a given country, two or more of these conditions may reinforce one another by promoting the same pattern of opposition; they may offset one another by promoting conflicting patterns; or they may be independent of one another. Differences in the patterns of opposition in two countries may therefore be accounted for by the way two or more factors interact with one another" (p. 349). I cite this logical structure because it is presented so clearly and simply and is, indeed, appropriate for problems of this sort. And, of course, such a logical structure is so rarely used in this way. But I also reconstruct the logic because it is deceptively simple and very difficult to apply in fact.

When there are so many interacting conditions and so few cases, it becomes quite difficult to compare two countries in terms of a relationship between initial conditions and patterns of opposition. There will always be a variety of other factors—including the interaction with other initial conditions—that makes the test of hypotheses as to the relationship between the initial conditions and the patterns of opposition unsatisfactory.

In some respects, it would make more sense to look for changes over time within a single country. This approach has the advantage of holding constant a large number of the variables that would confound the experimental comparison across nations. But great problems exist here. Consider, for instance, the relationship drawn between constitutional structure and electoral system on the one hand and patterns of opposition on the other. Here Professor Dahl presents the evidence of how the constitutional structure is related to the patterns of opposition in three countries:

> The American constitutional system, it was pointed out in Chapter 2, provides a complex array of positions from which a minority coalition can check presidential policies favored by a majority coalition in Congress. The constitutional framework thereby inhibits a high degree of concentration of all opposition groups, encourages diffusion, helps prevent clear identifiability, and reduces the prospects of strict competition. All these characteristics, in turn,

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> favor the use of bargaining strategies. To take another case, if the present electoral system in Britain were replaced by one of the continental systems of proportional representation, the present degree of concentration, identifiability, and strict competitiveness of the opposition party surely would not continue to exist. For in the last half-century, no party in Britain has ever received a majority of popular votes. Hence under most PR schemes, no one party could ever have formed a government during this period; all governments would necessarily have been coalition governments; in these circumstances strategies of parliamentary bargaining . . . would have had a great deal more utility for parliamentary opposition and the government than they can possibly have under the present system, which, as we saw, strongly promotes strict competition and concentration on elections. . . . To take a final example, the abrupt change in the pattern of opposition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth can be accounted for mainly by the changed position of the chief executive. Indeed, there is good reason to think that a return to the Constitution of the Fourth Republic would to a considerable extent restore the previous pattern of opposition (pp. 349-50).

The three examples in the paragraph above take the form of "changes in constitutional electoral structure would be accompanied by changes in the pattern of opposition." But it is clear from the paragraph above that only one of these changes—that in executive structure between the Fourth and Fifth Republics—has actually taken place. The other two changes refer to imaginary constructs of what would happen in the United States or Britain given a major change in their constitutional structure. The author has performed a mental experiment and this is very useful. But it is not exactly the same as testing a hypothesis in real life.

In sum, the logic is correct, but the opportunities to test it out in the real world are severely limited. And the kind of mixed strategy employed here is probably the best we can attain. Indeed, the mixed strategy used throughout this book seems in general the best we can attain—and let me make it clear that I do not mean this as faint praise, for the book is one of the best books in comparative politics I have seen.

The way in which the problem dealt with in this book is defined illustrates another research dilemma in the study of comparative politics: how do we define the boundaries of a problem in which we are interested? Dahl properly defines the problem quite broadly as that of

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political opposition. It is not defined as one that is associated with any particular institution or any particular setting within which the opposition takes place. As Dahl points out, and as the other chapters in the book illustrate, opposition political parties play a particularly crucial role in patterns of political opposition, and the setting of this opposition is usually the institutions of elections and parliamentary representation. But to have defined the problem in terms of these institutions—to have dealt with party competition or with patterns of opposition within modern parliaments—would have severely limited both the relevance of the work and the comparability of the findings. The reason is that although significant political opposition may sometimes be focused on the struggle of political parties for control over the central governmental organs, under certain circumstances it may not. As Stein Rokkan points out in his essay on Norway, much of the most significant political opposition in that nation takes place outside of the parliamentary arena as interest groups bargain with each other and with bureaucracies for the allocation of relevant values. What may appear to be a decline of political opposition or, as it is sometimes phrased, a decline of politics may really represent a shifting of the site for the conduct of political competition. If the problem had been defined in terms of a particular setting, the authors would not have been able to deal with it systematically.[4]

Indeed, one of the most interesting themes in the book is the way in which the pattern of political opposition is affected as opposition moves from one site to another. For instance, in many of the nations described in this book there is emphasis on the phenomenon of *Verzuiling*—a word derived from the Dutch word for pillars and referring to the existence of social groups that form separate subcultures within the society. In a society like that of the Netherlands, these pillars form the social bases of the political parties and are the focus of electoral opposition. But what happens to them when the locus of political opposition moves into the bureaucracy? One answer might be that the separate pillars would lose much of their significance, and politics would come to be organized around specific political interests more appropriate for bureaucratic dealings. But it also may be that we would find a bureaucracy penetrated by the separate subcultures. Thus we

[4] One open question is whether this pattern of secondary political opposition is as significant in other countries as it seems to be in Norway. It is difficult to tell how much of the reference to it in Rokkan's essay derives from the greater significance of this phenomenon in Norway and how much derives from Rokkan's particular interest in the problem. It is, for instance, mentioned only in passing in Allen Potter's essay on Britain, but it may indeed be as significant a pattern of politics there.

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have the Austrian *Proporz* system of appointments on the basis of membership in one of the two main *Lager*, a system that is paralleled by a less formal though recognized practice in Belgium. Apparently, though the role of *Verzuiling* is particularly relevant in the Netherlands, the bureaucracy there has not been organized in this way.

As the site of political opposition switches from the electoral system–legislature setting to the interest group–bureaucracy setting, what happens to the political parties? How can they maintain the commitment of their supporters and, in particular, how can those parties that are relegated to a position of relatively permanent opposition do so? They may not. Commitments to political parties may decline through time, or one may see the paradoxical phenomenon of the rise of anti-party parties—as the *Democraten 66* party seems to have been in the recent Dutch election. But parties do maintain their adherents, and the various essays suggest some of the reasons. Rokkan shows that in Norway voters continued to vote for the conservative and middle parties even though these parties had been in what seemed to be a permanent opposition, and even though the voters, when asked, expressed the belief that there was very little likelihood that their party could win an election. For these citizens, he points out, "elections clearly were not occasions for choosing between alternative governments but simply opportunities for registering loyalties to particular parties" (p. 105). In Germany, as Kirchheimer points out, support for the permanent opposition party, the SPD, was maintained in part by the fact that the socialists were in power in several of the states, if not in the national government. Nor can we ignore the "hope springs eternal" phenomenon. Indeed, for the Norwegian and German oppositions, such hopes were recently fulfilled—at least in some small part. In Austria we find the political parties becoming even more deeply involved in the bureaucratic allocation of benefits to citizens. Affiliation with one or the other of the major *Lager* may or may not be relevant to control over the legislature, but it may be the key to all the specific job, housing, and other benefits that are allocated through the parties.

In an earlier day, the question we would have asked about the countries dealt with in this volume would have been, How can one give relatively free rein to political opposition and yet not have the political system rent asunder by the tensions so generated? Recent writing suggests that we should now ask the opposite question: How can enough opposition be maintained in the postideological era of affluence so that legitimate political choices are presented to the populace? The essays in this book suggest that it may be premature to talk

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about the end of politics. Social cleavages do persist and have an impact on the intensity of political opposition. But as Kirchheimer points out so well in his essay on Germany, the trend clearly does seem to be away from politics of opposition on the basis of meaningful electoral and legislative alternatives. In the future, we may have to follow political opposition into the administrative branches of the government. We are likely to find it still important there.

III

This brings us to two last queries: How widely can one generalize from this book? In particular, does it tell us anything about opposition outside of the established democracies? The question of the relevance of the experience of the older nation for the newer one is too broad to deal with adequately here. But some themes in the *Oppositions* book are particularly relevant for the newer nation, as W. Arthur Lewis's little book *Politics in West Africa* makes clear. It is in those nations with which Professor Lewis deals that the prior key problem in Europe, that of domesticating opposition so that it does not tear the society apart, has yet to be solved.

The Dahl volume is limited to nations that have in recent years had more or less successful patterns of opposition. In the African context we can ask, What are the conditions for legitimate political opposition? If opposition is fading in Europe, it is because there is less to be opposed about; if it is weak in Africa, it is because it has been banned.

Professor Lewis argues vigorously that the winner-take-all model of opposition politics, which the African nations have learned from Europe, is inapplicable and, indeed, immoral. Unlike Europe, where divisions are on economic grounds, the African nations are plural societies in which majoritarian systems of rule will not apply; one group cannot be expected to turn power over to its opponents when they are separated by linguistic and tribal barriers. The various groups can coexist without the suppression of one by another only if they are protected from each other. They must share in the central government; hence Lewis calls for coalition governments and proportional representation. Poor areas must not tax the rich; hence he calls for federalism.

Professor Lewis is right that the model offered the African nations has often been inappropriate and unworkable. But the Dahl book makes clear that this does not mean the European experience is irrelevant. It is the *British* model—for that is what is offered as the model

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of democratic oppositions—that does not fit. In countries characterized by *Verzuiling*, like the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Austria, we find a pluralism much like that Lewis finds in Africa. We have a conflict of subcultures, not mere economic rivalries. In Africa, national integration and the attempt to develop a national economy bring differing subcultures into contact with each other and hence into conflict. Tribes with less education find themselves competing with more advanced segments, and clashes occur. But, as Stein Rokkan points out, the same conflict of cultures developed in Norway as the mobilization of the peasantry created a clash between the urban and rural cultures. And as in many African states—but not as in England—the ties between urban and rural elites were few and tenuous. Similarly, in Africa the clash of cultures often takes place in the capital city as different subcultures are forced to interact—a pattern paralleled in Belgium, where Brussels forms the locus for much of the clash between Flemings and Walloons.

And the ways in which the problems that grow out of plural segmentation or *Verzuiling* have been handled in Europe are closely related to Professor Lewis's argument. Two ways of handling opposition —repression of one group by another and separation of the opposing groups into independent states—have characterized recent African politics. And though these techniques are not used currently by the ten Western democracies discussed in the *Oppositions* book (which were selected for study because they do not use these techniques), these same ten Western countries are the present-day products of long historical development that included both separations and repressions. Those plural societies that have survived intact have developed patterns of accommodation for the various subcultures which resemble Lewis's prescription for successful opposition in Africa. The main pattern involves the violation of the majority principle so that the various subcultures can be protected. The techniques include a multiplicity of parties accompanied by proportional representation; mutual vetoes over policies particularly relevant to a particular subculture; and elite willingness to preserve the unity of the system by avoiding interference in the various subgroups. The plural nations of Europe are not federal systems such as Lewis prescribes for Africa—the territorial divisions are not clear enough for this—but *Verzuiling*, at least as practiced in the Netherlands, appears to be a kind of sociological federalism.[5] And in all these countries the majority principle is most seriously violated by the fact that much significant political interaction takes place be-

[5] The phrase "sociological federalism" was suggested by Professor Dahl.

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tween elections and outside of the legislature in the relations of private groups to bureaucratic agencies. This latter deviation from the majority principle is, of course, also characteristic of England, which suggests that the model of democratic politics presented to the African nations is not even an accurate model of the deviant nation from which it is derived.

All this is not to say that the experience of the plural European nations is easily applicable in Africa. Many of the characteristics that have allowed the European plural societies to remain united are just those characteristics missing on the African scene—economic modernization, effective national symbols, cross-cutting cleavages, wise and self-restrained elites, and some lucky historical breaks. In addition, the policies of protection of subcultures may work best where governmental aspirations are low. Mutual protection means mutual veto and perhaps stalemate. This is not much of a problem if politics involves the resolution of grievances—satisfying the demands of a few groups here and there as social conditions demand. But when elites see their task not as the allocation of values among competing groups but as the transformation of the society in fundamental ways, pluralist protection may seem less attractive. The violation of the protected position of subcultures by national elites will lead to resistance on the part of the subcultures. The next stage is repression.

Lewis would dispute the fact that African leaders must choose repressive policies. Pluralistic competition is possible if they follow the rules of restraint. And, he argues further, the resulting lack of central government control may indeed be conducive to the accomplishment of their developmental goals. In the end, for good or ill, much depends on the willingness of leaders to take such advice and on their self-restraint in dealing with various segments of the society. The European plural societies depend upon elites capable of working together in coalitions and restrained in their actions when they have power. And wise compromise at one point in time may make later wise compromises easier. As Hans Daalder, writing about the Netherlands, and Nils Stjernquist, writing about Sweden, both stress, subcultures must learn to get along with each other. And the learning is cumulative. Successful experience in resolving one conflict builds the kind of trust across subcultures that makes the resolution of the next conflict easier. Recent experiences in Africa suggest that the opposite lesson is currently being learned. They also suggest that much of Professor Lewis's advice will go unheeded.

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WHAT DOES POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT MEAN IN AFRICA?

By HENRY BIENEN

Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966, 168 pp. $2.50 (paper).
Martin Kilson, *Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966, 301 pp. $6.95.

THERE is disagreement among analysts about political development in Africa. Debate over the meaning of political development is not confined to those concerned with Africa, of course. Once the question, What does political development mean? is reformulated as, What do we mean by political development? there is no dearth of people willing to provide definitions and to free us from value-laden concepts.[1] The lack of consensus on definitions is neither more nor less profound among those who study African politics than among those who concentrate their inquiry elsewhere, and the major ingredients of dispute are present in both groups in approximately the same mixture. Differences center on the issue of the primacy of politics and the relative priority of political, economic, and social factors in the nation-building process. Should political development be seen as a secondary effect of changes in economy?[2] (Those African leaders who have been concerned with political thought and with articulating ideologies have defined political development very broadly, have overlapped it with modernization, and have stressed an ethical component, while at the same time often equating development with economic development.)[3]

[1] I do not intend to review this debate here. Many issues of *World Politics* have included articles that explore the meaning of political development. And as studies of the "developing areas" have become "modernization" studies, that ancient concern to understand modernity once again has become prominent. Much of the discussion has centered on the relationship of political development to modernization. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430; Manfred Halpern, "Toward Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations," *ibid.* (October 1964), 157-81; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Policy Sciences of Development," *ibid.* (January 1965), 286-309; Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *ibid.*, 183-214.

[2] For a discussion, see Herbert Spiro, ed., *Africa: The Primacy of Politics* (New York 1966), particularly Spiro's own chapter, "The Primacy of Political Development," 150-69, and Edouard Bustin's, "The Quest for Political Stability in the Congo: Soldiers, Bureaucrats, and Politicians," 16-48.

[3] See David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York 1963), 57-104; Kenneth W. Grundy, "Recent

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Those who are concerned with definitions of political development and correlations of political and nonpolitical variables are not the only ones to write about political development in Africa. For many observers, "political development" is used synonymously with "political history" or "political happenings"; but even here there is no consensus on past, present, and future. This is not surprising, given the difficulties of doing historical research in Africa, the scarcity of detailed studies of African political systems, and the dearth of micropolitical studies in particular. Since we do not have very substantial knowledge about the rise of African national movements and rarely understand the way ruling institutions operate in Africa, discussions of the prospects of democracy or totalitarianism—or the tendency toward the no-party or one-party state—are often carried out in an empirical vacuum. Similarly, the construction of typologies designed to facilitate analysis of African politics and relate African data to the comparative study of developing areas, as well as the criticism of specific typologies, is hard to assess with our present information about politics in Africa. Because we cannot say with confidence what political development in Africa is—in the sense of political happenings—we are hard put to determine the relative priorities of factors, and we have not been able to test the precision and relevance of concepts that have a generality of application sufficient to permit comparative analysis. We have not been able to say what political development means in Africa or to decide whether or not we ought to mean something by "political development in Africa" which is *sui generis*.

We are at the stage where we greet new books about Africa with anticipation (and too often read them with disappointment): Is our knowledge going to be advanced by a new political history? Are we going to be able to test and revise concepts against new research or a new synthesis or revision of past work? The two books under review are most welcome because they throw a great deal of light on the recent political history of Africa. In the process, one author, Aristide Zolberg, makes a strong argument for studying politics in Africa so that contributions can be made to the more general understanding of the human experience. Both contemporary West African politics and recent endeavors to understand political development are put in perspective—the perspective of Zolberg's comparative persuasion. The other

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Contributions to the Study of African Political Thought," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 674-89; Charles Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism: Ideologies of African Leaders," in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964).

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author, Martin Kilson, addresses himself more explicitly to what modernization and development mean in Africa, and, taking up the argument for seeing political change as essentially an effect of a developing economy, he provides a case study of political change in Sierra Leone. He shows us how colonially sponsored change affected an indigenous population and how economic factors were crucial in an emerging elite's attempt to consolidate itself.

Zolberg's *Creating Political Order* provides a short history of aspects of political life of five West African states which focuses on the triumph of nationalist movements and the nature of party-state rule. Zolberg's account is a revision of recent West African political history; he makes clear what the parties of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast are not and establishes that even the most effective of the West African national movements were by no means "organizational juggernauts" as they became ruling parties. They did not need to be highly centralized and monolithic to achieve national independence under their banner; on the contrary, both before and after independence they reflected the pluralisms and lack of integration of their societies. *Creating Political Order* is likely to establish a new orthodoxy, since Africanists as well as Africans jump on bandwagons, and already many of the arguments that Zolberg so forcefully makes can be heard in the land.

Shortly after independence, the elites of "radical" West African one-party states were subjected to an assault from the Left when Frantz Fanon accused them of being a profiteering bourgeoisie.[4] He asserted that the one-party state was a dictatorship of this bourgeoisie for its own gain. With less vitriol, but with no less force, René Dumont criticized the plans and the actual development projects of African states.[5] The attacks on the elites of West Africa, including the rulers of Guinea and Mali, were synthesized when David Hapgood echoed Dumont's criticisms of agrarian development and sounded Fanon's themes in his attack on the elites' enjoyment of their prerogatives.[6] W. Arthur Lewis punctured the one-party balloon again, arguing that the single party fails in all its claims: "It cannot represent all the people; or maintain free discussion; or give stable government; or above all, reconcile the differences between various regional groups."[7] Lewis noted that West

[4] *Les damnés de la terre* (Paris 1961). That Zolberg was himself influenced by Fanon can be seen in his "Frantz Fanon: A Gospel for the Damned," *Encounter* (November 1966), 56-63.
[5] "L'Afrique Est Mal Partie," *Jeune Afrique*, No. 106 (1963), 22-23.
[6] *Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow* (New York 1965).
[7] *Politics in West Africa* (New York 1965), 63.

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African politicians do not have at their command either adequate administrative talent or sufficiently excellent systems of communication with which to build invincible party machines.[8]

Zolberg, by repairing to the history of the national movements, by taking a hard look at the organization of the ruling parties, and in particular by stressing the importance of environmental parameters of the political system, has swung the pendulum of analysis away from the view that a possible evolution of African party-states is toward mobilizing systems ruled by monolithic and centralized parties. Once someone asks the question, What states of the political system would be most compatible with the parametric values of the economic system, the international system, demography, and social stratification? the one-party emperor stands bereft of clothes. By focusing on the inherent weaknesses of the regimes of the West African party-states, Zolberg has made the past discussion of the possibilities of totalitarian political development of African states seem quixotic indeed.

We begin to see the difficulties inherent in the distinctions that have been made among African political systems. One of the first differentiations among one-party states was made by Ruth Schachter Morgenthau when she proposed "mass" and "patron" parties as categories of analysis.[9] Explicit in this analysis was the view that mass parties reached out for all citizens in the community in order to represent, lead, and rule them. Compared to patron parties at least, they had an articulated organization and an institutionalized leadership. But the nagging question remained, How successfully do mass parties represent and rule their constituents and society as a whole? Perhaps it was not possible to say in 1961. It seemed that some parties lost their vigor almost on attaining independence; but it was still hard to see *ruling* parties.

In the first years of the 1960's, the typologies constructed for African politics more and more became bifurcated by the problem of dynamicism. "Revolutionary-centralizing system,"[10] "revolutionary mass movement regime,"[11] "mobilization system"[12] were all essentially defined by the characteristics of party systems. They were contrasted with

[8] *Ibid.*, 86. Hapgood also expressed a growing feeling on the part of observers that "the leaders seem to be in the grip of forces stronger than themselves . . ." (p. 77).

[9] "Single-Party Systems in West Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 294-307.

[10] James S. Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966), 1-12.

[11] Robert C. Tucker, "On Revolutionary Movement Regimes," in his *Soviet Political Mind* (New York 1963), 3-19.

[12] David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton 1961), 22-24.

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"pragmatic-pluralistic"[13] or "consociational"[14] types. While the creators of these typologies did not insist that a system of one type would necessarily modernize a country more than one of the other, they did see the revolutionary and mobilizing systems as monopolizing legitimacy, demanding commitment from individuals and promising fulfilment, and reaching people through a hierarchically organized party. These parties were seen, to put it more impressionistically, as tougher and more dynamic.

It has become clear that something is wrong with the images these typologies convey. For one thing, the "dynamic" parties are not getting their economic programs across. Growth rates are not rising precipitously in Mali, Ghana, or Guinea. The Ivory Coast has been doing better in the growth numbers game. Nor are the one-party revolutionary systems managing affairs at local levels. Central party organs are not evoking the responses they want from regional and district party bodies. There is a great deal of deflection from central orders and plans, and commands made at the center simply are not implemented. As research is done outside the capital cities, all this becomes evident.

But even before we had an accumulation of evidence that belied the idea of African mobilizing political systems, there were difficulties in the choice of factors that differentiated political systems. The problem was not that a particular one-party system did not really fit the models that postulated dynamic, centralized, hierarchically organized, and monolithic parties, dominating, even monopolizing, political processes. Too often the descriptions of political systems in Africa were based on images that African parties tried to convey to the world.[15] We cannot use as the crucial factors by which we differentiate systems images of the systems which parties and leaders themselves put forward. These images are variables we must consider. It cannot be taken for granted that explicit ideologies in African states have any relevance beyond what a few people do and say. The aspirations of certain elites to transform their societies through a single party that penetrates all communities and social structures and mobilizes society's resources may or may not be significant factors.[16]

When typologies are based on structures—i.e., roles and statuses that supply us with a map of the sociopolitical terrain or tell us what elites'

[13] Coleman and Rosberg.

[14] Apter, *Political Kingdom in Uganda.*

[15] These points are made in my study *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton 1967).

[16] I have made some of these points in "The Ruling Party in the African One-Party State: TANU in Tanzania," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* (forthcoming).

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normative expectations are—and are not derived from the study of processes, then neither the typologies nor the maps from which they are derived specify how central institutions work. They do not tell us the nature of relationships within the party; nor do they tell us how the party relates to society as a whole and not merely to the modern, urban, or town sectors.[17]

One of the major contributions that Zolberg makes is to point out that analysts of African politics have been focusing on political structures without seeing them as organizations operating in an environment not coterminous with the nation territorially defined. Perhaps more obvious, but as often left unsaid, is the point that individuals who are not "mobilized," in Deutsch's sense,[18] still participate in politics of some sort (p. 131). Zolberg tries to get at what the political system of an unintegrated country is like by utilizing Easton's conceptualization of a political system as the most inclusive system of behavior in a society for the authoritative allocation of values.[19] "It is possible to suggest that the *values* that are authoritatively allocated in West African countries can be classified into two categories, one set to be called 'modern' and the other . . . 'residual' . . . . Furthermore, it is also possible to distinguish analytically between political structures that deal with authoritative allocations of the first set and others that deal with the second" (p. 131). We must find out what institutions determine which patterns of behavior in a society as a whole as well as in the various sectors of society.

Zolberg's study is a "short history." Thus he does not describe any one West African political system in detail. He does, however, suggest his own typological term—the West African party-state—and he provides a description of his analytical type. As the description proceeds, Zolberg's own conception of political development in Africa begins to come through, although it is never stated as a definition or even as a set of properties. Zolberg argues that the party-state is authoritarian in its domain; but that this domain is very limited and that on the whole the regime has little authority. That is, the party-state's activities do not fill the entire political system in which it operates (pp. 131-32).

[17] The aforementioned authors are themselves conscious of these questions. In fact, their typologies are designed to seek out the data that will tell us how much tactical flexibility parties have or how hierarchical their authority is. See, e.g., Apter, *Political Kingdom in Uganda*. Nonetheless, the typologies are dependent on formal structures and political rhetoric rather than on hypotheses about party function insofar as they purport to describe concrete African systems.

[18] See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 492-514.

[19] See David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1965).

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I would suggest that even in the modern sector, power is not highly centralized within the party-state. Regimes are in a sense similar to families, which may be highly centralized as self-contained units, but cannot affect the society outside themselves. This does not imply that leaders in Africa do not in certain areas have autonomy from middle-level elites; foreign policy formulation is an example. It does mean that the political resources usually are not sufficient within the modern sphere of African societies to enable leaders to build strong political bases for themselves. (Houphouet-Boigny seems to have been successful; Nkrumah was not; Touré, Senghor, and Keita seem rather unsure bets for the future.) In any case, political development in Africa should not be confused with dramatic change at the government or party level; indeed, the more things change, the more they stay the same in the centralization and scope of authority.

But the party-state is a regime, and the regime can be ended. Thus we want to know if changes in government and regimes—for example, a shift from party-state to military regime—will make any difference in Africa or if the environmental parameters will determine the nature of the political system. My own view is that economic factors, rather narrowly defined—level of income, per capita income, agricultural-industrial balances, and the share of total gross domestic product that subsistence sectors supply—preclude the possibilities of evolution to totalitarian or revolutionary centralizing political systems.[20]

One possible result of the interaction of a ruling party with its environment is the party's becoming increasingly centralized and bureaucratized as it undertakes economic tasks, for it is in the process of attempting to change the economy that the party's internal organization evolves. But many of the parties of Africa do not undertake such tasks. The party-state is too weak and has too few resources to tackle developmental problems. The countries are so poor that resources cannot be easily borrowed or appropriated to strengthen ruling structures. This is to state the vicious circle in a somewhat exaggerated way. I do, however, point to the importance of seeing political institutions and economy as interacting agents, or, as Zolberg puts it using Easton's language, seeing the feedback of the political system to its environment. The political culture that is now being created in African countries and the political institutions that handle economic and other tasks

[20] Zolberg makes a contribution when he notes that it can be useful to view concepts like mobilization as concepts that refer to aspects of the political process in given countries rather than as mutually exclusive tendencies.

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are not simply effects of changes in the economy or in demographic patterns (p. 146).

Political leaders can be active agents in the process of making change, and it does make a difference whether or not leaders are realistic about development plans and about abilities to enforce close control over their societies. Furthermore, political parties have real roles to perform in Africa. Zolberg sees West African parties as being more popular than government institutions: "[The party] is more serviceable as a sort of public relations agency for the central authorities . . ." (p. 126). More than this, neither the military nor the civil service in Africa is likely to make up in force what it lacks in legitimacy and political know-how.[21] Public order and political participation are the essentials of political development in Africa, and they will not be guaranteed by the removal of parties that have failed to maintain momentum.

We must now explore the remaining ruling single parties to find out how they differ in political functioning. (Indeed, we may have to hurry in this effort before we have no phenomena to study.) In a sense, we already have witnessed the end of the idea of mobilizing parties in Africa; but parties there still are, and they are important and interesting. It is too soon to proclaim the no-party state as ascendant throughout Africa.[22] And it is very questionable whether when such regimes come about they will have even as long a tenure as the party-states of Africa.

Kilson's *Political Change in a West African State* is a rather unusual political history of Africa also. By combining field research with the study of archives, Kilson has been able to focus on changes that colonialism created in rural and local African society.[23] It is precisely here, in

[21] I have dealt with the military as a ruling group in the Introduction and in "Public Order and the Military in Africa: Mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika," in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes: A Case Study Approach to Political Change* (New York 1967).

[22] See my "The Party and the No-Party State: Tanganyika and the Soviet Union," *Transition*, III (March-April 1964), 25-32. The argument for the "no-party state" designation is made in Robert I. Rotberg, "Modern African Studies: Problems and Prospects," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 571; and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966), 201-16.

[23] It might be mentioned that Kilson has explored some of the avenues of research that Zolberg, in his Conclusion, suggests are necessary: (1) a more thorough examination, through field study as well as use of documents, of the period preceding independence; (2) analyses of the "output" of political systems in the legal sphere as well as in the political economy and administrative spheres; (3) moving outward from the

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the study of local African society, that the major contributions to our understanding of African politics will be made, and Kilson is correct in noting that the study of political change among rural and urban masses is one of the most neglected aspects of analysis of modern African politics. "In seeking to understand what may be termed the 'mass factor' in African political change, the main problem is to define empirically and conceptually the way in which institutional modernization among the masses relates to the over-all process of colonial political change" (p. 117). Kilson sees the definition of the mass factor in political change as basically a historical problem that is rooted in the time lag between the initial colonial contact with some part of an African society and the eventual establishment of effective colonial administration throughout a territory. Indeed, the fact of uneven colonial impact on various tribes, occupational groups, geographical areas, and status groups is one of the most important phenomena to be analyzed in Africa. But it is clear that we cannot grasp the import of ethnic heterogeneity and uneven westernization unless we understand the traditional societies that came into contact with the colonial powers.

Thus, studying government locally in Africa means doing political anthropology as well as political history; it is essential to describe the specific patterns that existed and were modified in the course of the extension of colonial rule. (Political scientists have had little to say about traditional society in Africa in this respect;[24] anthropologists, sociologists, and historians have provided us with the information that exists.) Kilson's treatment is of traditional society in Sierra Leone rather than of traditional societies; his concept of tradition does not lead him to differentiate between various traditional norms or behaviors because "traditional" is equated with "premodern" and "precolonial." While Kilson shows that the modernization of tradition in Sierra Leone is occurring in a highly complex and ambivalent fashion, he concludes that "thus to persist in the modern context in utilizing traditional African guideposts to political relations or behavior like the reciprocity principle is, I suggest, inevitably to court basic socio-political break-

study of ideology as now approached to, specifically, concern with cognitive apparatus and, more generally, attention to political culture; (4) a stress on micropolitics, or "government locally"; (5) study of the interplay between traditional societies in any one territory and the relationship between tradition and modernity in contemporary African states; and (6) employment of a "comparative persuasion."

[24] Among the noteworthy exceptions are David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics*, XIII (October 1960), 45-68; and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," *ibid.*, XIX (January 1967), 190-217.

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down or disequilibrium, especially in view of the sizable wealth required for these guideposts to function in a modern system" (p. 287). But unless we beg the question by stipulating the criteria for modernity so that traditional norms and institutions cannot play a part, there is evidence to show that some traditional guideposts and institutions facilitate economic development and political equilibrium without enforcing political stagnation.[25]

Of course, there may be many tensions as elites try to stabilize sociopolitical relationships by infusing a modern political process with as many traditional norms as possible in order to govern the masses and slow up their demands. Elites may be perceived by nonelites to be allocating resources to themselves in a nontraditional way while they justify their actions by calling on traditional norms and obligations, and discontented groups may or may not act within traditional frameworks—or they may sometimes utilize the traditional framework but make demands that are substantially new. This is the process Kilson describes when he shows chiefs becoming a "mediating agency through which much of modernity—especially its socio-political orientations—reached the masses in rural society" (pp. 59-60). In other words, the material that Kilson presents makes one wonder whether political change in Sierra Leone conforms to the model of the modernization process as Kilson understands it, in which there is an irreconcilability between modern and traditional values, institutions, and behaviors, or whether his own case study of Sierra Leone is not an example of what Whitaker calls "dysrhythmic political change," in which tradition and modernity are hardly dichotomous.

For Kilson, "modernization" refers to that complex of changes resulting from the contact of Western industrial societies with the largely preliterate and preindustrial societies of tropical Africa. The modernization process is itself described in terms of new patterns of social stratification which center on the market economy and the extension of political institutions, norms, and power configurations beyond the former tribal, clan, and lineage structures. Thus modernization involves social, economic, and political change; "features of colonial political change that render it 'modern' in the context of indigenous African societies are (1) the process of rationalization and (2) the increase in

[25] Among the studies that treat the blending of modern and traditional institutions are Ann Ruth Willner, *The Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 26 (Princeton 1966); Lloyd I. Rudolph, "The Modernity of Tradition: Democratic Incarnation of Caste in India," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (December 1965), 975-989; and Whitaker.

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access to political authority and power on the part of the average person" (pp. 7-8). But while it is part of this complex of change, political change is attendant upon the modernization process. And Kilson sees a modern indigenous elite produced as the colonial oligarchy tried to introduce African resources into the world market system (p. 281). He allows that "no doubt a stage is reached when the process of change in colonial political institutions takes on a logic of its own . . . . But even this stage . . . functions in the generalized context of the rationalizing norms and ethos of a developing colonial-type market economy" (p. 281).[26]

Kilson argues that rationalization is the core of the modernization process. Here his study is similar to others in which modernization and political development are not separated out as analytically separate categories and in which "political development" (a term Kilson does not himself use) is understood synonymously with "modern political change" or "political modernization" (terms he does use).[27] Despite the fact that Kilson goes beyond this and states that the spread of power is the crucially distinctive feature of political modernization (p. 282), there is, indeed, a relegation of politics to secondary status in the framework of analysis. One cannot say that Kilson does not propose to take politics seriously. However, he does believe that politics is mainly about power and what power brings to those who hold it and perhaps not about very much else; politicians as well as bureaucrats are parasitic because they bring bureaucratic or political (manipulative) skills to the modernization process, but depend on those who fill economically productive roles (p. 288).

But what about the use of power? The exercise by rulers of political skills—precisely those manipulative skills that Kilson considers nonproductive—is an essential component of political development. The creation of effective political instruments that can be used by rulers to bring about goals depends on these skills; creating political order means the building of these instruments.[28]

[26] Kilson cites Marx and Weber here. In African studies he could have associated himself with Lucy Mair; cf. her *New Nations* (Chicago 1963).

[27] In his "African Political Change and the Modernization Process," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IV (December 1963), 425-40, Kilson said he would use "political change" instead of "political development" because it was more akin to the rather value-free term "social change." Moreover, for him the term "political change" better evokes interrelated norms, institutions, and processes (p. 425). That is, it emphasizes nonpolitical processes more than "political development" does.

[28] I understand Zolberg to equate political development with the creation of effective political instruments (p. 93).

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There is a difference between "political order" and "public order." The former refers to institution-building and the creation of stable patterns of politics. It is not some terminal state that, once attained, exists forever. Groups vie for authority and struggle for shares of valued things, but they may do so in a context of political order. This means that there are effective political instruments through which rulers and ruled act; a crisis of political order raises the specter of public disorder.[29]

When we begin to make concrete what we mean by problems of political development in Africa, we confront a situation in which central or national authorities are unable to exert authority over the territorial entity they "rule." This is not a phenomenon unique to Africa. The claims of central governments to rule anywhere must be seen against the realities of local autonomies, *de jure* and *de facto*. But in Africa, many areas of life in which centralized determination is taken for granted in Western polities that call themselves "decentralized" or "loose" or "democratic" are outside the reach or even the scope of national authorities. In the power realm, nationwide political structures either do not exist or are too weak to enforce the will of ruling national elites, no matter whether these elites are of traditional lineage groups, the civilian bureaucracy, or the military. In the realm of legitimacy, there is a failure of centralized authority. Although many African one-party states exhibit a rhetoric of mobilization-for-development-through-disciplined-parties, we have seen that it is often in these very states that values are not allocated for the society as a whole by central authorities.

Highly localized determination of political life need not to be synonymous with disorder, anarchy, and chaos. In fact, it may be the only way to avoid these conditions in African circumstances. This localized determination may go hand in hand with the vigorous self-interest of elites and even with the outright corruption that Kilson, among others, has described. As J. David Greenstone has noted, the total political capacity of a system measures the effectiveness of all political units in coping with problems raised by their environment.[30] Greenstone argues that "a political system could try to offset the loss of public-spirited cooperation by introducing the incentive of individual self-interest." The model in mind is the American political machine, which func-

[29] I have made this point at greater length in "Public Order and the Military in Africa."

[30] "Corruption and Self-Interest in Kampala and Nairobi," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VIII (January 1966), 200.

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tioned to help overcome the constitutional dispersal of authority typical of separation of powers.[31] The difficulty of Africa is not the constitutional dispersal of authority but the low level of political capacity at the center. This low level of capacity might be offset by a modified and politicized version of the invisible hand working at the local level.[32]

Kilson has argued that the principle of reciprocity, which is implicit in the exchange of gifts between the Sierra Leone People's party and voluntary associations—a principle that is associated with political machines—is difficult to assimilate politically when transposed to the modern context because of the sizable material wealth required for its functioning (p. 287). But does it follow that local and autonomous political machines are inappropriate to Africa because the economic pie is small and is not going to expand much in most countries in the immediate future? The largest payoffs to most voters in American cities were symbolic, not material.[33] Given the restricted economic resources available to African leaders, they too have tried for ethnic balances within their parties and for payoffs by means of the assertion of their countries' status on the world scene. And Kilson himself makes the point that African politics entails people's being more concerned with conserving their own group's needs and interests than with advancing them, because given the general conditions of backwardness, people are less capable of recouping political losses through alternate outlets. This argues for the possibility of elites' manipulating symbolic payoffs to attract followings.

Because the resources in the hands of central elites are few, the elites have a hard time centralizing authority over their own local party organizations. This holds true whether African leaders opt for the American machine model for their parties or for the model of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. So far, they have often equated modernity and political development with the construction of disciplined central organizations, first the ruling single-party and now the military. But the gap between image and reality cannot be closed by facades. And in African conditions there is no way of forcing central authority on the countryside.

We can agree that the only organization in Africa that can become a source of authority and can become effectively institutionalized is the

[31] Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 126, cited in Greenstone, 208.

[32] I have used Greenstone's formulation to argue a different point; he talks of offsetting a decline in political capacity resulting from a loss of dedication to the goals of "good government."

[33] Greenstone, 207.

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political party.[34] This does not commit us to the view that the attempts at centralized one-party systems are going to work.

The nation can be built in Africa through a congeries of regional, district, and subdistrict organizations that communicate with each other and the center. Each knows the others are there, but the organizations exist with full lives of their own. Political competition and decentralization are not, *per se*, inimical to development. In fact, if political development in Africa means creating effective political institutions, these are going to be political machines that are competitive and decentralized, whether within a one-party or multiparty framework.

[34] As Huntington argues in "Political Development and Political Decay," and as he argued in "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 412-13.

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FROM CONTAINMENT TO INTERDEPENDENCE

By T. V. SATHYAMURTHY

Vincent P. Rock, *A Strategy of Interdependence: A Program for the Control of Conflict Between the United States and the Soviet Union*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964, 399 pp. $7.50.

VINCENT Rock's *A Strategy of Interdependence* is a pioneering effort to consider the positive connotations of peace. Considering that a large proportion of "peace research" still takes the form of empirical, inventory-type work on the level of "subsystems" analysis carried out with highly sophisticated and successful computational and allied methods,[1] Rock's work, which is based on a macroconceptual framework, deserves the thorough and careful consideration of political scientists. His study was undertaken at a time when the power relations between Russia and America, or rather, the mutual perceptions of such relations, were already undergoing a change, and when the assumptions upon which the immediately postwar American policy of containment was based had become the subject of intensive reexamination by several notable scholars and men of public affairs. This review of his work may therefore be divided into three parts: (1) the chief features in the development of world politics since 1945, (2) an interpretive outline of Rock's main thesis, and (3) an evaluative critique of "the strategy of interdependence."

I

The inherent assumptions underlying the cold-war policies of the United States have been unquestioningly accepted by a majority of American students of international relations and military strategy. A review of the published material on the cold war, Soviet-American relations, disarmament and arms control, and nuclear strategy would indicate a surprising and even alarming degree of uniformity in the world views held by the authors.[2] And yet, the world is not the same

[1] E.g., the Dimensionality of Nations Project at Yale University under the direction of Rudolph J. Rummel, the work of Harold Guetzkow and Raymond Tanter at Northwestern University, and, most important of all, the research of Karl W. Deutsch. The *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *Journal of Peace Research* carry interesting articles based on empirical research employing sophisticated statistical and computational techniques.

[2] To cite only one example, an examination of eighteen issues of *World Politics*

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now as it was twenty years ago. Major changes in objective reality can be discerned, even though corresponding changes in the perception of it by observers and policy-makers have not yet taken place.

The roots of the cold war go back to the period before Yalta. Even when Russia was invaded by Hitler's armies, the young professional diplomats with expert knowledge of Soviet society and government (chief among them Loy Henderson, Charles Bohlen, and George Kennan) advocated a tough policy toward the Soviet Union on the basis of the view that the Soviet government was unpopular in Russia itself, was militarily weak, and was therefore bound to collapse under the impact of the German attack. Their advice was disregarded by the policy-makers and their advisers—Roosevelt himself, Hull, Davies, Stimson, and a few others—who decided to enlist the Soviet Union as a chief ally in the prosecution of the war against the Nazis. Loy Henderson's paper of February 1938 examining the whole range of Soviet foreign policy and the 1937 memorandum of Second Secretary Kennan to the Department of State during the trial of the leaders of the so-called Trotskyist-Zinovievite Terrorist Center represented the American professional consensus on the nature of the Soviet regime and its foreign policy. The dominant feature of Soviet-American relations during the interval between Kennan's memorandum of 1937 and the publication of his "Sources of Soviet Conduct"[3] was the direct personal diplomacy between Roosevelt and Stalin. But this brief period of cooperation between the two heads of state represented an unusual break in a history of basically hostile interrelationships.

Since Kennan gave the first and fundamental formulation of the theoretical assumptions of the American cold-war attitudes, it may be appropriate to examine briefly his main theses. These theses are contained in three works published over a period of ten years in which Kennan's fertile mind moved from the general world view expressed by the containment of Soviet expansionism to an acceptance of the need for both American and Russian disengagement in the most crucial theater of their interrelationships, Europe. During this period, Soviet

(1956-1966) containing articles or review articles on the cold war and the armaments race indicates a surprising degree of uniformity of views on the major topics affecting American policy, as well as a uniform perception of Soviet aims and policies. Thus, out of twenty-one review articles and twenty articles surveyed, fourteen review articles and seventeen articles were based on a world view spawned by Acheson and Dulles. The rest, published more recently, demonstrate a greater flexibility and a willingness to question at least a few of the cherished official assumptions of the fifties and the early sixties.

[3] *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947), 566-82.

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thinking also moved away from the Stalinist thesis of the implacable hostility between two opposing hegemonic centers around which the world was destined to be polarized, which had dominated Communist thinking for over a quarter of a century.

Kennan's Reith Lectures[4] were given in 1957, the year following the dramatic denunciation of Stalin in the Kremlin and the adaptation of the Leninist theory of the general crisis of capitalism, which would permit long-range peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world. The recently liquidated colonial empires were no longer regarded as "reserves of imperialism" but as a "peace zone" friendly to the socialist countries. In the arena of the world economy, as opposed to the politico-military field, the Soviet Union had been able to make a few spectacular gestures to the developing world, as well as to show considerable increase in its trade with the more developed nations. By 1957, Kennan was convinced that waiting for the Soviet system to crumble under the weight of its own iniquities would be like waiting for doomsday. The Soviet Union could no longer be regarded as a "transient phenomenon." Some positive effort was called for to incorporate a recognition of its continued existence into the American international political experience.[5] Although this change of orientation on Kennan's part did not extend to China when he subsequently wrote about U.S. policy toward that country,[6] his Reith Lectures must be viewed as a significant revisionist statement from one who had had a long and continued association with the American Establishment.

But even before Kennan publicly admitted the need for far-reaching changes in American policy toward Russia, a small group of avant-garde columnists, writers, and intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic had consistently regarded both containment and its successor, massive retaliation, as short-sighted and unwarranted by the facts of life. In 1947 Walter Lippmann rightly saw in containment a state of diplomatic immobility, a fundamental reluctance to seek settlement until the enemy "changes, ceases to be our rival, and becomes our partner."[7]

The mood of the Department of State in 1947, however, very much like the later mood of the Kremlin, was determined by a confidence that "time is on our side." Once the decision had been reached in favor of a tough, uncompromising attitude rather than gradual and steady

[4] *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (New York 1958).

[5] For a lucid discussion of some aspects of this question, see Robert C. Tucker, "Russia, the West, and World Order," *World Politics*, XII (October 1959), 1-23.

[6] "A Fresh Look at Our China Policy," *New York Times Magazine* (November 22, 1964).

[7] *The Cold War* (New York 1947).

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negotiation with the adversary over disputed questions, a series of policy options was adopted by Washington during the period 1945-1947 which at least partially determined the structure of the cold war. Given the comparative backwardness of Soviet power during the decade after the war (much like the present paucity, in world terms, of Chinese military resources), Stalinist saber-rattling was merely a camouflage for the extreme inherent limitations to which strategic options available to the USSR were subject. The United States policy-makers, on the other hand, were in a more favorable position to manipulate a whole range of alternative policy strategies not available to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the political thinking of American leaders after the passing of Roosevelt and until the brief interregnum under Kennedy favored a monochromatic approach directed toward an all-out solution of the "Soviet problem." The appearance rather than the reality of Soviet power thus became the determinant of the U.S. posture. The voices advocating moderation and flexible strategies were muted in a national effort to mount a defensive ideology to counter the ideology of revolutionary violence and Communist internationalism. Had other voices such as Lippmann's been heard in 1947, it is quite possible that the division of Europe might at least have been eased; certainly some of the complications to which American policy led during the first ten years of the cold war could have been avoided. Ten years of encirclement of the Soviet Union by military, political, and economic methods did not hasten the decay of Soviet power. Quite the contrary. Kennan, as Reith lecturer in 1957, gave the stamp of official respectability to the views put forth by Lippmann as early as 1947.[8]

It is not within the purview of this article to review particular occasions on which variants of the standard American policy were employed (from Korea, or even earlier, to Cuba). But it should be pointed out how the general American mood stemming from postwar disillusionment with the Soviet Union affected two important areas of international relations—international organization and armaments.

The United Nations was expeditiously created by Roosevelt, who was aware both of the susceptibilities of the American public and of the possible winds of change that might sweep the Soviet power structure, once victory in war became an accomplished fact. Two basic assumptions underlay the formation of the Organization. It was to be the instrument of world peace with a membership whose collective

[8] For a critique of the policy of containment, see Roger D. Masters, "Goals for American Power," *Yale Review*, LV (Spring 1966), 365-88.

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commitment to peace would constitute the common denominator of a wide variety of competing philosophies of life. Secondly, its purpose was to be all-embracing, not merely political. In order to safeguard political peace, social, economic, cultural, and functional forces making for international cooperation had to be taken into account and fostered. The first fundamental assumption fell victim to the day-to-day relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, as it unfolded from the day Truman became President. The result was an injection of the cold war into the United Nations system. The Soviet Union did not control a majority of the votes in the General Assembly and so was driven to use its veto in the Security Council; the United States tried to mitigate the effect of the Soviet veto by emasculating the Security Council and strengthening the General Assembly (thereby reversing the intended balance between the two organs) with the aid of a large number of nations that were on the sidelines of the cold war but were then easily amenable to American influence. The result was an erosion of such influence as the Organization was initially able to muster, a complete removal from the United Nations' domain of all questions on which the Big Two (and now, the Big Three) were in conflict, a buffeting of the Organization between the contradictory efforts of the Big Two to modify its structure and constitution in such a way as to increase their influence in it, and a general preoccupation with those problems of the third world in which neither of the Big Two chose to exercise a decisive influence.[9]

The fate of the second and more all-embracing functional thesis underlying the United Nations system can best be discerned in the rather checkered career of UNESCO. The original lofty aim of this specialized agency of the United Nations has been subject to much ideological debate. Even before the USSR belatedly joined UNESCO in 1954, cold-war politics had been injected into the deliberations of the agency.[10] UNESCO has been able on many occasions to sidestep purely ideological debates in an effort to discuss concrete problems. This has meant that at best the organization has been able to separate *pragma* from *dogma*; at worst, it has been unable to protect its deliberations from the invasion of ideology. In either case, despite disclaimers by members of the secretariat to the contrary, the cold war has been a catastrophe so far as UNESCO's vision of peace is concerned.

From the point of view of Soviet-American relations, questions of

[9] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Contrasting Concepts of the United Nations* (Leeds 1963).
[10] T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Politics of International Cooperation: Contrasting Conceptions of U.N.E.S.C.O.* (Geneva 1964).

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the arms race and disarmament have been full of both portent and promise. In sheer intellectual terms, the cold war has produced "nuclear Machiavellis" in both camps (e.g., Herman Kahn in America and A. N. Lagovskii in Russia).[11] It has stimulated the growth of an enormous amount of very sophisticated literature in both countries on the consequences of war and peace, on the relative merits and demerits of the different strategies of war, peace, and coexistence, and on the interrelationships between political, military, and economic considerations in this historic confrontation between history's most titanic powers. Nevertheless, it must be asserted that precisely because the political path initially chosen did not permit flexibility, the writings of military men and men of peace have had to be circumscribed in range in order to be acceptable. Thus a great deal of the literature on war and strategy consists of studies in depth that are not wide-ranging in their consideration of alternative strategies available for dealing with the opponent. That this should be true of the USSR under the Stalinist aegis is understandable. What is not so easily understood is the fundamental sterility in the approach to the cold war found until recently in American literature on the subject. A hundred flowers have no doubt bloomed, but they have almost without exception been tactical flowers on a single strategic stem.[12]

Thus policy-bred literature on arms control and disarmament tended to push American policy further in the same direction. It was only with the advent of the Kennedy administration and its avowed desire for some change (although until the test-ban treaty, even Kennedy's policy seemed a continuation if not an intensification of previous policy)[13] that new trails have begun to be blazed. Unfortunately, however, the Kennedy interregnum did not last long enough for new policy outlines to be clearly drawn and singlemindedly pursued. The international relations of America under President Johnson are dominated by Vietnam. Despite the forceful advocacy of a policy of détente and de-escalation by such statesmen and public figures as Senator Fulbright,

[11] Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton 1961) and *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York 1962); Lagovskii, *Strategiia i Ekonomika* [*Strategy and Economics*] (Moscow 1957).

[12] The few studies that suggest a fundamental reorientation of strategy have until recently emanated from outside the pale of the Establishment and have therefore had little impact. See Arthur I. Waskow, "Disarmament as a Special Case in Military Strategy," *World Politics*, XVI (January 1964), 322-27. Also see Evan Luard, "Conventional Disarmament," *ibid.*, 189-204.

[13] For a discussion of this aspect of Kennedy's presidency, see David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (London 1965), esp. 355-97.

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Senator Morse, George Kennan, and Walter Lippmann, the die seems to have been cast in favor of the opposite course of increasing tension and decreasing the chances not only of a Southeast Asian but also of a Soviet-American détente. No one can guess the outcome of the policy at present pursued by Washington. No foreboding can be too gloomy; the hope of peace could not hang on a slenderer thread.

But one should be glad of minor developments, and the Kennedy era did unleash vast intellectual resources devoted to a study of the conditions, limits, and prospects of peace and interdependence in our world, and between Russia and America in particular. Changes in emphasis if not changes in the basis of policy have brought about the appearance of a more variegated stream of political literature on the cold war, coexistence, interdependence, and disarmament, not only relieving monotony but also holding out fresh hope. These studies have acquired the stamp of respectability because Kennedy himself was plainly a fearless advocate of a rational policy of peaceful competition and interdependence with the Soviet Union. Rock's book belongs to this new category of literature to which also belong the more recent works of J. David Singer, Amitai Etzioni, Marshall D. Shulman, Charles E. Osgood, and a few others.[14]

II

Rock's book is addressed mainly to the American elite. It deals with the challenges faced by American foreign policy-makers in a world in which the unquestioned American supremacy during the early postwar period has been drastically reduced to a marginal or even doubtful superiority. It is a plea for the initiation of a new strategy, which Rock calls "the strategy of interdependence," in the hope that it might prove itself to the point of driving the old strategy of deterrence and containment into obsolescence. It is an appeal to the publics of both the USA and the USSR to convert, in gradual but well-defined stages, the vast technology of destruction into constructive channels of endeavor, and thus enable both societies, and eventually the whole world, to achieve a richer and happier life and attain greater liberty. The strategic reliance of both the USA and the USSR "on the panacea of nuclear power" for their security is no longer enough as the cold war has yielded to a gradual, limited, but perceptible Soviet-American détente. If international society is viewed as "a single, imperfect, but rapidly developing

[14] Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament* (Columbus 1962); Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York 1962); Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War* (New Haven 1965); Osgood, *An Alternative to War and Surrender* (Urbana 1962).

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community," then both a program of "positive constructive endeavors and enterprises" and the creation of an environment in which a successful control of conflict between the main adversaries will be seen by each to be in its own interest are essential aspects of any strategy of interdependence.[15] Reasonably enough, Rock isolates for his main examination the most important dimension of interdependence, namely, the Soviet-American interdependence. He does not, however, ignore the fact that a strategy of worldwide interdependence is the sufficient long-range condition of peace, even though a strategy confined to the Soviet Union and the United States may represent its necessary immediate condition. Thus Rock is essentially an advocate of a preferred strategy; and, although by implication the book is addressed to an American audience, it is likely to attract attention beyond the United States in all the three worlds. Rock believes that while a vague *de facto* state of interdependence characterizes the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (especially through interaction in the fields of weapons, science, communications, and politics) no viable, consciously planned, concentrated strategy is in existence. Interdependence seems to be merely a state of affairs, without the structures necessary to exploit its beneficial results. Given the fact that coercive power in international relations, as in national affairs, is concentrated in the hands of central governments, the main initiative for establishing a *modus vivendi* between antagonists, and releasing the resources and energies necessary for it, should come from governments. But while mechanisms exist in the national system to diffuse power while concentrating force at the center, no such device has yet been created or is likely soon to be created for the international system. Since the international system as a whole consists of structures and substructures that cannot be encompassed in a short period within a single strategy of cross-national interdependence, it is reasonable to start with a dyadic system[16] such as the Soviet-American one that happens at the present time to be crucial in matters of war and peace.

Since the known methods for containing conflicts within national contexts are not available in the international system, given the present predominance of the belief in sovereignty, ways and means should be found for promoting "a substantial cross-national diffusion of *interest*

[15] Unless otherwise indicated, all passages quoted in this section are taken from the book under review.

[16] On the operational feasibility of dyadic studies of conflicts, see Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Dimensionality of Nations Project," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven 1966), 119-29.

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and ultimately of power." But Rock sees in "the nation state system at its present stage of evolution" a perennial source of difficulty in creating and fostering cross-national interests. He nevertheless believes that "possibilities for weaving a web of interdependence across national lines" will arise with material progress, despite the "monolithic design of the Soviet state." The implication that underlies much of Rock's thinking is that the obstacles to interdependence are more powerful on the Soviet than on the American side.

Long-range Soviet-American progress in the fields of arms, politics, and trade is essential for peace, but cannot take place in the absence of "salient and important cross-national purposes in other areas" and cross-national structures and programs for achieving them. While such programs already exist between the nations of the West and East (or rather, of Western and Eastern Europe), they have yet to find suitable soil in the field of Soviet-American relations. And yet, consciousness on both sides of the need to reassess goals and modify traditional perceptions has grown in recent years in the wake of the knowledge, which each side possesses, of the total and irretrievable damage it can cause with its nuclear arsenal. Apart from the incalculable harm that can be inflicted upon unsuspecting populations by individual acts of error or madness, both powers have learned through actual experience how difficult it is to avoid the temptations of escalating conflict to dangerous levels.

Rock identifies three important clusters relevant to "the management and enlargement of a viable interdependence" between the American and Soviet societies: both nations' historical experiences of coexistence and interdependence;[17] their common experiences in the fields of science, industry, and technology; and their experiences of each other in direct intercourse as well as in the "third areas" of the world. Among these, the first, illuminating the different historical experiences of the two nations, gives us an idea of the difficulties involved in creating a solid foundation of understanding, without which true interdependence would be extremely difficult to achieve. As regards the other two areas, in which at least initial efforts are likely to be vigorously competitive in nature, one should recognize that the first thrusts of interdependence might well result in a temporary deterioration rather than in an improvement in the relations between the two giants. Unlike Quincy Wright, who has devoted considerable attention to the possible initial phase of deterioration of relations in experiments involving interde-

[17] Rock makes the point that coexistence as postulated by the Soviets is not enough.

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pendence,[18] Rock has chosen to emphasize the functional aspects at the expense of the dysfunctional, and the beneficial results to the neglect of possible negative interactions during the initial stages.

Rock's conceptual framework of the strategy of interdependence draws heavily upon the wide variety of knowledge now available on the subject of human behavior and the control of conflict. The author has a thorough grasp of the work (especially by American social scientists) that has accumulated in the field of "tensions affecting international understanding," to which such men as Klineberg, Cantril, Cottrell, Bettelheim, and Wright have made significant contributions. He is aware of the researches of psychologists (e.g., Morton Deutsch on different kinds of motivation), experts in the field of communications (especially Charles Osgood), and those who have attempted to delineate the conditions under which frustration might lead either to aggression or to adaptive behavior. Fundamental to his thesis is the notion that interdependence means compromise among individual men and not between abstract, mutually irreconcilable ideologies. The goal of interdependence is the control of conflict between two groups of people purposefully interacting. Control of conflict itself is a "learned social process," involving the exercise of restraint, which is often accompanied by a sense of frustration "that may lead either to aggression or to more adaptive behavior."

Rock extracts from his knowledge of human behavior two principles essential to his strategy: (1) "There must be a continuing and vigorous search for common purposes, or common interests as they are referred to in foreign relations," and (2) "The infinitely varied capability of man to attach values to life's experiences requires that his opinion of what is needed or acceptable, threatening or rewarding, be recognized as an important reality." The import of the second principle is that, given proper education, most men would prefer dynamic interdependence to deterrence. Given these two operative principles, the interdependence that already exists in limited fields can be transformed into a constructive force affecting the whole fabric of cross-national life. To ensure the overarching common purpose of survival, a web of "subordinate purposes," capable of serving the interests of both the Soviets and the Americans, must be created. Any infrastructure of viable interdependence should fulfill certain criteria of which Rock specifies five: (1) contribution to the convergence of values and purposes of the two societies (e.g., cultural exchanges), (2) germaneness to the present

[18] *A Study of War*, 2nd ed. (Chicago 1965).

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stage of development of relations between the two sides (e.g., while Professor Berman's lectures on law were feasible, Professor Barghoorn's visit to Russia in 1963 turned out to be inopportune), (3) direct or indirect relevance to the "control of conflict" (e.g., the Pugwash discussions, the test-ban agreement, cooperation in space, the International Geophysical Year, and so on), (4) a range across the entire spectrum of relationships (e.g., professional cooperation, correction of national stereotypes, expansion of trade), and (5) a cumulative character. Rock also emphasizes the need for measuring the utility of such programs in achieving their goals before committing scarce resources to their execution.

The main part of Rock's work consists of descriptions of the world community he hopes will be ushered into existence by the adoption of a strategy of interdependence initiated by the USA and the USSR, the impediments to the control of conflict, and the potential common interests that are likely to lead to a restraint of force on both sides—especially in science, technology, communications, culture, and in the common endeavor in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Rock's image of the world community is in essence not very different from the usual utopian images with which we are familiar. The conceptual background of his "ideal" world makes no new distinctions, breaks no new ground. He starts with the "radically different" views—Lenin's and Woodrow Wilson's—of the "ideal of the unity of mankind." According to Rock, the clash between the romanticist "class" image of Lenin and the idealist "democratic" vision of Wilson was avoided in the period subsequent to the Second World War as a result of "the striking discontinuity which arose in weapons technology." On the one hand, the discovery of world-circling weapons of total destruction and the spread of worldwide communications have made a worldwide "communitas" technologically feasible; on the other, the increased acuteness of the dilemma of security caused by the enemy's possession of such ultimate weapons has effectively blocked the psychological receptivity vital for the formation of a world community. Thus, from the purely political point of view, neither side has been able to pursue *its* vision of one world; nor is there any likelihood, in the near future, of a consensus on an acceptable world political community. Rock suggests that "the task of the present is not so much to devise the structure as to lay the foundations of a world political community."

Rock's intellectual search for the foundation of a world political community or an incipient world order consists of three stages. First, with the aid of the work of sociologists, psychologists, and political

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theorists of the West (from Durkheim to MacIver), he first considers the gradual replacement, albeit not without resistance from traditional forces, of the traditional by the instrumental stream of experience in the life of a community. On a world scale, the community has often been confused, on the one hand, with the modern state and, on the other, with the class—in particular, with the proletariat cutting across national and cultural boundaries. The Leninist view of class as providing a basis for instrumental solidarity is dismissed by Rock on the grounds that overbureaucratization and party supremacy have led to the emergence of a new class with vested interests of its own,[19] that Communist ideology has oversimplified the instrumental solidarity of "workers *qua* workers," and that Communist policies have underestimated the complexities of human nature, once basic economic requirements are met.[20] In contrast to the revolutionary, dogmatic, monolithic, and inflexible view of community behind the Stettin-Trieste line, the development of the American view of world community, from the time of Wilson to the present, is seen by Rock as essentially evolutionary, pragmatic, gradualist, and pluralistic. The American view, stated in simple terms, aims at the unification of the "free world" as a prelude to the emergence of a "coherent world community."[21]

Secondly, while not rejecting or even subjecting to analysis and criticism the dichotomy between the "free" and the "Communist" worlds, Rock proposes a shift to a different kind of division—that between the industrialized and the industrializing. Industrialized societies are already closely related to one another in "instrumental interdependence spawned by science and technology." Rock conceives an essential natural community comprising Europe (East and West), Russia, and America. Without assigning relative weights to the ideological and objective factors, he transfers his whole concern to solutions of practical differences between the USA and the USSR.[22] The under-

[19] Recent experiences in Yugoslav politics would indicate that some room must be provided for the possibility of communityward changes occurring in the Communist system. Also, certain interpretations of Chinese communism emphasize the firm basis of Maoism, or rather "Mao Tse-tung-ism," in an appreciation of the paramount importance of the community as a whole in China.

[20] On this as on several other matters, Rock seems to accept without criticism the official American dogma about Soviet priorities, although impressive evidence to the contrary has become increasingly available during the last few years. For instance, see Alec Nove, *Was Stalin Really Necessary?* (London 1964).

[21] For a typical example, see Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Theory and Practice of UNESCO," *International Organization*, IV (February 1950), 3-11. For a critique of this view, see Sathyamurthy, 45-47.

[22] Among examples of differences cited are those regarding the origins and use of power within society, the role of science, the means of controlling production for the

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developed nations are trailing along the same path as the modern industrialized states, but they are still far behind. Their general aim is no different, and as long as the industrialized states are able to form a community, the others will eventually become part of an ever-expanding world order. Thus the crux of world community formation lies in the uniting of the industrialized states. The crux of the unity of industrialized states lies in turn in the formation of a Soviet-American community, which should be facilitated by the common heritage each shares with Europe.

The third series of ideas that Rock examines relates to order and development. Order is highly valued in the community. The state is vested with the responsibility of maintaining order, fostering development, and safeguarding security. To carry out its responsibilities, the state is given the monopoly of force. Thus the state is the instrument of the community. While most national communities are thus protected from chaos by the existence of the state as the instrument of order, international relations take place in an atmosphere in which a monopoly or even a duopoly of force is unlikely. "The absence of government [order] in the relations among sovereign political units is one of the unmistakable signs that civilization has entered into its 'Time of Troubles.' "[23] While science, technology, and enterprise have brought about order in industrial states, one should not make the error of supposing that these alone would be sufficient conditions of order in the external relations of states.

In considering East-West relations (Soviet-American relations in particular) from this perspective, Rock cites the inherent limitation of the common official American argument (espoused by most American leaders from Truman to Rusk) that in the "free world" the establishment of order is dependent on development. Action confined to the "free world" can produce only marginal effects, if any, on Soviet-American relations. The dominant fact of Soviet-American relations is nuclear power, with its capacity for total annihilation. Reliance on force, either nuclear or conventional, in solving crises affecting the relations between the two countries reduces the chances of creating or maintaining order. On the other hand, Rock sees, rightly, signs of willingness on the part of both adversaries to implement "policies which rely upon development as a means of preserving order within

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ends of society, and willingness of elites to make the sacrifices necessary for world order.

[23] Kenneth W. Thompson, "Mr. Toynbee and World Politics: War and National Security," *World Politics*, VIII (April 1956), 374-91.

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

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their bloc or association of nations." Could this willingness not be extended to cover areas of "mutual development" with a view to maintaining order, that is, ensuring security and avoiding war?

In other words, it is necessary to create the "prerequisites of order" at the very center of the world conflict, through common commitment to development. Such a commitment would involve common enterprises in the international sphere, but would also include concern for each other's economy. At this point, Rock advocates the view that the benefits of Western economic progress should be liberally offered to the Soviet Union in the interest of the latter's stability and thus of world security. The West should devote its efforts not only to the development of the "free world" but also to the development of its adversary. Even though Rock points out the insufficiency, if not the unsuitability, of the concept of the "free world" in the contemporary context, he himself fails to make the distinction between the "underdeveloped parts of the free world" and the "third world." His acceptance of a more or less abstract concept such as "development" as an alternative to "firm ideological commitments" as the moving force of the relations between America and Russia will no doubt raise several questions, to some of which we shall return later.

Rock notes that recent years have witnessed a discernible increase in sophistication in the understanding of the control of conflicts, as well as a developing appreciation by both the USA and the USSR that they are "involved in a single process of differentiation and integration" that should stimulate a search for common interests beyond mere survival. Despite this, he is not unaware of the main obstacles that America faces and will continue to face. He views the developments in Soviet society during recent years with a mixture of skepticism and surprise—skepticism about the future of the social order and surprise that the achievement of new levels of social integration has not been accompanied by any remarkable recourse to internal violence or coercion. An association between affluence and stability (and, therefore, world order or peace) in the Soviet Union can be promoted by the adoption of suitable policies by the West.

Another barrier to the control of conflict is seen in the changing relationship between Communist ideology and Communist power, in both the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. Rock sees in the emergence of autonomous associations within the Soviet society a sign of a desirable change in the role of ideology.[24] Although the prospect

[24] For a brilliant confirmation of this view, see Nove.

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of a major change may be still remote, the growing complexity of Soviet society may stimulate its eventual realization. From the American point of view, so long as Soviet ideology is not divorced from actual experience, especially in the international sphere, there should be no cause for concern. It would be in the American interest to promote community-type outlooks in both Eastern and Western Europe. Rock emphasizes the need for correcting ideologically oversimplified images of American society and life widely prevalent in the Soviet Union by enabling members of Soviet scientific and technological elites to gain increased access to the science and culture of the West.

A third obstacle to interdependence is seen in the Soviet view of world unity. According to Rock, this view has not undergone any significant change. He thinks that as long as the Soviet Union seeks to interpret world unity only in terms of those tendencies that enhance Soviet world power and influence, America will have to devote its superior power to strengthening the "free world" in order that it may resist "Communist blandishments." In actual fact, however, the numerous actors belonging to the third world are likely to involve the two superpowers in minor parochial conflicts. Unless the Soviet Union and the United States learn to develop new sets of mutual relationships based on an "understanding of their common interests and more extensive common efforts to achieve them," a worldwide collision between these two contradictory agglomerations of power is unavoidable.

The fourth and the fifth obstacles are of American origin. Rock sees postwar American efforts to contribute to the building of free associations "which will bring unity and a stable world on the basis of consent" as thwarted by the efforts of the Soviet Union to extend its hegemony in Europe, in the Arab world, and in the Near East. The policy of containment was designed "to protect" the non-Communist world—especially those parts of the world that America sees as vital to its national interest—from the inroads of Soviet expansion. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the nuclear missile policy of the Kennedy administration were designed to cope with the requirements of a containment of Soviet power. Each Soviet breakthrough in space technology and weapons production prompted a fresh American commitment to the attainment of *supremacy* and, through it, invulnerability. If supremacy was unattainable, American *superiority* over the Soviet Union would have to be the minimum goal of policy.[25] Thus the whole concept of containment acquired a military

[25] It should, however, not be forgotten that the American response to Soviet space

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rather than a political connotation, with diplomacy taking a second place to military strategy and preparedness as the means to policy ends. In this process, the military and the industrial organizations, as was noted by President Eisenhower in his Farewell Address, acquired a disproportionate voice in the conduct of national policy. This tendency in the USA has, it may be safely assumed, evoked a tough response of a similar nature in the USSR. Is not the simultaneous development of powerful military-industrial complexes in both America and Russia a matter for concern to those who would like to see a world community of fear replaced by a world community of shared interests?

The final obstacle in Rock's discussion stems from the "balance of terror" system resulting from the furious and interminable preparations for mutual deterrence. The balance itself is precariously dependent on repeatedly occurring crises, the turning points of which might initiate events leading either to war or to de-escalation. At best, perpetual uncertainty; at worst, total annihilation—such is the narrow vista vouchsafed by policies of mutual deterrence and military supremacy. Such advances as meetings between heads of state, an increase in the varieties of military conflict, and the concentration of efforts to achieve rationality "in the threatened use of force" can offer little comfort as long as either adversary is unwilling to shed total commitment to his own exclusive vision of "world community." The lessons of Hungary and Cuba point in the same direction. The existing areas of common interest between America and Russia are far too narrow. They must be widened, and they must grow both in volume and in range.

In the examination of mutual interests Rock is extremely competent. He provides the reader with a comprehensive inventory of feasible projects and subjects in which America and the Soviet Union could exert their combined efforts and sink their combined resources to mutual advantage. The broad front he has chosen spans science, communications, technology, and development. Already a start has been made in the direction of limited cooperation between the two countries in such functional fields as oceanography and geophysics (as in the International Geophysical Year). The greatest disincentive to mutual cooperation in fields such as space lies not only in the potential military nature of the work involved,[26] but also in the inherent ability of each

successes has not been dissimilar to the Soviet response to American nuclear successes during the period 1945-1955.

[26] Rock's discussion of the complementary and competing roles of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in American space projects is particularly illuminating. Any collaborative effort

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superpower to develop highly sophisticated programs by its own efforts.[27]

The universal value system that is characteristic of science ought to make cooperation in science and technology easier than in political and social areas of life. Mutual cooperation and the creation of a web of Soviet-American technological institutions would depend upon two related factors: the relatively symmetrical interplay between Soviet and American science, which should make cooperation easier, and the flow of capital and technical knowledge between the Soviet Union and the United States, which has tended to be relatively asymmetrical, thus rendering cooperation rather difficult. Rock sees his strategy as providing the key to the achievement by the Soviet Union of some "reasonable approximation of the [American] quality of life" ("equaling us in the cultural-economic convergence sense"), of not only an affluent but also a "mature" society. Since the Soviet Union can no longer be prevented from achieving substantial growths, it would be unprofitable and inadvisable for America to continue to engage in either "countervailing" or "preclusive" competition. Rock's alternative to these unsuitable strategies is one of "interdependent" competition in trade, which, he hopes, would combine both the carrot and the stick that may induce the Soviet Union to reallocate its "resource use" in a direction not necessarily compromising its independence, but in conformity with American national interest (which in broad terms means the maintenance of the status quo).

How exactly does Rock envisage the initiation of his strategy? He prefaces his view of the subject with a brief but brilliant discussion of the time dimensions within which the strategy will have to materialize. One must be aware of the crucial distinction between time as *Augenblick* ("the moment of truth") and time as "the stream of consciousness." Moments of truth are preceded by periods of intense preparation. The present nuclear preparation can only lead to a Pyrrhic coexistence, if not a Pyrrhic victory. A modest and thoughtful start given to a strategy of interdependence, even while old strategies of attrition and competition are still in fashion, might in future lead to a new vision, a new moment of truth, that can only bring forth "new avenues of

with the USSR would inevitably involve a high-level cooperation among these agencies and, through them, among the various opinion leaders of the general public.

[27] That mutual cooperation between countries ideologically opposed to each other need not in practice be inhibited in such spheres has been demonstrated during the recent visit of General de Gaulle to Moscow. One of the General's most spectacular achievements was the Soviet-French agreement by which France will be in a position to avail itself of Soviet rocket-launching facilities for some of its experiments.

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great promise," instead of the "moment of nuclear truth" that can mean only sterility or holocaust. While those committed to unbridled nationalism may, with popular support, be tempted to caution against the new strategy itself, proponents of the new strategy who will have to work without wide support as long as "public perception of a common and interdependent future is obscure" should act cautiously, steadily, and not in a precipitous manner.

Rock breaks down into four periods the long haul ahead of the strategists of interdependence. After a preparatory period of initial successes, it will be necessary to redefine national security interests and programs. When this is done, the strategy in its more concrete forms will be ready for takeoff. The period of development will then be followed by one of common commitment.

During the first years of the strategy, a relationship of mutual respect between the Soviet and American leaderships should be built up. This will inevitably rest on a common understanding by both nations that in the present age the state could no longer protect the nation if a nuclear showdown were to occur. Although nuclear disarmament might continue to occupy the attention of both powers, tasks envisaged by the strategy that Rock proposes can be pursued simultaneously with military preparedness. Common constructive undertakings already embarked upon and new tasks consistent with interdependence should be elevated above the day-to-day clash of narrowly defined national interests.

Rock envisages the possibility of domestic antagonism to interdependence from the military-industrial complex that will form the natural opposition to the President. He suggests that opposition will have to be met on the grounds of fact. If possible, a major opposition party leader of a stature similar to that of Senator Vandenberg during the forties "must be taken step by step through the moments of truth which the President has faced as he has come within uncertain days and hours of the climax of a nuclear crisis." In other words, the President should be in a position to convince voices of opposition that, during the initial years of the strategy, national security can be increased by combining a policy of effective deterrence with the pursuit of common endeavors. The present period is decidedly different from an earlier one in which deterrence was an adequate response to the international situation. Furthermore, the development of an increasing body of experience of constructive interdependence will be necessary to fill the vacuum in the relationship between the two countries when they decide that nuclear brinkmanship is no guarantee of security.

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Rock seems to feel that neither America nor Russia should allow its allies to affect its attitude toward the other in any major way. In this he seems to echo the views of Etzioni,[28] although the latter would go to the extent even of advising the two superpowers to ignore those views of their allies that are detrimental to their common interests. Rock sees in the close linking up of Russia and America the necessary prelude to the creation of the "Greater European community" (Europe plus Russia plus America—or rather, Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals plus America) which would provide a stable basis for world peace.

On the actual planning and execution of the strategy of interdependence, Rock emphasizes two main points. He notes that "the overwhelming bulk of the physical resources on both sides are already being devoted to ends that are compatible with those of the strategy of interdependence." The second point relates to the problem of converting resources now used in both countries to support mutual antagonisms (notably, military purposes) into resources for interdependence. The experience of the recent war has demonstrated the suppleness of both economies. In both cases, a major proportion of the gross national product was shifted to military purposes at short notice.[29] Rock argues that the transfer of resources in the opposite direction (from military to peaceful expenditure) would be equally easy once the political decision for interdependence was taken by both sides.

The most convincing single justification for the strategy of interdependence lies in the growing commitment in both societies to science—"to an increased understanding of man's existence, both physical and social." Self-consciously interdependent action and behavior are argued as the only way out of the present untenable situation obtaining in Soviet-American relations. These relations have, after a period of acute antagonism, now begun to drift and drag aimlessly and without purpose. If even a fraction of the enormous means at the disposal of both these countries were to be used to develop a more productive and positive relationship, not only would the possibility of inadvertent war recede but also the nucleus of a stable world order would be built.

III

Kenneth Waltz reserves his strongest and most uncompromising criticism for the behaviorist persuasion in the study of international

[28] *Winning Without War* (New York 1964).

[29] Klaus Knorr, "The Concept of Economic Potential for War," *World Politics*, x (October 1957), 49-62.

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politics.[30] A great deal of it is unkind and even unreasonable, as it ignores the three important potentialities of behavioral science, viz., utilization of empirical findings where significant gaps exist in our body of knowledge, promotion of methodological habits and the search for variables, and heuristic contributions that only middle-range theories may be relied upon to provide.[31] But, on the other hand, excessive reliance on behavioral science increases the vulnerability of any work on international relations to criticism. To be sure, a specific study, such as David Rees's one on Korea, can be undertaken with predictable success by employing behavioral models.[32] But the vast canvas needed by a strategy of interdependence affecting many sectors of life in the two most important nations of the world would require a palette of several methods and a synthetic adoption of several tools of understanding. The behavioral approach alone would be grossly insufficient to provide clues to an understanding of the nexus of interdependence.

Rock has chosen to rely almost exclusively on this hazardous behavioral method in his attempt to chart new ways of cooperation and competition between America and Russia. Although one must admit that he is an intrepid explorer, one must also regretfully conclude that he is not always a reliable guide. Waltz's vehemence against behavioral ways of thinking about processes that are essentially holistic in character would be partly justified in the case of the book under review. The author has ventured into an area in which "facts" and opinions often contradict each other and lead to complications in the choice of policies. He uses a view of the plasticity of human nature that is essentially without scientific foundation and that borders on the naive. To a degree, therefore, Rock has exposed himself to attack by ungenerous critics. But so far as his choice of strategy itself is concerned there can be no quarrel. Interdependence is one way of looking at the future condition of mankind, a way that is becoming more desirable, rational, and feasible with the efflux of time.

To a non-American reader unused to the self-image syndrome of the normal American, Rock can be irritating at times. The whole book is written on the basis of an *a priori* assumption that America is the most mature country, the most powerful country, and a country with infinite capacity for good. No effort has been made to explain what the author means when he makes these statements, much less to differentiate

[30] *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York 1959).

[31] For a detailed discussion defending the behavioral persuasion against Waltz's attacks, see J. David Singer, "International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis," *World Politics*, XII (April 1960), 453-61.

[32] *Korea: The Limited War* (New York 1964).

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between positive and negative attributes of the very considerable power America possesses. The possibilities of the Soviet contribution to peace or Soviet parity or superiority in a few fields are only grudgingly admitted—hardly conducive to thoughts of peaceful interdependence on the basis of equality! Yet it must be emphasized that Rock is objective whenever he writes about each country singly—nothing gratuitous is allowed to creep into a discussion of the Soviet Union; much effort is devoted to balancing the weaknesses of America against her strengths. It is when Rock discusses the two countries in conjunction that his objectivity sometimes fails him, and his sparks of brilliance are often dissipated in a torrent of clichés. This reviewer is only too aware of the difficulty of keeping one's objectivity totally unimpaired when writing on a subject such as this. But persuasive authors cannot accept a limit to the effort that they devote to exorcising the twin demon of complacency and self-delusion.

To a marked degree, Rock is conditioned by the official ethos of American policy-makers. This can be partly explained by the auspices under which much of this work was undertaken. His commitment to interdependence has not weakened his belief in the official government views of the military and political aspects of policy toward the Soviet Union. This has resulted in a wide disparity between the rather grandiose picture of the ultimate contours of interdependence and the meager beginnings that he is able to recommend after taking into account the present limits on psychological readiness on the part of the nation and on the resources that it might be expected to devote to his strategy. This disparity would not be serious if the author had brought a better sense of proportion to bear on the different weights he has attached to the ideal and the possible.

Two more points need to be made. The omission of China in any policy of interdependence or arms control is fraught with consequences. American policy toward China is still following a refrain with which students of Soviet-American relations during the twenties and the thirties and during the first fifteen years of the cold war are only too familiar. By omitting China from the task he set himself, the author is tacitly placing his seal of approval on a policy, the general consequences of which could be disastrous to world peace and interdependence. The reviewer could adduce several reasons why Rock ought not to have limited his inquiry solely to the Soviet-American sphere and why he should at least have included a fair amount of discussion of the Chinese factor. Chief among these are the recent developments in Chinese policy toward immediately neighboring countries, the widen-

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ing split between Russia and China, the attempt of China to isolate America as the hegemonic force of imperialism with which revolutionary forces should contend, Chinese commitment to achieving a great-power status for itself in economic and military terms, and China's self-appointed role as the revolutionary beacon guiding the political path of the third world. Even the inclusion of China as a peripheral complicating factor in a discussion otherwise exclusively devoted to Soviet-American policies would have enhanced the value of the book.

A rather long quotation from the book will serve as the basis for a few comments on Rock's prescription for the developing areas:

> The proper role for the United States, at this point, is to seek to hasten the process of the evolution of the Soviet role in relation to developing nations. Once again, the United States should seek to push the pattern and instrumentalities of Soviet action in the direction compatible with the American style before the Soviet Union reaches the American level of economic output. A few may continue to dream of excluding the Soviet Union from the free world, but this is not possible at a price the free world can pay and remain free. Thus, the United States must seek to induce the Soviet to act both toward its own bloc and toward the rest of the world in ways that are compatible with the free-world pattern of behavior. . . . The United States must strive to create the conditions in which the Soviet Union can be *permitted* to compete and will be *impelled* to cooperate (pp. 281-82, italics added).

Only an assumption of American near-omnipotence and a belief that the third world is a prize for the best runner could have given rise to the reasoning contained in this quotation. We have recently witnessed Senator Fulbright's animadversions of the "arrogance of power." If the thesis of "arrogance of power" constitutes a reflection on American willingness to use force to maintain the international status quo, the thesis contained in the statement quoted above may be legitimately seen as a specifically American manipulation of the world in times of peace. Although the reviewer can appreciate the fact that Rock, like many of his well-meaning compatriots, sees nothing unusual in his understanding of the crux of his strategy, it would be difficult for him to convince equally well-meaning non-Americans that his strategy accords greater priority to world interests or the interests of the total international system than to particularistic American interests. After all, the vindication of a strategy fundamentally different from strategies already known to us should lie in the new vistas it is capable of unfold-

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ing, showing us the new world that is to replace the old. Rock at first raises our hopes, but he subsequently maroons us on the shoals of superpower jargon of which he, like so many intelligent and genuinely reform-minded men in both Russia and America, has become an indoctrinated victim.

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